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ABSTRACT  
 
 This dissertation argues that the American colonists came to resist the Stamp Act of 1765 through equating it with slavery, a state still understood as resulting 
from surrender in war. This metaphor both dominated print discourse and served 
to justify violence against supporters of the Act. Slavery rhetoric implied that 
resistance through violent struggle was essential for the colonists both to win 
their freedom and to demonstrate to the wider world that they deserved such 
freedom. Understanding resistance in these terms reveals the close connections 
between the rhetoric deployed against the Stamp Act and the actions taken 
against stamp officers and other supporters of the Act. A close examination of 
the chronology of rhetoric and resistance shows that it was the colonists’ 
commitment to violent struggle—the actions of urban crowds and of a vigilant 
network of Sons of Liberty—that prevented enactment of the Stamp Act. And it 
was knowledge of that resistance that caused Parliament to vote against sending 
troops to enforce the Stamp Act, well before merchants and manufacturers 
testified to their economic straits.  
 
The four chapters proceed chronologically through the period May 1765 – May 
1766. The first chapter examines the colonists’ decision to resist the Stamp Act 
and ends in July 1765. Chapter 2 is a study of the crowd actions against crown 
officers in August through October. The third chapter contrasts the ineffectual 
Stamp Act Congress with the actions of the Sons of Liberty in the winter of 1766, 
while the final chapter focuses on the repeal celebrations of May 1766. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation represents the first book-length study of the Stamp Act in the 
American colonies since Edmund and Helen Morgan’s The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to 
Revolution from 1953. As such, it incorporates nearly sixty years of historiographical and 
methodological evolution to reinterpret the resistance to the Stamp Act as a specifically 
colonial moment, rather than simply one step on an inevitable and logical path to the 
American Revolution. The four chapters proceed chronologically through the period May 
1765 – May 1766. The first chapter examines the colonists’ decision to resist the Stamp Act 
and ends in July 1765. Chapter 2 is a study of the crowd actions against crown officers in 
August through October. The third chapter covers the long winter of nullification, while the 
final chapter focuses on the repeal celebrations of May 1766. Throughout, this dissertation 
looks specifically at the colonists’ point of view and uses sources penned in the heat of the 
moment to reconstruct their states of mind as they reacted to events. It focuses on slavery as 
the dominant metaphor colonists used for the Stamp Act and shows how the metaphor both 
dominated print discourse and served to justify violence against supporters of the Act. 
Parliament passed the Stamp Act in early 1765. Intended to raise revenues to offset 
the costs of the Seven Years’ War, the Act taxed nearly all printed papers used in the 
colonies: newspapers, customs forms, and legal writs were among those. The colonists 
received word of the Stamp Act in May 1765. It was set to be enacted on 1 November. 
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Paper, pre-stamped, would be shipped to the major port or capital of each colony, where a 
single designated stamp officer would take charge of the paper and, perhaps through sub-
distributors, sell it to the colonists.  
The colonists were initially disposed to submit to the Stamp Act, as they had the 
Sugar Act. Some planned a congress of representatives from each colony to petition King and 
Parliament for relief. However, over the summer of 1765 a spirit of resistance grew. 
Resistance hardened into a movement that through threats and violence nullified the Stamp 
Act by forcing the stamp officers to resign. By 1 November none in the colonies between 
New Hampshire and Georgia were willing to enforce the Act. During the long winter groups 
of Sons of Liberty in many towns took on the tasks of keeping the colonies free from 
stamped papers in their particular regions and of forming communities of mutual aid with 
the Sons in other towns. At the same time, Parliament, alarmed by the riots in the colonies 
and pressured by merchants and manufacturers who feared loss of trade, steadily moved 
towards a repeal of the Stamp Act. The King signed the repeal in March 1766; the colonists 
celebrated with great “rejoicings” in May of that year intended to demonstrate their renewed 
loyalty to the mother country. 
 
The broadest historiographical trend with which this dissertation converses is that of 
the history of the coming of the American Revolution. Of those works, the muse for and 
nemesis of this project has been Edmund and Helen Morgan’s classic The Stamp Act Crisis: 
Prologue to Revolution. The Morgans argued for the importance of principled, constitutional 
opposition to the Stamp Act, culminating in the rational declarations of a congress made up 
of a representative cross-section of colonists. For the Morgans, the riots against stamp 
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officers were at best a sideshow. This dissertation bows to the Morgans’ breadth of sources 
and subtle narrative; it nevertheless takes issue with them on several substantive points.1  
The other two agreed classic works that have been of great influence are from 
opposing viewpoints: Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of the American Revolution and Gary 
Nash’s Urban Crucible. Bailyn, rightly, identified a current of fear and uncertainty running 
through the writings of the time. What he saw in his very limited set of sources—he only 
consulted political pamphlets of the era—is magnified in the news reports and essays of the 
other major print source of the time, weekly papers. Bailyn’s, though, is about a revolution 
of the mind. Nash brings that revolution crashing to earth, identifying how the lower classes 
of the urban seaports had similar sensibilities but had very different particular grievances. In 
this dissertation I try to show how this current of fear both shapes and is shaped by the 
specific events of 1765 and 1766.2  
Within the larger historiography of the onset of the Revolution, some specific trends 
can be seen. Most important to this dissertation is the eroding interest in the Stamp Act. 
Modern historians have dismissed the Stamp Act as less important than the Townsend Acts 
and the Coercive Acts in provoking the Revolution. This trend is most apparent in the 
works that focus on colonial consumption and the importance of material goods—especially 
British goods—to their sense of self. But non-importation measures played only a minor role 
                                                 
1 Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Va., 1995).  
2 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1967); Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of 
the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).  
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in colonial resistance to the Stamp Act. Thus, the Stamp Act has little place in such 
histories.3  
The North, particularly Massachusetts, has generally been considered the birthplace 
of the Revolution. This is in part due to the regional biases of historians of the Revolution—
the bulk of elite colleges have always been in the North. But it is also due to the fact that 
dramatic and well-publicized events happened there. From the Boston Massacre of 1770, to 
the Tea Party of 1773, and the landing of troops at Boston to maintain order afterwards, to 
Lexington and Concord, the events of the early 1770s seem to indicate Massachusetts as the 
flash point. As merchants and their non-importation agreements were essential to Northern 
resistance, a consumer-oriented history of the Revolution tends to lean to New England and 
the middle colonies. This dissertation, in particular, argues for the importance of considering 
the actions of Virginia’s burgesses to understanding how resistance to the Stamp Act 
developed.4  
                                                 
3 The ur-text of this interpretation is T. H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped 
American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Breen published a series of articles exploring the 
subject beginning in 1986; these writings have been tremendously influential in the recent historiography of the 
Revolution. In a similar vein see Benjamin L. Carp, Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party & the Making of 
America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and 
the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Joseph S. 
Tiedemann, “Interconnected Communities: The Middle Colonies on the Eve of the American Revolution,” 
Pennsylvania History 76 (2009): 1-41. 
 An alternate view of colonial America as a society of consumers, less tied to the American Revolution, is Cary 
Carson, “The Consumer Revolution in Colonial America: Why Demand?,” in Of Consuming Interests: The Style of 
Life in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Cary Carson, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia for the United States Capitol Historical Society, 1994).  
4 Holton, Forced Founders; Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1982); Rhys Isaac, 
Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom: Revolution and Rebellion on a Virginia Plantation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, 
Va., 2007).  
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Some historians of the Revolution have focused on the interaction between colonists 
and representatives of the British government. Abstracted, these can be histories of imperial 
oversight, often looking at the mistakes made by ministers in London. Others examine 
interactions on the ground between colonial Americans and customs officers, royal 
governors, and military and naval forces. The latter, especially, have greatly influenced this 
dissertation. Resistance to the Stamp Act cannot be understood without looking at the way 
in which that Act was to be implemented, and at the roles of the prospective stamp officers.5  
Situated within the larger history of the relationship between colonies and mother 
country is the history of taxation, and in particular, just what taxes the colonists objected to. 
Here the dominant voices for generations have been those of Edmund and Helen Morgan, 
who argued that during the Stamp Act crisis Americans held a reasoned position that 
accepted Parliament’s right to legislate for the colonies but did not differentiate between 
internal taxes and external taxes or trade duties. That interpretation has been challenged—I 
believe convincingly—but has never been entirely overthrown. This dissertation will 
                                                 
5 The classic work that looks at both events on the ground in America and the politics of the British court is 
Laurence Henry Gipson’s fifteen-volume The British Empire Before the American Revolution, the first volumes of 
which were released in the 1930s and the last not until the 1960s. The volume directly relevant to this dissertation 
is Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 1763-1766, vol. 10, The 
British Empire Before the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961). On colonists’ running battles 
with British naval forces see Neil R. Stout, The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775: A Study of Enforcement of British 
Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973). For conflicts with 
customs officers, see Nash, The Urban Crucible. More recently, Fred Anderson, in A People’s Army: Massachusetts 
Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1984), shows the culture shock that resulted from the colonists’ 
interactions with the British Army during the Seven Years’ War. Anderson's Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War 
and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000) ably extends this 
theme to cover the Sugar and Stamp Acts. That I am influenced so heavily by imperial history and the history of the 
port cities is due largely to my specific topic; I suspect for an understanding of the larger Revolution that adding the 
historiography of internal conflict in the 1760s and 1770s, as well as conflict on the frontiers, would be equally 
important.  
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illustrate that, indeed, the colonists did make a distinction between internal and external 
taxes, and that both their words and, importantly, their actions illustrate that distinction.6  
Over the past decade, historians of the Revolution have returned to the question of 
how the colonists were mobilized for armed resistance. Most of these histories focus on the 
period leading up to the war itself. This dissertation, in contrast, looks at how Americans 
progressed from an initial passive acceptance of the Stamp Act to violent attacks on crown 
officers with the goal of nullifying the Act.7  
My argument is that it was a rhetoric of slavery, and of the necessity of struggle 
against slavery to prove oneself worthy of freedom, that oiled the machine of colonists’ 
mobilization against the Stamp Act. Thus, this dissertation draws on the historiography of 
the intellectual and cultural history of slavery during the colonial era with a view towards 
understanding the metaphor of slavery as it was deployed during the crisis over the Stamp 
Act. The historiographical trend has been to emphasize the nascent definition of slavery as a 
condition of African-Americans. However, during 1765 the classical understanding of slavery 
as a result of defeat in battle was still strong, and I draw in particular from works that 
reference that view.8  
                                                 
6 Morgan and Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis. For the opposing view, see Gipson, Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West; 
Thomas P. Slaughter, “The Tax Man Cometh: Ideological Opposition to Internal Taxes, 1760-1790,” William and 
Mary Quarterly 3rd series, 41, no. 4 (1984): 566-91.  
7 T. H. Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2010); Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007); Carp, Defiance of the Patriots; McDonnell, The Politics of War.  
8 Preeminent among works that see colonial understandings of slavery as still influenced by classical definitions 
are François Furstenberg, “Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, Virtue, and Resistance in Early American 
Political Discourse,” Journal of American History 89 (2003): 1295-330; François Furstenberg, In the Name of the 
Father: Washington’s Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Two classic 
works have been of great help on classical thought as well: David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western 
Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966) and Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American 
 7 
Much of the major work done on the Revolutionary era in recent years has been in 
the field of cultural history. Important books have examined particular aspects of life during 
the period: forms of communication, whether print, oratory, or even demonstrations; 
metaphors like slavery or parent-child relationships; or, more recent, emotions, particularly 
sympathy and sentimentality. These provide valuable insights into particular aspects of life, 
yet none alone can successfully hold together a narrative of events. Moreover, these works 
tend to cover a long stretch of time, typically 1760 to 1820; the result is that the colonial 
period and even the Revolutionary War is quickly passed over in favor of the richer sources 
of the early republic. This dissertation tries to use the insights of these cultural histories 
while forcing them to serve a larger narrative that blends rhetoric and action.9  
 
                                                 
Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1968). Also see David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years 
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2011). The two modern books beyond Furstenberg’s that deal with the slavery 
metaphor are Patricia Bradley, Slavery, Propaganda, and the American Revolution (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1998) and Peter A. Dorsey, Common Bondage: Slavery as Metaphor in Revolutionary America (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2009). Special mention should be made of F. Nwabueze Okoye, “Chattel Slavery as 
the Nightmare of the American Revolutionaries,” William and Mary Quarterly 3rd series, 37, no. 1 (1980): 4-28. 
Okoye considered the colonists as being literal when describing their fear of being made slaves by the British. 
Though I do not believe the colonists believed the redcoats intended to place shackles on them and force them to 
labor, Okoye still describes the psychological state that the slavery metaphor engendered better than any other 
commentator.  
9 On print, oratory, and demonstrations see Sandra M. Gustafson, Eloquence is Power: Oratory & Performance in 
Early America (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2000), David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of 
Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1997) and Michael Warner, The Letters 
of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990). On the parent-child metaphor see Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American 
Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). On 
emotions, see Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 2008) and Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 
2009).  
 8 
The primary methodological goal of this dissertation is, indeed, to craft a larger 
narrative of the Stamp Act that accounts for rhetoric, action, and the interplay between the 
two. It thus places added weight on documents written in the immediate aftermath of 
events. This is a significant shift from most histories, which, in particular, rely heavily on 
early nineteenth-century sources when examining Patrick Henry’s performance before the 
House of Burgesses in support of the Virginia Resolves. These Resolves and the passion they 
engendered across the colonies are the central subject of chapter 1. 
Using documents written in the heat of passion is also important to reconstructing 
the states of mind of both colonists and Crown officers during the riots and crowd actions 
aimed at nullification described in chapters 2 and 3. The main sources here are newspaper 
essays and accounts of events, giving the anti-Stamp Act point of view, and letters from 
Crown officers describing the situation for their superiors in London for the other side. 
In contrast, this dissertation places little emphasis on pamphlets, or any document 
written from a longer view and with a more abstract perspective. Historians, I believe, have 
been insufficiently suspicious that such works penned with the benefit of leisure and 
retrospection are going to be rationalizations of positions already held. I would prefer to 
look at the rhetoric surrounding such positions without the weight of self-justification 
masking real passions. The writings of Daniel Dulany and John Dickinson, the preeminent 
pamphleteers attacking the Stamp Act, are the main casualties to this method. The resolves 
of the Stamp Act Congress also fall into this category. Chapter 3 contrasts them to the 
resolves of local Sons of Liberty, the Virginia Resolves, and the rhetoric in the newspapers at 
the time. However, in chapter 4, on the repeal celebrations, I do focus more on well-
 9 
planned rhetoric, for here I am interested in the rationalizations as a way of understanding 
how the colonists stood down from their militant position against the Stamp Act.10   
The dissertation takes as its subject “the colonists,” an admittedly amorphous and 
under-defined grouping. By it I intend to indicate the white, male European-descended 
settlers in the region between New Hampshire and Georgia. Most of the resistance to the 
Stamp Act that we know about took place in coastal towns and cities. However, there are 
hints of significant resistance in more rural regions. During the Stamp Act period there are 
almost no reports on women participating in resistance in any way, in contrast to their 
importance to the non-importation movements over the coming decade. Nor do we have 
much information on what black slaves or Indians did in direct relation to the Stamp Act. 
And unlike, say, colonial Virginia from 1767–1775 as described by Woody Holton, there is 
little indication of how, or if, those members of society lacking privilege even pushed elite 
colonists into resistance.11   
 
                                                 
10 The preceding discussion draws on recent work in the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The 
best introduction to these themes for the general reader is Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). Also see Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of 
Mind (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006) and Eric R. Kandel, The Age of Insight: The Quest to Understand the 
Unconscious in Art, Mind, and Brain, From Vienna 1900 to the Present (New York: Random House, 2012). 
Historical works that have begun to explore the implications of modern cognitive research for the humanities 
include Lynn Hunt, “The Experience of Revolution,” French Historical Studies French Historical Studies 32, no. 4 
(2009): 671-78, Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 
and Nicole Eustace, et al., “AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions,” The American Historical 
Review 117, no. 5 (2012): 1487-531. On the American Revolution in particular, see T. H. Breen, “America’s 
Insurgency: Reflections on Popular Mobilization During the American Revolution,” in Atlantic Understandings: 
Essays on European and American History in Honor of Hermann Wellenreuther, ed. Claudia Schnurmann, and 
Hartmut Lehmann (Hamburg; New Brunswick: Lit : Transaction Publishers, 2006). An under-appreciated 
historiographical forebear is Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1941).  
11 Holton, Forced Founders.  
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In sum, this dissertation argues that the American colonists came to resist the Stamp 
Act through equating it with slavery, a state still understood as resulting from surrender in 
war. This equation implied that resistance through struggle, violent if necessary, was 
essential to both winning their freedom and demonstrating that they deserved such freedom. 
Understanding resistance to the Stamp Act in these terms allows us to see the connections 
between the rhetoric deployed against the Stamp Act and the actions taken against stamp 
officers and other supporters of the Act. Indeed, what is revealed is a practice in which one 
leads to the other in a cycle of hardening resistance and widening geographical scope. This 
understanding of resistance to the Stamp Act raises questions about the modern 
historiography of the build to the Revolution as rooted in a transatlantic consumer culture, 
in which the most meaningful forms of resistance were based on restricting consumption of 
British goods and increasing manufacture of American products. Instead, future studies of 
the Townshend Acts and beyond should ask which British actions produced a rhetoric of 
slavery and struggle among the colonists, and resulted in violent action meant to directly 
prevent such acts from being implemented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Virginia Resolves and the Origins of Violent Resistance 
 
When the American colonists received the news it could not have been a surprise. 
The rumors were true—George III had signed the Stamp Act into law. The colonists had 
followed the progress of the Stamp Act from its genesis. They had petitioned against it, only 
to have those petitions rejected. They had devoured reports of the debates in Parliament 
when the bill was proposed. And, with increasing despair, they had seen the accounts of 
those debates: first the Parliament passed a set of fifty-five resolves, then a bill that bundled 
them together into a Stamp Act, and all with little protest from any member. The colonists 
responded to the news with a sigh: they would have to bear this burden, for their monarch 
had made it their duty. 
Yet three months later, in mid-August 1765, the colonists would have decisively 
rejected this reasoning. Across America, stamp officers came under threat, their houses 
attacked and their bodies threatened, until they had all resigned. The colonists had chosen 
to defy the Stamp Act, to nullify it. 
This chapter asks: how and why did the colonists come to resist, violently, the 
Stamp Act? I argue that the answer lies in a detailed understanding of the events as they 
happened, inextricably embedded within a particular, and to us, foreign, time and place. The 
particular characteristics of the colonies in 1765 included a deep struggle with patriarchal 
authority and in particular what the colonists saw as a new challenge to their self-conception 
 12 
as Britons with British rights. In this period the common narratives of authority—metaphors 
of slavery and of parent-child relationships—became the way in which the colonists 
understood the Stamp Act. At first the colonists understood the proper lines of authority to 
indicate that they must submit to the Stamp Act. But these narratives could also be written 
to suggest a course of resistance. This latter course was buttressed by a defiant initiative 
attempted on the floor of the Virginia House of Burgesses.  
The “Virginia Resolves” emerged in late May of 1766, at the end of a month-long 
session of the Virginia House of Burgesses, Patrick Henry—then a newly-elected legislator 
from Hanover County—proposed a set of seven resolves that denied Britain's right to pass a 
Stamp Act and that called on Virginians to nullify it. Over two days the Burgesses debated 
and voted on each of the resolves. They passed the four deemed moderate and reasonable 
but not those they considered dangerously inflammatory. Yet when newspapers printed the 
resolves, they printed them all without specifying some had been rejected. The end result 
was to make it seem as if the Burgesses had approved all seven.1 
                                                 
1 The interrelated questions of how and why the colonists came to resist the Stamp Act have never been 
satisfactorily answered. The most famous study of Revolutionary mobilization, Pauline Maier’s From Resistance to 
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776 (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1972), 51-54, shows the first Stamp Act riots arising ex nihilo. Her narrative begins with the decision to 
intimidate Andrew Oliver, the stamp officer in Boston, into leaving his position. The Boston crowd action then 
became the “cause,” the example and inspiration, for resistance elsewhere.  
Maier’s narrative implicitly follows that of Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, who in 1955’s Stamp Act Crisis. 
entitled a chapter on the riots “Action: Boston Sets the Pace.” For Morgan and Morgan, the riots were an 
unfortunate, if necessary, expression of ideas. It was these ideas that caused the Stamp Act crisis, and their book was 
written and reprinted, “in part, to reaffirm the significance of ideas in society, particularly political and 
constitutional ideas.” (viii) The colonists, in this interpretation, drew on their long-standing belief that taxes, 
internal or external, could only be levied by a properly representative body. Thus, the logical course was to protest 
the Stamp Act to Parliament. Violent resistance was an inconvenient distraction from the constitutional issues at 
hand. 
Gary Nash’s explanation in The Urban Crucible. turns Morgan and Morgan’s argument on its head. Nash focuses on 
economic reasons and local conditions. “Only the economic buffeting suffered by the seaport towns after 1760 and 
the build-up of antagonisms on local issues can fully explain the extraordinary response to the Stamp Act.” (292) 
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Thus, if the Virginia Resolves are key to understanding resistance to the Stamp Act, 
a study of that Act must begin with an examination of those resolves: their origins, their 
nature, and their dissemination across the colonies. 
 
The wild popularity of the Virginia Resolves indicated they reflected the mood of 
colonists throughout Britain’s possessions. But the resolves also reused the ideas that some 
of Virginia’s most influential gentry had developed during the previous few years. Two events 
had forced them to explicitly state a theory of the proper relation between the colonies and 
the mother country. The first was their struggle with the Anglican clergy and with the King 
and Parliament in Britain over the Two-Penny Act. The second was their reaction to George 
Grenville’s original announcement that he was considering a Stamp Act for the colonies.2 
The Parsons’ Cause drama—the culmination of years of contention—was Patrick 
Henry’s first step onto the Virginia stage. His performance at Hanover Courthouse in late 
1763 would be a model for his words and actions two years later at the Capitol in 
                                                 
The problem here is that the Stamp Act becomes incidental to the economic displacements of the period. Nash 
counts the riots as the whole of the resistance, without any consideration of the complex processes of which the riot 
were only one part. 
The best explanation so far has been J. A. Leo Lemay’s 1983 article “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 
1764-1765,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 91, no. 1 (1983): 3-38. Lemay rightly points out that the 
immediate reaction of the colonists was to submit, if unwillingly, to the Stamp Act. It was the spread of the 
Virginia Resolves in June and July of 1765 that inspired resistance.  Though Lemay’s argument is correct as far as it 
goes, like Morgan he tends to concentrate political arguments and does not connect the colonists’ resistance to the 
rhetoric of previous months. 
In my attempts to understand the interrelation of event and culture, I am informed by the theoretical work of 
Marshall Sahlins, particularly “The Return of the Event, Again: With Reflections on the Beginnings of the Great 
Fijian War of 1843 to 1855 Between the Kingdoms of Bau and Rewa,” in Clio in Oceania: Toward a Historical 
Anthropology (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). But the practical and humanistic variations 
on the model in Greg Dening, Mr. Bligh’s Bad Language: Passion, Power, and Theatre on the Bounty (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Inga Clendinnen, Dancing With Strangers: Europeans and Australians At 
First Contact (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) have been the greater influence. 
2 The following discussion is drawn from Lemay, “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 1764-1765,” 4-
11. 
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Williamsburg. Local clergyman James Maury had sued in Hanover County court for the 
recovery of back wages due him now that the Two-Penny Act had been annulled. A panel of 
judges agreed that the merits of his case were not in dispute, for Parliament had the power 
to annul the act. Therefore it was left to a jury to determine the precise amount owed 
Maury. The jury awarded him a single penny.3 
What frustrated Maury more, if anything, than the result of the case was the way in 
which the opposition had achieved it. The jury had been stacked, Maury believed, with the 
“vulgar kind” of the county—Presbyterians and their sympathizers—rather than with good 
Anglicans and members of the gentry. The judge was a wealthy local planter named Patrick 
Henry. And the courtroom hung on every word of an hour-long oration by a then-unknown 
young lawyer. This lawyer was the son of the judge —Patrick Henry, junior. 
The surviving description of Henry’s performance that day comes to us from Maury 
himself. But his letter was an effort to warn a friend, John Camm, of the arguments being 
used against the Parsons’ Cause. Thus, Maury had little incentive to shade the truth. 
Despite his obvious bias, we can believe that the events he described did happen.4 
Henry argued that the Two-Penny Act was a good law. It was constitutional, 
fulfilling a need beneficial to the community. Therefore, it “could not consistently with what 
he called the original Compact between King & People, stipulating Protection on one Hand 
& Obedience on the other, be annulled.” What, then, to think of a king who did annul a 
                                                 
3 Rhys Isaac, “Religion and Authority: Problems of the Anglican Establishment in Virginia in the Era of the 
Great Awakening and the Parsons’ Cause,” William and Mary Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1973), 19-21; James Maury to 
John Camm, 12 December 1763, James Maury Letterbook, Sol Feinstone collection, microfilm, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC. 
4 This and the following paragraphs are taken from Maury to Camm, 12 December 1763. 
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good law? Henry’s conclusion was that such a monarch was a tyrant who forfeited his right 
to obedience. 
A ripple of horror went though Maury at this point. Was Henry speaking treason? 
Maury described the scene: 
the more sober & virtuous Part of the Audience were struck with Horror. Mr Lyons 
called out, alone & with an honest Warmth, to the Bench, “That the Gentleman 
had spoken Treason;” & expressed his Astonishment, “That their Worships could 
hear it without Emotion, or any Mark of Dissatisfaction.” At the same Instant too, 
amongst some Gentlemen in the Crowd behind me, was a confused Murmur of 
“Treason, Treason, Treason!” But Mr Henry went on in the same treasonable & 
licentious Strain without Interruption from the Bench, nay even without receiving 
the least exterior Token of their disapprobation. One of the Jury too was so highly 
pleased with these Doctrines, that, as I was afterwards told, he every now & then 
gave the traitorous declaimer a Nod of Approbation. 
Henry here had the bench and jury fully on his side. They made no motion to keep 
him from continuing his oration. To Maury, this was a sign that the whole proceeding was a 
charade. 
The only use of an established church, Henry continued, was to enforce obedience 
to civil sanction. If the established church and clergy ceased to answer these ends, then the 
community had the right—perhaps even the obligation—to strip them of their 
appointments. And indeed, “the Clergy of Virginia, in this particular Instance of thus 
refusing to acquiesce in the Law in Question, had been so far from answering, that they had 
most notoriously counteracted those great Ends of their Institution; that therefore instead of 
useful Members of the State, they ought to be considered as Enemies of the Community.” 
Thus, Henry concluded, the jury should deny Maury any but the most trivial 
compensation. The alternative, he argued, was slavery: 
And then he perorated to the following Purpose, “that, except they (the Jury) were 
disposed themselves to rivet the Chains of Bondage on their own Necks, he hoped, 
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they would not let slip the Opportunity, which now offered, of making such an 
Example of him [Maury], as might hereafter be a warning to himself & his Brethren, 
not to have the Temerity for the future, to dispute the Validity of such Laws, 
authenticated by the only Authority, which, in his Conception, could give Force to 
Laws for the Government of this Colony, the Authority of a legal Representative, of 
a Council, & of a kind, benevolent, & patriot Governor.” 
Henry here deployed an argument and metaphor similar to those which he would 
use against the Stamp Act. The “only authority” which could legislate for Virginia was the 
royal governor, his council, and the legally elected Burgesses. Though during the Stamp Act 
crisis the question of who could properly legislate would be, for practicality’s sake, shrunk to 
the question of who could properly levy internal taxes, the method of argument was the 
same. During the Stamp Act, the metaphor and the imagery of slavery would become the 
rhetorical center, the dramatic conclusion, of anti-Stamp Act discourse. 
There was no doubt in Maury’s mind that Henry had been performing a part here, 
that his rhetoric was meant merely to enrage his listeners against the Parsons’ Cause. Henry 
had himself acknowledged this: “After the Court was adjourned, he apologized to me for 
what he had said; alleging, that his sole View in engaging in the Cause & in saying what he 
had, was, to render himself popular. You see then, it is so clear a Point in this Person’s 
Opinion, that the ready Road to Popularity here is, to trample under Foot the Interests of 
Religion, the Rights of the Church, & the Prerogative of the Crown that even this little 
pettyfogging Attorney could not miss seeing it.” Whether Henry was as soulless as Maury 
believed, there was no doubt that the aftermath fulfilled Maury’s estimate of the “ready 
Road to Popularity.” In early 1765 Henry would be elected to the House of Burgesses, 
where one of his first acts would be to introduce his resolves against the Stamp Act. 
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At the same time that the final act of the Parsons’ Cause drama was underway, a 
quieter but scarcely less influential event was taking place. In late 1763, the lawyer Richard 
Bland circulated a political manuscript among a group of friends. In this piece—intended as 
a final answer to the question of whether Parliament could constitutionally annul a law 
passed by the Virginia Burgesses and Council.  He reviewed “the rights of Englishmen and of 
colonists” and surveyed “the legal confirmation of those rights by charters and by 
Parliament.” Through this two-fold chain of reasoning, he showed that Parliament had the 
power, but not the right, to force laws respecting the internal polity of the colonies upon 
them.5 
Many of the friends to whom Bland circulated his manuscript were on the 
Committee of Correspondence assigned to draft addresses to the King and Parliament over 
the proposed Stamp Act.  The danger seemed particularly acute because Grenville had stated 
that he “hoped that the power and sovereignty of Parliament, over every part of the British 
dominions, for the purpose of raising or collecting any tax, would never be disputed.” Robert 
Carter Nicholas and George Wythe drafted a letter for the Committee of Correspondence to 
Virginia’s agent in London, Edward Montague. The letter instructed Montague “to oppose 
[a Stamp Act] with all his Influence, & as far as he may venture insist on the Injustice of 
laying any Duties on us & particularly taxing the internal Trade of the Colony without their 
Consent.”6 
When Nicholas and Wythe presented their protest to the whole committee on 28 
July 1764, they drew a distinction between internal and external taxes. Internal taxes were 
                                                 
5 Lemay, “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 1764-1765,” 9-11. 
6 Lemay, “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 1764-1765,” 10-11. 
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not constitutional, but trade duties were. But there was less of a distinction between internal 
taxes and internal legislation. They argued that laws respecting the “internal Polity” of the 
colonies, passed without the consent of the Virginia Assembly, could not bind them. Their 
“just Liberties & Privileges as free born British Subjects” meant that they could not be made 
subservient to laws taxing “such Part of our Trade & concerns as are merely internal.” 
Granted, “Parliament had the power to do it, Parliament did not have the right, for the 
internal tax was ‘contrary to Reason & Justice’ and tended ‘to the Destruction of the 
Constitution.’”7 
It is not clear whether Bland or the Committee of Correspondence first developed 
these arguments.  What is certain is that there was a circulation of ideas and a “reciprocal 
influence” between those who wrote against the Parsons’ Cause and those on the 
Committee of Correspondence—in fact, many of the same people worked on both.8 
The sentiments of these gentry magnates were made public in late 1764. In October, 
Bland published his manuscript as a pamphlet, now entitled The Colonel Dismounted. And in 
December, the Burgesses drafted an address to the King, a memorial to the House of Lords, 
and a remonstrance to the House of Commons.  There was, as J. A. Leo Lemay argued, a 
clear line of descent from the debates over the Parsons’ Cause and the thinking of the 
Committee of Correspondence, through the addresses to King and Parliament, to “the 
sentiments and even, in some details, the diction of Patrick Henry’s Stamp Act Resolves.” 
 
                                                 
7 Lemay, “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 1764-1765,” 10-11. 
8 Lemay, “John Mercer and the Stamp Act in Virginia, 1764-1765,” 11. 
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So Patrick Henry’s resolves had intellectual and rhetorical roots in two recent 
Virginia controversies. The resolves would thus resonate with Virginians. But the specific 
metaphors he would use would, too, echo with colonists far beyond Virginia’s borders, for 
they were themselves speaking in the same ways. 
Colonial writers deployed two great metaphors during 1765 and 1766. First, they 
compared the relationship between Britain and her colonies to that between a parent and 
their child. Second, they compared the Stamp Act itself to slavery. 
Over the last few decades, historians have spilled much ink on the parent-child 
metaphor. The metaphor, they have found, was ubiquitous. It found its way into pamphlets, 
newspapers, conversation, even the visual culture of prints and paintings. Parent-child 
imagery could be deployed by writers on both sides of the Stamp Act and on both sides of 
the water. Was Britain a good, loving parent or a evil, tyrannical one? Were the colonies 
obedient children, impudent adolescents, or young adults on the cusp of maturity and ready 
to take responsibility for themselves? Tolstoy began Anna Karenina with the famous line, 
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” In the same 
way, the contested relationship between Britain and colonies could be represented by 
endless permutations of the parent-child dynamic.9 
                                                 
9 The classic work on the parent-child metaphor is Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims. Fliegelman’s genius is to 
study the novels and letters that Americans read as well as their political writings. An older work that concentrates 
on the metaphor as used in political works is Edwin G. Burrows, and Michael Wallace, “The American Revolution: 
The Ideology and Psychology of National Liberation,” Perspectives in American History VI (1972): 165-306. Lynn 
Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)  is a beautifully-
written look at the parent-child metaphor in the French Revolution that uses artwork as well as writing to make its 
case. Finally, Isaac, Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom skillfully juxtaposes the metaphor and its use in the Revolution 
with the travails of one particularly unhappy family, seen through the eyes of its insecure patriarch. 
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The parent-child metaphor was flexible, but the slavery metaphor was not. A reading 
of the sources suggests that was its strength: it could not be twisted by the opposition and, 
once confronted, forced the reader to deal with the implications. In article after article, 
pamphlet after pamphlet, the writer built a narrative with skillful use of constitutional 
arguments and cunningly-deployed familial metaphors, only to crown their efforts with an 
appeal to resist “slavery.” Indeed, slavery became practically the only thing to which the 
colonists directly compared the Stamp Act. And to understand what “slavery” meant to the 
white colonists of British North America when they used it to describe the Stamp Act, it is 
necessary to first understand how the institution was conceived and justified by those same 
colonists. 
Over the last forty years historians have begun to realize the ubiquity of slavery in 
early America. The institution was legal, common and taken for granted across the colonies. 
African-Americans were a majority in some of the southern colonies. But even in the North, 
slavery was everywhere—almost ten percent of the population in some northern port cities 
were slaves of African descent, and more than that in Newport. No white person could go 
through life unaware of the presence of slavery among them.10  
In the patriarchal world of the American colonies, bonded servitude of all types was 
ubiquitous. Three categories existed: apprenticeship, indentured servitude, and slavery. 
Apprenticeship was the least onerous of the three. It was common in the colonies, as it was 
in England, and was widespread among social classes from lower-class workers to the 
political and mercantile elites of the colonies. Indentured servants were also common, but 
                                                 
10 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 179, 374. 
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lower in social standing. Sold to masters for a period of five or seven years, they were often 
treated with contempt. “In the colonies,” writes Gordon Wood, “servitude was a much 
harsher, more brutal, and more humiliating status than it was in England.… Colonial 
servants often belonged to their masters in ways that English servants did not.” This 
difference, Wood argues, meant that indentured servants in America were viewed as less like 
apprentices and more like members of the third category of bonded servitude, chattel 
slaves.11   
So, for Wood, there was nothing unique about slavery in a world of forced labor. “By 
modern standards,” he writes, “it was a cruel and brutal age, and the life of the lowly seemed 
cheap. Slavery could be regarded, therefore, as merely the most base and degraded status in a 
society of several degrees of unfreedom.” Yet other historians, most notably Ira Berlin, have 
argued that slavery was different in kind as well as in degree from the other forms of coercion 
in the eighteenth century. Berlin writes, “African slavery was no longer just one of many 
forms of subordination—a common enough circumstance in a world ruled by hierarchies—
but the foundation on which the social order rested.” Berlin here emphasizes slavery as 
inextricably entwined with Africanism. But the American colonies in the 1760s had not yet 
come to identify slavery exclusively with race. Earlier conceptions of slavery still had some 
sway, and understanding these is essential to understanding what colonists meant when they 
talked about the Stamp Act as a form of slavery.12  
                                                 
11 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1992), 50-55, quote 
p.53. 
12 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 99. 
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The late-eighteenth-century conception of slavery as inextricable from race had not 
replaced earlier conceptions of slavery. It had merely been laid atop those foundations. 
Especially in the 1760s, when the new racial attitudes were just taking shape, the institution 
of slavery still rested in part on understandings of slavery first developed in the Biblical and 
classical periods and then further refined in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Atlantic 
world.  This older ideology saw slavery as conceived in warfare and born in the aftermath of 
victory. In a just war—or so said the theorists—the victors had the right to kill the 
conquered. But because their lives were in the victors’ hands, the victors could also show 
mercy of a sort and merely enslave those who had lost. Early modern Europeans, therefore, 
argued that captivity in the wake of a war was the first slavery.13  
And indeed, colonists did not yet understand slavery as based only in the single 
dimension of race. Their rhetoric still on occasion referenced white slavery at the hands of 
Turks or Moors. In this they had significantly diverged from the mother country, where 
slavery had since the 1730s been disassociated from these forms of white captivity.14  Indeed, 
the very language of politics in Britain and America had begun to differ. Bernard Bailyn 
argued that by the 1760s the metropole and colonies had very different understandings of 
the concept of liberty. The colonists held to early eighteenth-century notions that had been 
espoused by Addison in Cato and Trenchard and Gordon in Cato’s Letters. These might have 
been foundational texts for the colonists but they were well out of fashion in Britain by the 
1760s.15  
                                                 
13 Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, 120-22; Jordan, White Over Black, 55. 
14 Linda Colley, Captives (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), 64-65. 
15 Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 52. 
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The colonists’ understanding of slavery, I argue, was inextricably tied to their 
understanding of liberty. But slavery may have been the more important concept.  In 
England, where large-scale slavery was nonexistent, slavery rhetoric had disappeared from the 
political discourse by the 1760s. But slavery was visible in every aspect of the lives of Anglo-
American colonists, and the metaphor of slavery filled their political writings. Liberty could 
be understood as immunity from slavery more easily than slavery could be seen as the 
absence of liberty. How the colonists conceptualized slavery, then, is essential to 
understanding how they conceptualized liberty, and thus a key to their political thought. 
The powerful hold that slavery had on them meant that it could be deployed as a political 
weapon. If one could, successfully and consistently, invoke slavery as a metaphor for the 
situation one opposed, it would have great effect on public opinion and public behavior. And 
that was what happened, both during the Stamp Act crisis and throughout the 
Revolutionary era. 
The use of slavery rhetoric in Revolutionary literature has not been given the 
attention it deserves. When historians have acknowledged the prevalence of the slavery 
metaphor, often it is only to highlight hypocrisy—slave owners themselves decrying taxes as 
slavery. Taking that approach further, historians have used slavery rhetoric in the Revolution 
as a starting point to examine the growth of anti-slavery movements.16  But little has been 
written on slavery as metaphor as part of the burgeoning resistance to Britain. Historians 
have not asked just why it figured so prominently in the pamphlets, the newspapers, and 
even (as we will seen in chapter 3) the material culture of resistance. 
                                                 
16 Prominent examples include Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution and Davis, The Problem 
of Slavery in Western Culture. 
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To the extent that historians have asked why slavery rhetoric was so prevalent, the 
answers have been general and unsatisfactory. The first attempt to answer the question 
concluded that white American colonists were afraid of themselves being reduced by Britain 
to equality with their own African-American slaves.17  This assessment found no support 
among other historians and, indeed, was followed by a long period in which historians 
avoided the question entirely. A second answer was much more plausible. It suggested that, 
since slavery was so common in the colonies, appeals using slavery as a metaphor would be 
understood by all white colonists. Slavery could act as a slogan—individual understandings 
of the institution or of what it meant as a metaphor would be subsumed under the general 
understanding that slavery for oneself, or for free white colonists, would be a very bad 
thing.18  
So, scholars have neglected the influence of slavery metaphor during the 
Revolutionary era. When they have acknowledged it, it has been, largely, in the growth of 
anti-slavery sentiment as Anglo-Americans recognized the hypocrisy of founding a nation 
based on liberty for all but built by enslaved workers. Literary scholars have begun to show 
the importance of the slavery metaphor in the abstract. But we are still missing knowledge of 
how this metaphor influenced events on the ground—the progress of the Revolutionary 
movement. We also don’t fully understand how colonists’ historically-constructed 
understanding of slavery was reflected in their use of the slavery metaphor. 
                                                 
17 Okoye, “Chattel Slavery as the Nightmare of the American Revolutionaries,” 28. 
18 Bradley, Slavery, Propaganda, and the American Revolution, 3. A good summary of the historiography (sparse as it 
is) can be found in Peter A. Dorsey, “To ‘Corroborate Our Own Claims’: Public Positioning and the Slavery 
Metaphor in Revolutionary America,” American Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2003): 353-86, and, more recently, in Dorsey, 
Common Bondage, xvi-xviii. Dorsey’s focus, however, is still on the evolution of anti-slavery thought rather than the 
direct usage of the slavery metaphor. 
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The answers to these two questions are intimately connected. The key is that slavery 
was not yet understood exclusively in terms of white over black. Rather, older conceptions 
of slavery—those that admitted the possibility of white bondage—still held great power, 
even as the racialized conception grew in strength. Slavery was still understood as forged in 
captivity, in the surrender that followed warfare and the decision of the victors to enslave 
rather than execute their captives. So when writers in the Revolutionary era invoked the 
metaphor of slavery, this idea of slave as helpless captive—as a person whose life was in the 
hands of the victorious master—also was there.19  
So when a John Adams, a James Otis, or an anonymous writer in the newspaper 
compared the Stamp Act to slavery, he was tapping into a deeply-seated, historically-
constructed notion of slavery. The question was: should the colonists submit to the Stamp 
Act? Without the rhetoric of slavery, this was a question of costs and opportunities, an 
economic decision matched against the danger of angering the mother country. But the 
slavery metaphor gave the question a very different interpretation. Now submission to the 
King and Parliament’s authority was like surrender in war. By accepting the Stamp Act, the 
colonists would forfeit any right to control of their own lives. They would be entirely at the 
mercy of their rulers in London, their lives only preserved to labor for the victors. 
The colonists, though, had a way out. Like an opposing army, they could fight 
against the oppressor. If they were victorious—if they did not surrender—they could not be 
made slaves. By opening up this possibility of resistance, writers portrayed the initial impulse 
                                                 
19 When writing Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson found himself still struggling with this 
justification for slavery. See Ari Helo, and Peter S. Onuf, “Jefferson, Morality, and the Problem of Slavery,” William 
and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 60, no. 3 (2003), 599-601. 
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to submit to rightful authority as a slave’s choice. The colonists accepted the metaphor of 
the Stamp Act as slavery, and accepted the logical implications of that metaphor: to remain 
freemen, to remain true Britons, they had to resist the Stamp Act by any means necessary, 
even violence against those trying to enforce it. 
 
When news of the Stamp Act arrived, few were pleased. But all accepted that the 
colonists would submit to the Stamp Act. This was agreed upon by the colonists spread 
across the Atlantic seaboard, by the crown officers, and most especially by visiting Britons. 
Chauncey Whittelsey of New Haven was explicit about the need to submit: 
“Whatever we can’t avoid we must Bear.”20  Writing when it was certain the Stamp Act 
would pass but before official confirmation of the King’s signing, Whittelsey provides us a 
detailed look at one colonist’s first reaction to the Stamp Act. In a letter to Ezra Stiles, 
Whittelsey referenced virtually all the arguments and metaphors that the colonists would use 
in their writing on the Stamp Act. He thought about colonial consumption and the supply 
of money. He showed his concern for colonial rights and a bitterness at Parliament’s seeming 
disinterest. And he employed the two metaphors that would be referenced continually by the 
colonists in the months to come: the parent-child and master-slave relationships. 
Whittelsey reviewed the events of the previous months. He had been pleased by the 
petitions of the Virginia Assembly to the King and Parliament, but despaired that they had 
not helped. And the Stamp Act could be compared to the worst form of subjugation, as, 
Whittelsey concluded, the passage of the Stamp Act will “date the Slavery of ye Colonies.” 
                                                 
20 Chauncey Whittelsey to Ezra Stiles, 16 April 1765, Ezra Stiles Papers, microfilm, Beineke Library, Yale 
University, New Haven, Conn. 
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How, then, could the colonies bear what they could not avoid? Whittelsey thought 
that they had to change their behavior, to use the “best OEconomy” and to “less[en] the 
number of Laws [and] Suits [to reduce] the Duty as far as may be.” Yet, the Stamp Act 
would still be a heavy burden that drew a great deal of money out of the colonies. 
Whittelsey speculated about the mechanisms of enforcement. Presumably the duty 
would be collected by “a great Number of Officers, to be supported in Idleness.” Already 
people were suggesting that perhaps juries would ignore the law that stamped paper must be 
used in the courts. But even if the courts were forced to use only stamped paper, how would 
the law be enforced in other realms? Could the British government really regulate the paper 
upon which college diplomas would be printed? 
Whittelsey became more and more agitated as he wrote. The Stamp Act, he thought, 
was indicative of a trend: the colonists were quickly losing their rights. “Pray tell us,” he 
asked Stiles, “what are all our boasted Charter Privileges if we are thus liable to have any 
property in our Interest taken from us, whether we will or now, & without our Consent or 
Voice.” Britain, perhaps, feared that the colonists would prove disloyal—but where was the 
evidence that this was ever the case? 
From the specific question of the Stamp Act and the general issue of “Privileges” and 
rights, Whittelsey struggled to find a metaphor that would encompass the relationship 
between colonies and metropole. Though he had earlier referenced the metaphor of slavery, 
here he settled on a relationship that was even more familiar—that of child and parent. Was 
it “prudent, in a Parent, to correct a Child severely, for fear he should be disobedient and 
run away?—a Child that always has been dutiful, and still discovers & possesses a 
Disposition entirely dutiful?” 
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Finally, his frustration exploded into bitter sarcasm. “But this duty (if laid) is laid by 
the Parliament of Great Britain, it must therefore be wise and right and best.” Still, 
Whittelsey’s hope was not in direct resistance but in action by the Colonial assemblies. He 
would wait to see what measures they took in order to gain redress. 
The reactions of other colonists were similar to Whittelsey’s. They expected that the 
Stamp Act would be enforced. They bewailed Parliament’s infringement on their rights. But 
most of all, they returned to the same metaphors to describe their treatment. 
Parliament’s power over the colonists could be represented by variants on the 
master-slave or parent-child relationship. The Reverend Henry Melchior Muhlenberg had 
heard enough news by 15 April to conclude that the Stamp Act was certainly passed. The 
“supreme government,” he wrote, “have laid a Stamp Act on us in America. By degrees the 
wild colt has a bit put into his mouth, and a saddle on his back, so that the people will be 
homesick for their old homes in Europe.”21  
The bit and the saddle could be symbols of involuntary bondage. But symbols could 
be made real rather than imagined. James Parker wrote to Benjamin Franklin, “Three Days 
ago Charles Read made me a Present of a Pair of Wooden-Shoes as a proper Badge of the 
Slavery the Stamp must soon reduce all Printers in America: And I shall wear them sometime 
for the Sake of contemplating on the Changes of Fortune’s Wheel.” Still, Parker thought 
“we are not yet worse than the Peasants in France, who have yet the Liberty of tilling the 
                                                 
21 Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, “Extracts From the Journal of the Rev. Henry Melchior Muhlenburg,” Collections 
of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1 (1853), 73-79. 
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Ground, and eating Chestnuts and Garlick when they can get them.”22  A month and a half 
later Parker would still think that he must submit to the “fatal Black-Act,” and he still used 
the slavery metaphor to describe it. “Indeed,” he wrote to Franklin, “we seem to be in 
Suspense and Expectation of some Alterations in the Post-Office, as all Things else seems 
going topsy-turvey; and However, I may be too apt to be chagrin’d, and sometimes the true 
Old English Spirit of Liberty will rise within me, yet as there is a Necessity to acquiesce in 
the Chains laid on me, I endeavour at a patient resignation.”23  
It was left to Nathaniel Carter of Newburyport to weld the two metaphors of 
authority together. “Since receiving the last Prints with the shocking List of Stamp Duties, I 
can look upon my Children but with a Damp on my Spirits, viewing them as born for 
Slavery, & futurity as a Time when Blessed will be the Womb that never Bare, & the Paps 
that never gave Suck.”24  
It was clear that much of the burden of the Stamp Act would fall on the colonial 
printers. Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time the Stamp Act was passed, wrote “Every 
Step in the Law, every Newspapers, Advertisement and Almanack is severely taxed. If this 
should, as I imagine it will, occasion less Law, and less Printing, ‘twill fall particularly hard 
on us Lawyers and Printers.”25  Many printers, indeed, looked at the rates they would have 
                                                 
22 James Parker to Benjamin Franklin, 25 April 1765, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=12&page=111a. 
23 James Parker to Benjamin Franklin, 14 June 1765, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/yale?vol=12&page=174a. 
24 Nathaniel Carter to Samuel P. Savage, 11 April 1765, S. P. Savage papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Boston. 
25 Benjamin Franklin to John Ross, 14 February 1765, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/yale?vol=12&page=067a. On printers and the Stamp Act, the best source is 
Charles E. Clark, “Early American Journalism: News and Opinion in the Popular Press,” in The Colonial Book in the 
Atlantic World, ed. Hugh Amory and David D. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press for the American 
 30 
to charge just to cover the cost of the stamped paper and decided to stop producing their 
newspapers. On 4 May, William Goddard suspended the Providence Gazette for at least six 
months, to be revived “provided the oppressive and insupportable Stamp Duties, with which 
the colonies are threatened, should not render it impossible.” A month later, William 
Weyman announced he was shutting down his New-York Gazette. The Virginia Gazette did 
the same, while reports said that the Maryland Gazette was “in a very ill state, occasioned by 
a violent cruel Kick, and it is thought cannot possibly survive the Month of October next.”26   
Despite the evident pains it would inflict upon them, the printers—who would later 
become principals of the resistance—were at first reconciled to the Stamp Act. They 
stopped their newspapers, tried to recover debts, and printed their yearly almanacs early—all 
precautions against the imminent drop in their income. It was not until the latter half of 
June, when the colonists had begun to prepare for a nullification of the Stamp Act, that the 
printers realized they might not be able to sell anything at all after 1 November. David Hall 
wrote his partner Franklin that “the Stamp Act is a Thing the People here in general dislike 
prodigiously, and it certainly will hurt the Printers and Papermakers in an extraordinary 
Manner.” His customers were canceling their Pennsylvania Gazette subscriptions, “being 
resolved, as they say, not to pay any thing towards that Act that they possibly many avoid.”27  
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Even before they had decided to resist, most of the colonists were aghast at the 
Stamp Act and its implications for the relationship between colonies and mother country. 
But Crown officers and others sympathetic to Britain, even those who thought the Stamp 
Act a bad law, saw little reason for concern. Thomas Hutchinson believed that the colonists 
would accept the Stamp Act, if grudgingly. He observed that trade regulations such as the 
Sugar Act were being better observed now than at any time in the past. But his other reasons 
were based in an unwarranted optimism: 
The Stamp Act is received among us with as much decency as could be expected. 
Hitherto I have endeavoured to state the case of the colonies in the most favourable 
light always with submission to the supreme authority. It is now become my duty as 
an executive officer to promote the execution of the act and I hope there will be as 
little room for complaint from this as from any colony. Some boulefeus there are 
who will stick at nothing to inflame the people. I have always been more or less their 
butt.28  
Hutchinson had always opposed a Stamp Act as bad policy. But there was no doubt 
that “submission to the supreme authority” was the proper course. So, Hutchinson 
concluded, his “duty as an executive officer” took precedence over his personal misgivings.29  
Every crown officer would have to make this decision. Yet, given his choice to carry 
out his official duties, it seems strange that Hutchinson conflated the “boulefeus” dislike for 
him with their discontent over the Stamp Act. Perhaps he forgot that for him, “submission 
to the supreme authority” meant obeying King and Parliament. For the rest of 
Massachusetts, it meant obeying Hutchinson. 
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Hutchinson’s belief that the Stamp Act must be obeyed was despite his 
understanding that it had great potential to upset the colonists’ lives. It was, he continued, 
difficult to tell how much the Act would raise, since the colonies had no previous experience 
with duties of this sort. But the Stamp Act would execute itself since there was no room for 
evasion—and the executive court (headed by Hutchinson) would not accept any attempts to 
evade it. The most serious effect, he thought, would be on the courts. Probate court duties 
would hit the colonists especially hard. Common law court duties would bring in more than 
all the other court duties put together, though this would at least have the benefit of 
lessening the number of common law suits. The fledgling colonial system of colleges would 
be hurt. Scarcity of money could also become a serious problem, especially if the money 
collected by stamp officers was carried “to Europe or to remote colonies.”30  
Hutchinson disapproved of the Stamp Act but believed that the colonies had to obey 
it. He understood the potential for unrest. British visitors, used to their own stamp act, 
could not. Lord Adam Gordon, on a circuit of the colonies, was fêted by the governors and 
the wealthiest merchants everywhere he went. In conversation with John Watts of New 
York, he was “as sanguine about laying it thick upon the Colonies, as they are to throw off 
everything, an immense difference.”31  
News slowly arrived, carried across the sea on merchant vessels. The colonists picked 
over each nugget of information. Often the details were inaccurate or incomplete. 
Sometimes they contradicted earlier reports. Trying to understand what had happened, the 
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colonists fabulated narratives from the scraps they were given. The narrative described an 
overbearing imperial power attempting to exert great control over the largely voiceless 
colonists. The powerful were opposed in Britain only by a small, though passionate, 
cohort—but it was in those few men that the colonists could see themselves reflected. 
The colonists are sometimes dismissed as conspiracy theorists. Historians argue that 
they fabricated mysterious plots generally attributed to the ministers in Britain. The King’s 
old tutor, the Scots lord John Stuart—better known as the Earl of Bute—was a primary 
villain, as was the self-designated “first minister” and drafter of the Stamp Act, George 
Grenville. The goal was usually to bring the colonies to heel, to establish absolute control, 
and to reap the profits of power. 
But the term “conspiracy theory” dismisses the colonists’ beliefs out of hand. It 
implies two separate points. First, that the colonists were credulous and believed fanciful 
things. Second, that they could only do so by dismissing or explaining away evidence to the 
contrary. The problem with applying the term “conspiracy theory” to the beginnings of the 
Stamp Act crisis is that there was no evidence to the contrary to be dismissed. The distance 
from Britain and its attendant time-lag, the uncertainty of the reports they received, and the 
contradictions among those reports, meant that the colonists had no reason not to assume 
the worst. All the evidence that seemed credible pointed in that direction, while the many 
rumors circulating supported that conclusion. 
To be certain, the colonists fabulated a story of their own based on the available 
evidence. During the months of April and May, when news about the Stamp Act was 
arriving, the colonists discussed several other aspects of an increasing imperial control. 
Naturally, the news of the Stamp Act dominated. As explained above, the colonists—with 
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increasing bitterness—described the Stamp Act as a kind of “slavery.” But the colonists also 
began to fear other, seemingly more subtle, indications that Britain was trying to dominate 
them. 
The colonists continued to heap scorn on the Sugar Act and its burdensome 
restrictions on trade. If they had hoped for a repeal or at least a lessening of the duties, they 
were to be disappointed. Reports from London suggested that the molasses duty would not 
be removed. An “Advocate for that Duty” had told Parliament that “in two Months from 
the Commencement of the Act, there had been collected at Boston £14,000 and at 
Charleston £10,000 Sterling.” The Massachusetts Gazette insisted that “this Information must 
be wrong, as it is well known here, that during that Space the whole Collection did not 
exceed £1,400 Sterling. The Truth of which the Nation will soon be convinced of.” The 
same report indicated that “some Relief will be obtained with respect to the Lumber trade” 
but any relief the colonists felt must have been tempered by the news that “it is feared there 
will be almost a Prohibition of the Distilling and Sugar boiling Business in America.”32  
Letters from London indicated that Britain intended to reform the colonial 
governments. According to the Pennsylvania Gazette, Parliament planned an “Alteration of 
Governments … in the Northern District of America.” Under this plan, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut would be divided between New York and New 
Hampshire.33  The reforms would not be limited to the colonial level: it was also said that 
the King had ordered North America divided into a northern and southern district at the 
Potomac, and a line drawn due west from “the head of the main branch of that river.” There 
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would be a surveyor-general appointed in each district “to make general surveys both of 
coasts and main, in order to facilitate the navigation, and promote the speedy settlement of 
the new acquisitions.”34  How could the colonists have known that the first of these was false 
and the latter, harmless if taken by itself, was true? They did not have the information to 
distinguish between rumor and reality. Thus, both became fabulated into a grand plan, the 
benign nature of the latter taking on a darker shade because of the outrage engendered by 
the former. 
There was great uncertainty over the methods of enforcing the Stamp Act. The 
colonists began to understand that all breaches could be tried in the hated vice-admiralty 
courts at the request of the informer or prosecutor. The Boston Gazette lamented that now 
“the Americans are not only to have their monies taken from them without their consent, 
but to be deprived of another darling privilege, viz., trials by jury.”35  Further, all fines had to 
be paid in sterling money—of which the colonists believed they held an insufficient supply.36  
Even the colonial agents, who had been instructed to present petitions against the 
Stamp Act, came under suspicion.  Letters from London suggested that “since the plantation 
agents have failed in opposing the intended duty on American stamps, a motion is preparing 
to be made in the house, that the commissioner for the receipt of this duty may be 
appointed from the natives of each province, where the tax is to take place.”37  The colonists 
might have been suspicious that their agents had become turncoats; if so, the appointment of 
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Connecticut’s agent Jared Ingersoll to be stamp distributor for that colony would have 
served as confirmation of those suspicions. 
The fear of an American bishopric lurked in the back of people’s minds. American 
colonists were always at odds with the Anglican clergy. The northern Congregationalist and 
Presbyterian ministers were, of course, anxious about a threat from the mainstream church 
their forebears had tried to escape. But so were the southern gentry who, while Anglican, 
had great power over their own parishes precisely because of the lack of a central authority. 
And dissenters in the South, while in tension with the Anglican church there, had no 
illusions that an American bishop would somehow reduce their persecution. It was in fact a 
court case in Virginia over the “Parsons’ Cause,” a conflict between the colonists and their 
Anglican clergy, that would serve as a prologue to Virginia’s response to the Stamp Act. 
Some worried about the dark implications of reforms planned for the colonial postal 
service. Parliament had passed resolves that would extend the general post to cover the 
American colonies.38  It was not so much any increase in rates that disturbed the colonists so 
much as Parliament raising money directly within the colonies, rather than delegating the 
task to the colonial assemblies. In a pamphlet excerpted in many colonial newspapers, 
Thomas Whately, secretary to the Treasury, used the example of the post office to dismiss 
colonial concerns over taxation. The postal service, which fees colonists had paid over many 
years, was by any definition an internal tax. Why, then, would the colonists now be so 
concerned over the Stamp Act, claiming that it was unconstitutional because it was an 
internal tax? But it was not until early 1766 that concern over British control of the postal 
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service would come to the fore, when the Sons of Liberty, fearing spies, would insist on the 
use of unofficial riders to send mail. 
The reports that the revenues from the Stamp Act were to be used for “commodious 
post roads from one province to another, erecting bridges where necessary, and other public 
measures equally important” in the colonies did nothing to quell colonists’ fears.39  Like a 
more efficient postal service, internal improvements may have seemed beneficial, but not at 
the price of the “slavery” brought by the Stamp Act. 
By early June, newspapers had wrapped these various fears into a capsule summary 
that was read across the colonies. First printed in the Boston Gazette, the item reviewed both 
the imperial measures enacted so far and some that were only rumored. The judges of the 
new vice-admiralty courts would become wealthy men, with salaries of £800 per year coming 
from the American revenue. Regiments would be moved from Ireland to the American 
colonies, preceded by a bill that would allow them to be “quartered upon private Families.” 
There were reports of a possible new tax upon landed estates in North America. All this was 
facilitated by the ministry, who planned to deploy a “Swarm of Scribblers” to make the new 
measures—even if they were to ruin trade—acceptable to the British. The summary ended 
with a dark hint that all this was the work of “French agents & French monies,” employed 
to try and “alienate the Affections of the Colonies from their Mother Country,” in order to 
allow France to recover what had been French Canada, “taken from them by the Help and 
uncommon Exertions of these Infant Colonies.”40  
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Buffeted by this gale of dolorous news, forming a narrative of a dark plot against 
them fomented in Britain and perhaps in France, the colonists looked for any hopeful sign, 
any suggestion that someone in Britain would stand up for them. It was then that reports on 
the debates over the Stamp Act began to arrive. Before, all the colonists knew was that none 
had spoken in opposition to the resolves that would be bundled into the Stamp Act. But 
now word arrived that, during the later debates, at least one man had stood to defend 
colonial rights. That man, Colonel Isaac Barré, was quickly acclaimed a hero in the colonial 
press. 
Several different descriptions of the debates—and of Barré’s role in the debates—
were printed in the colonial newspapers. Not all received equal play; some only made it into 
one or two papers. But one particular report was reprinted across the colonies. It is worth 
examining the several narratives of the debates in order to understand why that one story 
became so popular. 
The Providence Gazette printed the first report on 13 April 1765: 
By a Letter from London in the last Ship to Boston, we are acquainted, that Colonel 
ISAAC BARRÉ, Member of Parliament for the Borough of Chipping Wycomb in the 
County of Bucks, distinguished himself gloriously in Parliament, by a strenuous 
opposition of ministerial Projections against the known rights of the colonies, which 
were most unconstitutionally attacked by the Commons of G. Britain, when they 
resolved that Stamp-Duties should be charged here.—He, openly, and with great 
Firmness, patronized the injured Colonies, and asserted their Privileges.—A Column 
ought to be erected to him in America, as a lasting Monument of the gratitude of the 
people, for his Virtue, Fortitude, & animated Endeavours to rescue them from 
Slavery.—Should this, or any other public mark of the warm sense we have of his 
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Friendship and Zeal, be resolved on by the Governments of North America, free-will 
offerings would abundantly supply the Expence.41  
It is important to note that this was the Providence Gazette’s summation of the letter. 
They were able to fabulate their report in whatever way they wanted, in this case presenting 
Barré as a sympathetic man defending colonists against “slavery.” Though the Providence 
Gazette’s summation of Barré’s speech would only make it into a few newspapers, the 
sentiments it expressed would soon become widespread. New York merchant John Watts, 
for one, immediately recognized the significance of Barré’s words. “We are obliged to Coll: 
Barré,” he wrote, “for espousing a derelict Cause.”42  
Doubt soon crept in: had Barré truly “asserted [the] Privileges” of the Colonies 
against the unconstitutional Stamp Act, as the Providence Gazette report had proclaimed? 
The publishers of the Boston Post-Boy, which had reprinted the Gazette’s abstract of the letter 
celebrating Barré, began to have doubts. They had received a letter which stated that Barré 
did not “say one word in Opposition to the laying of a Stamp-Duty on the Colonies.” 
Therefore, the previous letter must have been wrong—Barré could not have opposed all 
“Projections against the known rights of the Colonies.”43   
The Providence Gazette could not let this go unanswered. The letter they had read, 
the publisher explained, was written “to a Person of Distinction in this Town, from a certain 
Agent for one of the Colonies, who, one would think, could not be mistaken as to that 
Gentleman’s Behaviour in the House.” The argument from authority was followed by one 
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more logical: how, the publisher suggested, could “a meer Negative … be proved by a Letter 
in Boston?”44  
“However,” the Gazette had to acknowledge, “it may be [a] Matter of some Doubt, 
whether Col. BARRÉ objected against the Legality of taxing the Colonies, when he exerted 
himself to ward off the fatal Stamp Duties, or not.”45  Another report on the reception of the 
colonial petitions seemed to confirm this view. While George Grenville and Charles 
Townsend believed that the stamp duties were both fair and practical, “Col. B——
confirmed the Equity of the Taxation, but doubted whether the Colonies were in a Capacity 
to pay it, and seemed inclinable to favor them.”46  
Further missives from Britain did not clear up the question of Barré’s position on 
Parliament’s right to levy an internal tax, but they did provide more details on the content of 
his speech. Grenville, a new report said, introduced the measure with a long speech “more 
specious than solid.” Several speakers from each side then went back and forth, each saying 
little of note. But then came the best speaker on the colonists’ side, Colonel Barré. Barré 
“made a most excellent speech, wherein he asserted the colonies rights, urged their services 
& importance to Great Britain, [and] resented the hardships and indignities that had been 
put upon them. The “hardships and indignities” included restrictions on trade, the vice-
admiralty courts, and the corrupt or incompetent officials given high placed in the 
colonies.47  
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With the factual details laid out, Barré now made a transition in his rhetoric to the 
metaphorical. He invoked the parental metaphor for the relation between Britain and its 
colonies: “Great Britain called herself the mother country, but [Barré] cautioned here to 
beware that she did not give the colonies just reason to think her rather a cruel step dame 
than a mother.” Establishing a rhythm, Barré shifted back to the concrete: Britain had not 
incurred any cost at all in the planting of the colonies. Indeed, any services Britain had 
provided the colonies were “amply repaid her by their trade.” There was no reason to 
impose a tax on the colonies, who had suffered so much in Britain’s defense during the Seven 
Years’ War, for the sole reason of replenishing the mother country’s coffers. The Stamp Act, 
indeed, was as unreasonable as “to demand a reimbursement for the expences of defending 
Portugal and Germany.” 
Now Barré turned his attention to the colonists themselves, who he saw as “a brave 
people, inflexably loyal, and affectionately attached to his majesty’s person and family, and 
the British constitution.” Their love of freedom and their “native rights” was so strong that 
“to preserve which they quitted their native country, and fled to a wilderness inhabited by 
barbarous savages, whom they chose to encounter rather than bear oppression.” Already they 
were strong—evidenced by the late war, in which they had taken Cape Breton by 
themselves. Given time they would become “the strongest bulwark to the British 
monarchy.” 
This long-winded abstract of the speech got little play in the colonial newspapers. A 
dry summation of Barré’s opinions was, publishers perhaps thought, not to their readers’ 
taste. But another account of Barré’s speech soon made its way to the colonies—and this 
one was widely disseminated. This new account was much more dynamic than was the 
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detailed report that the printers had neglected. Rather than a dry narration of Parliamentary 
procedures, this account infused the debates over the Stamp Act with a passion designed to 
inflame the reader. The narrative dramatized the debate as a personal confrontation between 
two individuals: Charles Townshend and Isaac Barré. The account began:  
Mr. Charles Townshend spoke in favour of the bill, [Stamp Duty] and concluded his 
Speech by saying to the following effect. 
 
“These children of our own planting, (speaking of Americans) nourished by our 
indulgence, until they are grown to a good degree of strength and opulence, and 
protected by our arms, will they grudge to contribute their mite to relieve us from 
the heavy load of national expence which we lie under?” 
Townsend was here portrayed as the sinister figure that the colonists feared him and 
the other ministers influenced by Bute to be. His malevolence in the colonial eyes was the 
result of his twisting the parent-child metaphor. By portraying Britain as generous parent 
and America as ungrateful child, Townsend called for sympathy to be given to the former 
rather than the latter. 
It was this assumption, this story of the parent-child relationship, that Barré 
disputed. But the manner in which he disputed Townsend’s narrative is notable: 
…Which [Townsend] having said and sat down, Mr. Barré arose, and with eyes 
darting fire, and an outstretched arm, spoke as follows, with a voice somewhat 
elevated, and with a sternness in his countenance, which express’d, in a most lively 
manner, the feelings of his heart.… 
Where Townsend calmly “spoke in favour of the bill,” said his piece and “sat down,” 
Barré’s very body language suggested the passion he was about to unleash. By immediately 
following Townsend—no talk of proper parliamentary procedure here!—Barré directed his 
speech to the person as much as to the abstract argument. But even within Barré’s passion 
there was reason: he took care to respond directly to the propositions Townsend had laid 
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out. Townsend had described the colonists as “children of our own planting,… nourished by 
our indulgence … and protected by our arms.”  Barré raised and rejected each in turn: 
Children planted by your care? No! Your oppression planted them in America; they 
fled from your tyranny, into a then uncultivated land, where they were exposed to 
almost all the hardships, to which human nature is liable; and among others, to the 
savage cruelty of the enemy of the country; a people the most subtile, and I take 
upon me to say, the most truly terrible, of any people that ever inhabited any part of 
God’s Earth, and yet actuated by principles of true English liberty; they met all these 
hardships with pleasure, compared to those they suffered in their own county, from 
the hands of those that should have been their friends. 
Barré, a veteran of the Seven Years’ War, had for the audience (and especially the 
colonial audience reading the account, rather than the Parliamentary audience supposedly 
listening) special authority on the subject: who better to describe the hardships of American 
life than one who had warred with the colonists on the borders of English civilization? And 
yet, the colonists still upheld the “principles of true English liberty.” The dangers posed by a 
malevolent Parliament attacking that liberty were far greater than those posed by a “savage” 
enemy. 
Neither had the Parliament treated them well over the succeeding years: 
They nourished up by your indulgence? They grew by your neglect of them: As soon 
as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending persons to rule 
over them, in one department and another; who were, perhaps, the deputies of some 
deputy, of members of this house, sent to spy out their liberty, to misrepresent their 
actions, and to prey upon them; men, whose behaviour, on many occasions, has 
caused the blood of those sons of Liberty, to recoil within them; Men promoted to 
the highest seats of justice, some to my knowledge, were glad by going to foreign 
countries, to escape being bro’t to a bar of justice, in their own. 
And yet, though neglected at their birth and abused as they matured, the colonies 
still served their unworthy parent: 
They protected by your arms? They have nobly taken up arms in your defence, have 
exerted their valour, amidst their constant and laborious industry, for the defence of 
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a country whose frontiers, while drench’d in blood, its interior parts have yielded all 
its little savings to your enlargement… 
In the Seven Years’ War the colonies had been defending not their own autonomy 
but that empire that so disdained them. “Nobl[e]” and “valour[ous]” colonists had fought 
and died and yet still labored “constant[ly]” for the mother country. They gave their blood 
and their wealth so that Britain could grow rich. 
Having in turn logically refuted each of Townsend’s three premises Barré could at 
last give over to his passion. He prophesied that this state of affairs, this manifest injustice, 
could not long continue: 
And believe me, remember I this day told you so, that the same spirit which actuated 
that people at first, will continue with them still: But prudence forbids me to explain 
myself any further. God knows, I do not at this time speak from motives of party 
heat: What I deliver, are the genuine sentiments of my heart: However superior to 
me in general knowledge and experience, the respectable body of this house may be, 
yet I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been 
conversant in that country. The people there are as truly loyal, I believe, as any 
subjects the King has: But a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate 
them, if they should be violated; but the subject is too delicate, I will say no more. 
Even speaking with passion Barré took care to tread a fine line. His experience in 
America told him that the colonists were filled with the spirit of liberty. This spirit, he 
believed, would see them through the current crisis. What actions would that spirit 
engender? Here Barré refused, skillfully, to speculate. He hinted that, if it came to a choice, 
the colonists’ love of liberty would win out over loyalty to the King. But “prudence” and the 
“delicate” nature of the subject forbade him from doing more than hinting. Yet the 
suggestion was out there: the Stamp Act could cause the colonists to rebel. And Barré, it was 
clear, thought resistance a viable and legitimate option. 
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Did he mean violent resistance? The whole thrust of his speech suggests that he did. 
He began with the origins of the colonies, their birth. The narrative continued with the 
growth of the colonies into maturity and ended with their behavior during the Seven Years’ 
War, in which, grown to potency, they defended Britain and British liberties against the 
savage enemy. If they were willing to defend their liberty with violence against one threat, 
why not against another? The juxtaposition, the continuous interweaving, of the need to 
defend liberty with the methods of doing so meant that Barré could make his meaning clear 
without going so far as to say it straight out. And the method he chose—to step up to a line, 
suggest what was on the other side, and then to back down while leaving the taste of the 
forbidden in the listeners’ mouths—would soon be used by another orator, not in 
Parliament but in the Virginia House of Burgesses. 
 
By late May the names of the appointed stamp officers were arriving in the colonies. 
These men were well-known in the provinces in which they would work, if not so familiar to 
those beyond. Indeed, the Commissioners of the Stamp Duties wanted the stamp officers to 
be familiar to those from whom they would collect the tax. The ministry believed that the 
Stamp Act would go down easier were it swallowed with local drink. 
The colonial newspapers eagerly printed the names, though as business per usual 
rather than accusations of treason. All the prospective officers were wealthy and many held 
positions of prestige. Many had been in Britain during the time in which the Stamp Act was 
debated and passed. Jared Ingersoll of Connecticut had served as that colony’s agent. 
Massachusetts’s Andrew Oliver had held many offices in that colony and, most importantly, 
was aligned by marriage and politics with the Lieutenant Governor, Thomas Hutchinson. 
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Augustus Johnston was the Attorney General of Rhode Island. James McEvers was a well-
known merchant in New York as was John Mercer in Virginia.48  The newspapers did not 
carry any details about the stamp officers’s duties or when they would set up their offices. 
However, a rumor circulated about their salaries. “It is said,” they wrote, that Ingersoll “is 
to have a Salary of 300 £. per Annum.”49 
In the first weeks after news of the Stamp Act’s passage, many printers across the 
colonies had published abstracts of the stamp duties. Now, at the same time that they were 
publishing the names of the stamp officers, colonial printers were putting the full Stamp Act 
into press. The printers gave their reprint editions of the Stamp Act prominent advertising 
space in their own newspapers. Hugh Gaine of New York first advertised the Stamp Act on 
3 June and his New-York Mercury ran advertisements through June and July. William 
Bradford and David Hall of Philadelphia had their version in print by the second week of 
June. Edes and Gill of Boston printed theirs closer to the end of June, when it was advertised 
in several Massachusetts newspapers. A month later, Edes and Gill were still encouraging 
sales of the Stamp Act. Its complexity, they argued, made it necessary for everyone to own a 
copy—that way one could  avoid the “many Forfeitures” they might otherwise be subject 
to.50  
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So, by the first weeks of June, the colonists had received confirmation of the Stamp 
Act’s passage. They knew the tax would be in force from the first of November. They were 
beginning to find out how the tax would operate. The names of distributors were beginning 
to appear in the newspapers. Those same newspapers were preparing to close up shop, for 
fear they could not survive under the demands of the Stamp Act. Yet, during all this, the 
colonists were prepared, with set jaws, to accept the Stamp Act. Parliament may not have 
had the right to enact an internal tax on the colonies, but in point of fact they had the 
power. It was an event and a fabulation that changed their minds. The Virginia Assembly 
would pass several moderate resolutions against the Stamp Act, and the news as it traveled 
across the colonies inflated the tale to make it seem as if they had passed seven 
inflammatory—almost treasonous—resolves. 
On 29 May, the Virginia House of Burgesses met in the Capitol in Williamsburg. 
They had been gathered since the beginning of May and were nearing the end of a long 
session. Many of the legislators had already left town for their plantations across the colony. 
Over the next three days, the remaining Burgesses would, unexpectedly, be drawn into a 
debate over their rights as British subjects and the dangers to those freedoms represented by 
the Stamp Act. 
What happened over those three days is largely cloaked from view, largely because 
the most powerful Burgesses and Governor Francis Fauquier wanted it that way. Three 
contemporary accounts of those days remain: the official version in the Journals of the House 
of Burgesses, a letter from Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, and an eyewitness account 
by a young merchant traveling through the colonies, Charles Murray. Of these, it is Murray’s 
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that is essential to understanding both the Virginia Resolves and their embrace by the 
American colonists.51  
The Journal recorded only the barest necessary to explain the final product of those 
three days: that the Burgesses indeed passed four resolves against the Stamp Act. Fauquier 
provided a hint of the contention behind those resolves with the emphasis being to show 
that they were, at best, a minority view. Only a small number of Burgesses were present for 
the votes (39 of 116), and even so they barely passed, and a fifth was passed then struck. And 
those who promoted the resolves were by no means the important men of Virginia. They 
were “young, hot, and giddy,” led by a young lawyer, Patrick Henry, who was inciting them 
with “indecent speech.” And even so, according to Fauquier, Henry saw he did not have the 
support for two even more radical resolves, so did not introduce them. 
What were these seven resolves, four that passed, one passed and rescinded, and two 
so inflammatory that they could not even be brought up for debate?  
The first five were largely conventional. Indeed, the ideas expressed were much the 
same as those the greatest of the Virginia gentry had been discussing among themselves for 
several years: 
RESOLVES of the House of Burgesses in Virginia, June 1765, 
• That the first Adventurers and Settlers of this his Majesty’s Colony and 
Dominion of Virginia, brought with them, and transmitted to their Posterity, 
and all other his Majesty’s Subjects since inhabiting in this his Majesty’s 
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Colony, all the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that at any 
Time have been held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the People of Great Britain.  
• That by Two Royal Charters, granted by King James the First, the Colonies 
aforesaid are Declared Entitled, to all Liberties, Privileges and Immunities, of 
Denizens and Natural Subjects (to all Intents and Purposes) as if they had 
been Abiding and Born within the Realm of England.  
• That the Taxation of the People by Themselves, or by Persons Chosen by 
Themselves to Represent them, who can only know what Taxes the People 
are able to bear, or the easiest Method of Raising them, and must themselves 
be affected by every Tax laid upon the People, is the only Security against a 
Burthensome Taxation: and the Distinguishing Characteristic of British 
Freedom: and, without which, the antient Constitution cannot exist.  
• That his Majesty’s Liege People of this his most Ancient and Loyal Colony, 
have, without Interruption, the inestimable Right of being governed by such 
Laws, respecting their internal Polity and Taxation, as are derived from their 
own consent with the Approbation of their Sovereign, or his Substitute: 
which Right hath never been Forfeited, or yielded up: but hath been 
constantly recognized by the Kings and People of Great Britain.  
• Resolved therefore, That the General Assembly of this Colony, with the 
Consent of his Majesty, or his Substitute, HAVE the Sole Right and 
Authority to lay Taxes and Impositions upon Its Inhabitants:, And, That 
every Attempt to vest such Authority in any other Person or Persons 
whatsoever, has a Manifest Tendency to Destroy AMERICAN 
FREEDOM.52 
The ideas of these five resolves were identical to those expressed by Richard Bland in 
his pamphlets. Why, then, were the councilors and the Speaker discomfited? It seems likely 
that the tone and timing of the resolves may have had an effect on them. Patrick Henry put 
the ideas of the addresses into the form of resolves. The four forms of stating a position 
discussed here—the petition, address, remonstrance, and resolve—had specific meaning for 
students of rhetoric. In that order they were increasingly assertive and less deferential. Thus, 
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the very form of the resolves, which were an address to the general public, made them more 
defiant than a petition to the King or even a remonstrance to the House of Commons. 
Patrick Henry’s first contribution, then, was to put the ideas already expressed by Bland and 
others of the Virginia gentry into the form of five resolves to be announced to the world. 
Further, the role of the rhetor was to invigorate already-common ideas, so it would have 
been counterproductive to introduce anything too new.53  
The sixth resolve was, LeMay argues, an extension of the constitutional argument of 
the first five beyond that of the Parsons’ Cause and Committee of Correspondence 
arguments: 
• That his Majesty’s Liege People, Inhabitants of this Colony, are not bound 
to yield Obedience to any Law or Ordinance whatsoever, designed to impose 
any Taxation upon them, other than the Laws or Ordinances of the General 
Assembly as aforesaid.  
LeMay interprets this resolve to cover external taxes—trade duties such as the Sugar 
Act—as well as internal taxes like the Stamp Act. Such an argument was briefly used in 
Massachusetts, in particular in a circular letter sent by Massachusetts’s Assembly to the 
Virginia House of Burgesses in mid-1764. Yet it seems that, if this resolve was intended to 
cover trade duties, there was no reason not to state that explicitly in the fourth and fifth 
resolves. In those, it is precisely “internal Polity and Taxation” that go against the 
“Distinguishing Characteristic of British Freedom.” 
To be sure, the Virginia Resolves did have a logical order and did become 
increasingly controversial as they progress. But it was a progression of the means of resistance, 
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rather than of constitutional argument. The specific complaint against the Stamp Act—its 
interference in “internal Polity and Taxation”—was spelled out early on. The first four 
resolves establish this complaint in several contexts: the rights of the colonists, as defined in 
the establishment of Virginia; the granting of the royal charter; the assertion to right of no 
taxation without representation as “the Distinguishing Characteristic of British Freedom;” 
and the assertion that Virginians had never forfeited those rights of Britons. 
The first four resolves, then, established the rights. The last three established the 
proper methods by which to defend those rights. From this perspective, the fifth was 
uncontroversial. It asserted that the General Assembly had “the Sole Right and Authority” 
to levy taxes upon Virginians. Its assertion that “every Attempt to vest such Authority in any 
other Person or Persons whatsoever, has a Manifest Tendency to Destroy AMERICAN 
FREEDOM,” did not imply anything more of resistance than had the addresses to King and 
Parliament. Yet the fifth resolve, in expressly setting a limit to Parliament’s power, would 
still go too far for the Burgesses to back. 
But the sixth resolve specified that Virginians “are not bound to yield Obedience to 
any Law or Ordinance whatsoever, designed to impose any Taxation upon them,” except 
those passed by Virginia’s Assembly. Rather than a general statement of rights, the sixth 
resolve asserted an action that the colonists could take. They could refuse to “yield 
Obedience” to the Stamp Act—to go on with their business, to refuse to pay for or use the 
stamped paper that would soon arrive in the colony. 
If many of the Burgesses did not want to be associated with this explicit statement of 
defiance, then they must have been set even more firmly against the seventh resolve: 
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• That any Person who shall, by Speaking, or writing, assert or maintain, That 
any Person or Persons, other than the General Assembly of this Colony, with 
such Consent as aforesaid, have any Right or Authority to lay or impose any 
Tax whatever on the Inhabitants thereof, shall be Deemed, AN ENEMY TO 
THIS HIS MAJESTY’S COLONY.54  
Here Henry defined the specific people against whom the public could focus their 
anger. Stamp masters and stamp distributors would certainly be deemed enemies—by their 
very office they asserted Parliament’s right to levy an internal tax. Yet the resolve went 
further: it also implicated those colonists who defended Parliament’s position, “by Speaking, 
or writing.” Moreover, it removed those unfortunates from even the proper bounds of the 
public sphere. Not only were the ideas unacceptable, their holders were now enemies of 
Virginia. There could be no middle ground here, no more debates, no more petitions and 
remonstrances. Now any who submitted to the Stamp Act—any who, with whatever regrets, 
bought a newspaper or a pack of cards marked with the hated stamp—was as much an 
enemy of Virginia as Grenville or Bute. 
These were the Resolves as text. But the meaning of the Virginia Resolves cannot be 
explained entirely by only the text. The way in which they were presented and defended 
would enter into the narrative that the colonists told themselves about the resistance to the 
Stamp Act. 
Only a single eyewitness account—that was itself written at the time, rather than a 
memoir—goes into detail about the Burgesses’ debates over the Virginia Resolves. The 
author was probably Charles Murray, a lowland Scots wine merchant with the firm of Scott, 
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Pringle, and Cheap of London and Madeira, traveling through the colonies to make contacts 
for his company. He was also—as proven by the discovery of his (anonymous) journal in a 
French naval archive—spying for that hated Catholic power.55  
Murray wrote, 
May the 30th. Set out Early from halfway house in the Chair and broke fast at York, 
arived at williamsburg at 12, where I saw three Negroes hanging at the galous for 
haveing robed Mr. Waltho of 300 Ps. I went imediately to the assembly which was 
seting, where I was entertained with very strong Debates Concerning Dutys that the 
parlement wants to lay on the american Colonys, which they Call or Stile stamp 
Dutys. Shortly after I Came in one of the members stood up and said he had read 
that in former times tarquin and Julus had their Brutus, Charles had his Cromwell, 
and he Did not Doubt but some good american would stand up, in favour of his 
Country, but (says he) in a more moderate manner, and was going to Continue, 
when the speaker of the house rose and Said, he, the last that stood up had spoke 
traison, and was sorey to see that not one of the members of the house was loyal 
Enough to stop him, before he had gone so far. upon which the Same member stood 
up again (his name is henery) and said that if he had afronted the speaker, or the 
house, he was ready to ask pardon. and he would shew his loyalty to his majesty King 
G. the third. at the Expence of the last Drop of his blood. but what he had said must 
be atributed to the Interest of his Countrys Dying liberty which he had at heart, and 
the heat of passion might have lead him to have said something more than he 
intended, but. again, if he said any thing wrong, he beged the speaker and the houses 
pardon. some other Members stood up and backed him, on which that afaire was 
droped.  
May the 31th. I returned to the assembly today, and heard very hot Debates stil 
about the Stamp Dutys. the whole house was for Entering resolves on the records 
but they Differed much with regard the Contents or purport therof. some weere for 
shewing their resentment to the highest. one of the resolves that these proposed, was 
that any person that would offer to sustain that the parlement of Engl’d had a right 
to impose or lay any tax or Dutys whats’r on the american Colonys, without the 
Consent of the inhabitants therof, Should be looked upon as a traitor, and Deemed 
an Enemy to his Country. there were some others to the same purpose, and the 
majority was for Entring these resolves, upon which the Governor Disolved the 
assembly, which hinderd their proceeding. 
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More than the constitutional arguments, Murray was taken with the passions on 
display in the House of Burgesses. Thus, he emphasized Patrick Henry’s dramatic outburst. 
Even as Henry sidestepped accusations of treason, he bid his listeners remember the emotion 
behind his words, child of the “Interest of his Countrys Dying liberty which he had at heart.” 
Henry’s performance at the Capitol must be understood in the context of what he 
was promoting: the Virginia Resolves. Students of oratory have focused on his speaking, 
while students of politics have concentrated on the text of the Resolves. Both approaches 
miss something. Virginia was still an oral culture in 1765. Text and oratory were embroiled 
in a complex relationship. The Virginia Resolves and the dramatic gestures of Henry on their 
behalf, then, should be viewed as two aspects of a single performance.56  
And indeed, when we look at Henry’s performance of the Virginia Resolves—a 
performance comprising both text and oratory—we can easily see the parallels with Henry’s 
oration at Hanover Courthouse from a year and a half before. In both, he decried the 
behavior of a group disliked by many Virginians—the colonial clergy in the Parsons’ Cause, 
the ministry and Parliament who had devised and passed the Stamp Act.  In both, he 
purposely tried to inflame the crowd while being prepared to pull back if called on his bluff. 
The gentry and common folk at Hanover Courthouse approved of his attack on the clergy, 
the protests of treason being voiced by few and fully counterbalanced by the “Nod of 
Approbation” in Henry’s favor. At the Capitol in Williamsburg, when called out by the 
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Speaker—Henry immediately sidestepped. But in neither case could his words be unsaid. 
And it is perhaps notable that the Burgesses declined to censure him in 1765. 
Finally, both performances decreed an outgroup the “enemy of the country.” The 
Virginia clergy, for not fulfilling a useful role, now hindered rather than helped the 
regimented, hierarchical Virginia community. Those who supported the Stamp Act—for 
example, the men whose names were arriving in the colonies associated with the stamp 
office—were enemies of the country, of the heirs to and protectors of English liberty. 
So, Henry’s performance at the Capitol in May 1765 drew from his successful 
oration against the Parsons’ Cause from a year and a half before. Informed observers would 
certainly have recognized the connection. But, even more importantly, Henry patterned his 
performance on that of Isaac Barré before Parliament earlier in 1765—in particular, the 
dramatic telling of Barré’s oration through which the event was best known in the colonies. 
Both orations took the form of a sudden outburst, offered against another speaker. Both, 
purposely, walked close to or even crossed over the line of treason. Henry was called on his 
words and retreated while Barré with an effort controlled himself, but both speakers, in 
backing down, attributed their intemperate speech to their great love for the colonies and to 
the passions that the issues evoked in their hearts. 
Henry’s performance was too close to the wildly popular account of Barré’s speech 
for these similarities to be coincidence. Of course, by causing the Burgesses and observers to 
remember Barré’s words and his heartfelt passion he would have hoped to gain support for 
the resolves. But, more subtly, he would have thus reminded his audience of what Barré had 
suggested, that had, perhaps, been treasonous. Barré had warned Parliament that, if they 
continued to treat the colonists with scorn, “the same spirit which actuated that people at 
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first, will continue with them still. …  The people there are as truly loyal, I believe, as any 
subjects the King has: But a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate them, if 
they should be violated.” Barré was warning that the colonists would resist, perhaps with 
violence, a Stamp Act that violated their rights. Henry wanted to stir that memory in his 
listeners’ minds, in order to connect the heroic Barré with the possibility of outright defiance 
suggested in the sixth and seventh Virginia Resolves. 
A populace already excited by the dramatic version of Colonel Barré’s speech to 
Parliament would have thrilled to one of their own repeating and extending the sentiments. 
If Patrick Henry and his Virginia Resolves (or, as the people believed, the Virginia Burgesses 
and their resolves) could not directly confront the hated Grenville  as Barré had defied 
Townsend, they could at least declare their rights as British subjects and stake out the 
borders of the community. Like a political party of today that demands absolute fidelity on 
what is really only one of many important issues, the sentiment summoned by the Virginia 
Resolves created a fixed definition of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Those who 
supported internal taxes levied by any body except the colonial legislatures was now the 
enemy. 
Word of the Virginia Resolves spread quickly throughout the colonies. The Newport 
Mercury printed them on 24 June, the Maryland Gazette on 4 July. But before the newspapers 
put them into print the Resolves were circulating by word of mouth. Charles Murray left 
Williamsburg for Maryland soon after the end of the Burgesses’ session. During his travels he 
paid close attention to the people’s fulminations against the Stamp Act. The Virginia 
Resolves, he found, had stirred up a new anger, backed with promises of action, that had 
simply not been present before. 
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In Maryland Murray was mixing with the elite of the colony: the Galloway brothers, 
Samuel and John; Charles Carroll of Carrollton and his son, Charles Carroll of Annapolis; as 
well as the governor, magistrates, and other wealthy planters and merchants. He spent the 
middle of June at court days in Annapolis. On the 13th “There was a large and agreable 
Company at my tavern. Where we had nothing but feasting and Drinking, after the Kings 
health, the virginia assembly, and then Damnation to the Stamp act.”57  A week later at a 
shipboard party Murray watched a friendly dispute over which planter had shipped the most 
tobacco. The planters had their honor at stake; the dispute was about to grow serious when 
someone created a distraction by bringing up the Stamp Act, “which altered the 
Conversation imediately. Then was they Daming their souls if they would pay and Damn 
them but they would fight to the last Drop of their blood before they would Consent to any 
such slavery.”58  
On 26 June, Murray “Dined at the tavern in a large Company, the Conversation 
Continually on the Stamp Dutys.” The anger that the Marylanders had, and their willingness 
to express it, shocked the Scots merchant: “I was realy surprised to here the people talk so 
freely. This is Common in all the Country, and much more so to the Northward.” Yet he 
was aware of rifts among the colonists, as he saw that “The Catholiques seem to be very 
Cautious on this occasion.”59  The very next night, the planters’ agitation showed no signs of 
abating: 
After Dinner as the botle was going round the Conversat’n fell on the Stamps, and as 
the wine operated the rage against the proceedings of the parlement augment, only 
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the magestrate [Dr. George Stewart] seemed to retain himself, and took the part of 
the ministry, on acc’t of his Countryman lord Bute. In the hight of the Conv’on 
there was something said about takeing up arms, that if the americans took it in head 
they were able to Cope with Britain in america. Upon which the magestrate said that 
non but Disafected people, ore Enemys to the present government, could talk in 
such a manner, but notwithstanding his loyalty, he out with it at last, and said that if 
it Came to the push he would take up arms himself In Defence of his liberty and 
property, upon which he had a huza from the Company.60  
Even the Scots magistrate, with a personal attachment to his fellow-countryman 
Bute, acknowledged that he would use violence to defend “his liberty and property,” a 
sentiment clearly shared by the rest of his companions at the tavern. A month before, the 
Virginia Resolves had proclaimed that vocal supporters of the Stamp Act were “enemies of 
the country.” Stewart here first claimed the opposite, that those who said such things (like 
Patrick Henry, or Stewart’s drinking companions) were themselves “enemies of the present 
government.” But finally, under a certain coercion, he acknowledged that what he really 
believed was the position of the Virginia Resolves. 
In the wake of this display of passion, Murray concluded that the past month had 
seen a great change in the behavior of the American colonists. “It is Certain that this act has 
made a great alteration in the americans Disposition towards greatbritain, and will have a 
very Good Efect with regard to themselves.” Murray believed that the colonists would now 
become more self-sufficient: they would cut their spending on consumer goods and instead 
manufacture their own, “which they would never have thought of otherwise, for they 
hithertoo were the greatest spendthrifts in the world, satisfied if at the years End they Could 
make both Ends meet.” An increase in manufactures would cause great changes in gentry 
lives, but more importantly would redound to the benefit of small planters. This class, 
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Murray argued, had always lived hand-to-mouth, for what little money they made they were 
forced to spend on English goods. Moreover, the American change in attitude could have a 
great and deleterious effect on Britain. A decrease in American purchases of British goods 
could potentially destroy the manufacturing centers of the mother country.61  
Murray spent another several weeks in Maryland. But while he was there news 
continued to arrive, not just from newspapers but by word of mouth from travelers. 
Resistance to the Stamp Act continued to increase across the colonies. Merchants “schemed 
how to raise manufactures.” They were sending to Britain for skilled workers, weavers and 
spinners, rather than for fully-made cloth. They planned that “in short in three years time 
they would not have a farthings worth of anything from England.” It was not just the 
Maryland merchants.62  A traveler from Philadelphia told Murray “that the people in Boston 
are highly infla’d against the mother Country, and that their first toast after Dinner is the 
virginia assembly.” To topple the traditional “loyal toast” to the King from its preeminent 
place was a radical shift indeed.63  Finally, Massachusetts had called for a “Committee” to 
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meet at New York in early October, “to Consult what measures they should take to opose 
the Stamp act.”64  
Murray thought this “the best method they Could fall on the [to] unite the 
sentiments and Interests of the Different Colonys or provinces into one.” Britain, he 
believed, had always taken care to foster divisions among the colonies, whether by leaving 
different forms of government in place or by encouraging many different religions to populate 
the continent. Yet they had overlooked that such divisions were not unbridgeable, “for the 
Inhabitants of north america Can lay asside their religion, when their Interest requires it, as 
well as the English Can, and allways have done.”65  
Murray’s belief that the Massachusetts plan was the best way to oppose the Stamp 
Act was shared by much of the colonial elite. Thomas Wharton told his friend Benjamin 
Franklin that he and his compatriots hoped the Stamp Act Congress would “have a proper 
effect, As it is much more Consistent, than the Method pursued by Virginia.”66  Franklin 
himself was greatly disturbed by the Virginia Resolves. He told John Hughes, who he had 
been able to place as the stamp distributor for Pennsylvania, “the Rashness of the Assembly 
in Virginia is amazing! I hope however that ours will keep within the Bounds of Prudence 
and Moderation; for that is the only way to lighten or get clear of our Burden.” Franklin 
would work towards the repeal of the Stamp Act, but if he was unsuccessful, then Hughes 
would have to take the part of the noble, sympathetic man to successfully enact it. “If it 
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continues, your undertaking to execute it may make you unpopular for a Time, but your 
Acting with Coolness and Steadiness, and with every Circumstance in your Power of Favour 
to the People, will by degrees reconcile them.” Their best course was a “faithful Adherence 
to the Government of this Nation,” as opposed to “the Madness of the Populace or their 
blind Leaders, who can only bring themselves & Country into Trouble, & draw on greater 
Burthens by Acts of rebellious Tendency.”67  
But more of the colonists were becoming willing to chance those “Acts of rebellious 
Tendency.” The Virginia Resolves, it was agreed in retrospect, had stoked the colonists’ 
passion. Thomas Hutchinson saw signs of change at the time: “Upon the first arrival of the 
stamp act our political heroes seemed to be silenced and acknowledged the address or 
petition from the province which had been much exclaimed against was right and well 
judged but encouraged by Virginia they begin to open again and yesterday we had published 
a piece as full of rant as any which has preceded it.”68  And, John Adams, wrote later, the 
Virginia Resolves had filled the dying Oxenbridge Thacher with passion. “I asked him 
whether he had seen the Virginia resolves: ‘Oh yes—they are men! they are noble spirits! It 
kills me, to think of the lethargy and stupidity that prevails here.’” Thacher wanted to 
emulate Barré and Henry and “‘go into Court and make a speech, which shall be read after 
my death, as my dying testimony against this infernal tyranny, which they are bringing upon 
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us.’”69  Thacher’s anger was directed at the conservative wing of Massachusetts elite as much 
as it was at Britain. 
Murray himself had seen a hint of how far a radical response might go. The day he 
left Williamsburg he stayed the night at a Colonel Johnson’s tavern in Hanover County. The 
only talk there for a whole day and night was about the Stamp Act. “Some of them muter 
betwixt their teeth, let the worst Come to the worst we’l Call the french to our sucour; and 
if they were in Canada the British parlem’t would as soon be Dd. As to offer to do what they 
do now.” To call for not only armed revolution, but an alliance with the hated French—
even here, in Patrick Henry’s own center of power, he might have had trouble defending the 
taverngoers against charges of treason.70  
In the wake of the Virginia Resolves, the newspapers began to print more and more 
writings against the Stamp Act. And those writings would return, again and again, to the 
metaphor of slavery. Two bitter, satirical notes made the analogy between white colonists 
and African slaves clear to all. Both were widely reprinted across the colonies. The first 
directed anger at the stamp officers: “The Report that some Americans are to deliver Stamps 
to their Fellow Slaves, put us in Mind of the W. Indian Policy, most of their Plantations 
having Negro Overseers, who, in order to please their Masters, and hold their Posts, are 
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more severe to their own Colour in their Exactions and Whippings, than are the white 
Overseers, and consequently are more abhorred and detested.”71  
The second referenced an earlier event: “Not many Months have passed when a 
White Negro was such a Novelty in America, that one was exhibited Night by Night at the 
Sign of the White Horse, South End, for about 1s Sterling the Sight—Behold and 
Wonder—a Twin Brother of this Negro Necromancer has lately turned all the White Men 
on the Continent into Negroes, and not one Freeman is now to be seen on this half of the 
Globe.”72  
These notes, comparing the colonists to African slaves, were merely anecdotal; they 
proposed no remedy. For that, writers would have to invoke the earlier conception of slavery 
as the outcome of defeat in war. One writer to the Boston Evening-Post, in concurring with 
an earlier essay, concluded that “it appears an Englishman’s liberty, and the freedom so long 
boasted above our neighbors, is sunk to the bare name, and it is surely a matter of small 
import, what we are called if we are compleat slaves.” But this writer did not fully despair. He 
suggested that the colonists had a stark choice, a microcosm of which was the arguments he 
and his predecessor had presented. “Every friend to liberty will approve his sentiments, and 
those who are bred to slavery, can oppose with force.” Would the reader fight against the 
Stamp Act? Or were they “bred to slavery?”73  
In Connecticut, as many other newspapers were winding down their presses, 
Benjamin Mecom started a new publication. It was, he acknowledged, an unpropitious time. 
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“But, it is said there never was a Time when the Encouragement of such Papers was more 
necessary. The reigning question now is, Whether Americans shall be Freemen or Slaves?” 
Mecom made his answer clear through action: he would resist the Stamp Act by starting a 
new newspaper in direct defiance of those trying to impose slavery upon him. He and the 
writer in the Boston Evening-Post both drew from a particular conception of slavery as defeat 
and captivity.74  
In August, the implications of the Stamp Act conceived as “slavery,” the directives of 
the Virginia Resolves, and a diversity of local tensions would find a meeting-point in the 
violence directed at stamp officers. The rhetoric of the previous months would be 
interwoven with the riots. 
One man in Newport had a foot in both worlds. That summer, Ezra Stiles avidly 
read newspapers from across the colonies and maintained correspondences with some of 
those who would become victims of the riots. In late August, he himself would play a very 
small role in forcing Augustus Johnston to resign as Rhode Island stamp master. Stiles had 
read his friend Chauncey Whittelsey’s prescient assessment of the Stamp Act. On 17 July 
1765, a month before the riots but well after news of the Virginia Resolves had arrived, 
Stiles opened a new journal. On the cover he wrote simply, “STAMP ACT 
NOTEBOOK.”75  
On the first page Stiles began a mammoth undertaking: what would become a 
twenty-page inscription, to be placed on an imaginary column—a monument like that 
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William Goddard had suggested be erected to memorialize Isaac Barré. Stiles’s inscription 
would eventually encompass a history of the American colonies and their continual struggle 
against tyranny. But the first five lines placed the Stamp Act firmly in that tradition: 
This Column is erected AD 1765 
That fatal Year 
Which commences the Era 
of American Slavery 
and Subjugation to Great Britain. 
Stiles’s inscription thus drew on memories of Barré’s speech as it argued that the 
Stamp Act was “slavery.” And in Stiles’s actions a month later, facing off a stamp officer, he 
would prove that he had internalized the message of the Virginia Resolves. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Crowd Violence and the Fear of Slavery 
 
By August 1765, colonists from New Hampshire to Georgia knew about the Virginia 
Resolves. They read the resolves as printed in the Newport Mercury and Maryland Gazette and 
came to believe that the gentry of Virginia had approved resistance, violent if necessary, 
against “the Enemies of our Country.” And they justified such violence with reference to the 
threat of slavery implied by the Stamp Act. 
It was not until 14 August that the words of the Virginia Resolves were finally 
translated into action. And it was not the Virginians themselves, nor the Marylanders who 
boasted so loudly in their taverns, but the colonists of Massachusetts who made the break.  
But Massachusetts should not be considered as “setting the pace.” The patriots of 
that colony were no more forward in the pursuit of liberty than their southern counterparts. 
Rather, Massachusetts was first merely by dint of circumstance. The Virginia Resolves 
embodied the Stamp Act in those “Enemies” who by word or action advocated enslaving the 
colonies under Britain. And it was in Massachusetts and neighboring Rhode Island that such 
supporters of the Stamp Act were most visible. 
The most obvious target, and those who were unambiguously supporters of the 
Stamp Act, would be those who held office under the Act. And at the same time the 
newspapers were printing the Virginia Resolves, they were publishing the names of the men 
who had been named to offices under the Stamp Act. The Lords Commissioners of the 
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Treasury had appointed a distributor for each colony. The distributor would hold the 
stamped paper at a central place and sell it in exchange for specie, keeping a percentage of 
the income. The distributors were all colonists; it was thought that the Americans would 
accept the Stamp Act better if it was enforced by their own. Many were Americans employed 
in Britain, often as agents for their own colonies. They would return before 1 November, but 
for the moment were still in Britain or en route. But in Massachusetts and Rhode Island it 
was the respective attorneys general, rather than colonial agents, who had been named stamp 
distributors. Thus Andrew Oliver of Massachusetts and Augustus Johnston of Rhode Island 
were present to serve as targets of protest. 
And protest against stamp distributors could serve a practical function as well. For 
here, it turned out, was the weak point of the Stamp Act: there were not many small offices, 
but one large one, for each colony. If a colony’s single stamp distributor could be prevented 
from receiving and selling stamped papers, the Stamp Act would be nullified.   
 
So the second phase of resistance to the Stamp Act began with an embodiment of 
Massachusetts’s own “enemy.” Bostonians hung an effigy of Oliver, decorating the figure 
with objects and texts rich in meaning.  
 The crown officers were, of course, not present during the day to see the effigy 
exhibited. But John Avery, part of the cabal who had built the effigy, gave the inscriptions on 
the effigy’s breast: 
Fair Freedoms glorious Cause I meanly Quitted 
Betrayed my Country for the Sake of Pelf 
But ah! at length this evil hath me outwitted 
Instead of Stamping thus have hanged myself. 
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And those on his right arm (“AO”) and on his left: 
What greater Joy did ever New England see 
than a Stampman hanging on a Tree 
Behind the effigy “was a Boot with a Devil peeking his Head out.”1 
The Boston Gazette interpreted the symbols while avoiding the names of the targets. 
The effigy was “of a Gentleman sustaining a very unpopular Office, viz. that of St—p 
Master.” It was hung “together with a Boot, wherein was concealed a young Imp of the D—
l represented as peeping out of the Top.” Neither Bute nor Oliver (even as “AO”) were 
mentioned explicitly. Nor did the paper record the vituperation of the labels. The breast-
label now was merely “in praise of Liberty, and denouncing Vengeance on the Subvertors of 
it,” while the arm-labels went unmentioned.2 
Another newspaper was able to include a third person in its description. Behind the 
effigy hung “a Boot newly soled with a Greenvile Sole, out of which proceeded the Devil.”3 
The governor and his lieutenant tried to have the effigy removed. Lt. Governor 
Hutchinson, with Governor Bernard’s approval, directed “the Sheriff to order his Officers to 
take down the Effigy” and to record the names of any who opposed them so that a warrant 
could be issued for their arrest. The Sheriff reported back that his officers had tried to do so, 
“but could not do it without imminent danger of their lives.”4 
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The newspapers, in contrast, portrayed the day as free of conflict. (The Boston 
Gazette acknowledged that the owner of the tree had tried to take down the effigy, “but 
being advis’d to the contrary by the Populace, lest it should occasion the Demolition of his 
Windows, if nothing worse, desisted from the Attempt.”) In fact, the Evening-Post 
emphasized that “this Spectacle continued the whole Day without the least Opposition, 
tho’ visited by Multitudes.” The effigy, instead, served to build community: “The Diversion 
it occasioned among a Multitude of Spectators who continually assembled the whole Day is 
surprising; not a Peasant was suffered to pass down to the Market, let him have what he 
would for Sale, ‘till he had stop’d and got his Articles stamp’d by the Effigy.” By having the 
effigy physically “stamp” their goods, the organizers made visible the abstract threat of the 
Stamp Act and thus drew the incoming farmers into a community of protest.5 
The authorities felt they should respond, but realized they had little power to do so. 
Bernard summoned the Council to consider their response. Bernard himself believed that the 
effigy-hanging was only “the beginning … of much greater Commotions.” Some disagreed, 
suggesting that it was a “trifling Business” that could only grow if it was challenged. Others 
agreed with Bernard, saying that the well-planned demonstration should by rights be 
opposed. But they also argued that the authorities had no “force to oppose to it.” A weak 
opposition would “inflame the People” and thus would be worse than none at all. Thus, all 
were agreed against taking action. Hutchinson stood with this second group, though he 
doubted that the people would quiet down even if left alone.  After a debate on what should 
be recorded in the Council records—since nobody wanted it written down that they stood 
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against doing anything—they agreed to advise Bernard “to order the Sheriff to assemble the 
Peace Officers and preserve the peace,” which all understood to be “a matter of form rather 
than of real Significance.”6 
At dark the people lowered the effigy and prepared it for travel across town. How 
many people is uncertain: “some Thousands” and “the Mob to about three Thousand” said 
the Gazette and Avery, respectively. But the Evening-Post referred only to “a Number of 
Reputable People.”7 
All agree that the crowd took pains to stop by the town house on its parade through 
the streets. Bernard and Hutchinson were explicit about why: “knowing we were sitting in 
the Council Chamber, they gave three huzzas by way of defiance, and passed on.” When the 
newspapers mentioned that the crowd had made a short pause at the town house the 
informed local reader would have understood the challenge to authority—yet the distant 
reader would not.8 
The crowd passed down King Street to Oliver’s Dock, where Andrew Oliver had 
recently constructed a small brick building, intended, it was said, to be the stamp office. 
Accordingly, the crowd tore down the structure. They continued their march up to Fort 
Hill, carrying the timbers from the office as well as with the effigy. On the way up the hill 
they passed Oliver’s house. The crowd stopped and beheaded the effigy, according to Avery 
and Bernard—the newspapers did not mention the beheading. Bernard also wrote that at 
this point the crowd shattered all the windows on the façade facing the street. The Boston 
                                                 
6 Hutchinson to unknown, 16 August 1765; Bernard to Board of Trade, 15 August 1765. Bernard is quoted. 
7 Boston Gazette, 19 August 1765; Avery to Collins, 19 August 1765; Boston Evening-Post, 19 August 1765. 
8 Bernard to Board of Trade, 15 August 1765, (quoted); Hutchinson to unknown, 16 August 1765; Boston 
Gazette, 19 August 1765; Boston Evening-Post, 19 August 1765. 
 71 
Evening-Post acknowledged that the crowd had “received from the Populace some small 
insults, such as breaking a few Panes of Glass in the Windows of his Kitchen.” But the mild 
abuse would not have intensified without provocation from Oliver’s friends. In his turn, 
Hutchinson believed that the crowd’s attack on the house was in defiance of the gentlemen 
who were the nominal leaders of the demonstration.9 
They burned the effigy atop Fort Hill, on a pyre made of the timbers from the 
destroyed stamp-office. The Boston Evening-Post found a religious parallel: “kindling a noble 
Fire therewith, they makd a Burnt-Offering of the effigies for those Sins of the People which 
had caused such heavy Judgments as the Stamp-Act, &c., to be laid upon them.”10  
While the fire was burning the crowd returned to Oliver’s house. This was the point, 
the sources agree, where control shifted from the hands of the gentlemen “abettors” to the 
solid mass of the people.  They attacked Oliver’s outbuildings and improvements first: his 
garden house, the garden itself and the fences around it, his stables and coach-houses. The 
Boston Gazette emphasized that “a number of Spectators present” prevented the crowd from 
doing even more damage to Oliver’s property, saving the “Coach, Booby-Hutch, Chaise 
&c.” from being thrown on the bonfire. The Boston Evening-Post was much more sanguine 
about the attack, not mentioning the attack on the outbuildings.11  
Neither did Thomas Hutchinson mention the attack on the outbuildings. But by the 
time the crowd got to the house he was present. He had sent for “the Sheriff and Mr 
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Paxton” and the three of them had taken up station in Oliver’s house, after first forcing 
Oliver to leave for his own safety.12  
The Boston Evening-Post suggested that the house would have been left alone, “had 
not some Indiscretions, to say the least, been committed” by the men within. These “so 
enraged the People that they were not to be restrain’d, tho’ hitherto no Violence had been 
offer’d to any Person and the utmost Decorum had been preserv’d.” The Evening-Post’s 
assessment of why the house attack started paralleled the iconic story of Isaac Barré’s speech 
in Parliament, when he could no longer hold back against Townsend’s provocations and 
found himself standing up to passionately defend the colonies. The crowd, like Barré or his 
colonial counterpart Patrick Henry, could control themselves until righteous fury forced 
them to unleash their emotions.13  
The crowd spent half an hour breaking into the house, according to Hutchinson. 
They heaved stones at the house until “the glass and frames of the lower story were entirely 
gone on one side.” Soon they had shattered the interior shutters as well and made a breach 
big enough to climb through. It was at this point that Hutchinson and his companions 
retreated into the back rooms of the house. The crowd deliberated briefly before entering 
the house—something that would not be expected of an out-of-control mob. But enter they 
did, and Hutchinson and the others removed themselves from the house entirely.14  
No accounts survive from any of those who entered Oliver’s house, and neither 
Hutchinson nor Bernard were there to provide a crown officer’s viewpoint.  The only 
                                                 
12 Hutchinson to unknown, 16 August 1765. 
13 Boston Evening-Post, 19 August 1765. On Barré and Henry, see chapter 1. 
14 Hutchinson to unknown, 16 August 1765. 
 73 
sources that described what happened next were the newspapers. The Gazette and Evening-
Post were in a quandary. They approved of the attack on Oliver’s but could not appear too 
comfortable with it. The solution was to emphasize the rioters’ restraint. The Boston Gazette 
acknowledged that in Oliver’s wine cellar they “help’d themselves to the Liquor which they 
found there in the Silver Plate that the house afforded.” But “none of which however was 
missing the next Day, altho’ scattered over various parts of the House.” The Evening-Post 
concurred. “It is remarkable,” they wrote, “tho’ they enter’d the lower Part of the House in 
Multitudes, yet the Damage done to it was not so great as might have been expected, and 
not one thing missing.” The crowd had exhibited its restraint by leaving Oliver’s possessions. 
They were not out for personal gain, but for the good of the community. Though they were 
not entirely orderly—the Gazette acknowledged that they “destroyed Part of the Furniture, 
among which was a Looking Glass said to be the largest in North-America, with two others, 
&c.” Hutchinson would later estimate the damage as about 100 pounds sterling.15  
For the newspapers, this was the end of the night’s activity. Bernard and Hutchinson 
said more to their English correspondents. Bernard reported, of course secondhand, that the 
mob “searched about for Mr Oliver, declaring they would kill him.” A party searched “two 
neighboring houses, in one of which Mr Oliver was.” Fortunately for him, “a Gentleman” 
threw off the mob by telling them Oliver had retreated to Castle William with Bernard; 
“otherwise he would certainly have been murdered.”16  
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After his retreat, Hutchinson found the colonel of the militia. Hutchinson told him 
that they should “make an alarm the town being in the hands of the mob.” Hutchinson went 
to Bernard and was granted the appropriate order “to make use of at my discretion.” 
Bernard did not say whether he mentioned his earlier meeting with the colonel. Then, the 
colonel had told Bernard that such an alarm would “signify nothing, for as soon as the drum 
were heard, the drummer would be knocked down, and the drum broke.” In any case, 
“probably all the drummers of the Regiment were in the Mob.”17  
Hutchinson received more bad advice when he returned to Oliver’s neighborhood. 
At a house “near the scene of action” he spoke to “several gentlemen” who had themselves 
spoken with the mob. The gentlemen estimated that “they had spent their rage and did not 
doubt if I would take the Sheriff and go to the house I should have weight enough to 
disperse them.”18  
Hutchinson may have suspected something was up. “I was in doubt,” he wrote later, 
“but however went, but upon my entering the cry was G-d-n their blood here’s the Sheriff 
with the Governor—stand by my boys let no man give way. The cry was succeeded by a 
volley of stones and bricks.” Hutchinson had entered as the crowd were downstairs in the 
cellar and otherwise scattered about the house. Upon seeing him the mob reformed, any 
doubts mollified by the informal authority of their own leader. They must have picked up 
the same “stones and bricks” that they had earlier thrown through the windows into the 
house and used them again, not against the house but against two bodies.19  
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Hutchinson, avoiding the stones, “turned into a little room where a young 
gentleman cried out for god’s sake Sir put out the lights or you’ll be dead in a moment and 
then ran and blew out the candles and fled.” Presumably Hutchinson had entered a closet or 
other room with only one exit, for he “considered a moment whether to take my chance 
there or run thro the mob and chose the latter and escaped with a slight stroke in my arm 
and another in my leg.” He never mentioned how the Sheriff escaped. This ended the night’s 
escapades. Bernard wrote dryly that “nothing more to be done,” the crowd dispersed about 
midnight.20  
 
The next day Bernard again summoned the Council. They once again recommended 
only the most formal of actions, for “it would be to no purpose to attempt to raise a Military 
Force, as the Militia, the only force we had, would never act against the Rioters, if they 
would assemble at all, which was much doubted.” Instead they suggested Bernard issue a 
proclamation promising a reward for “discovering the Offenders” and to ask “the Justices of 
the Peace & the selectmen of the Town” to use their influence to protect the town. The 
councilors realized that their authority was in name only and wished to take no steps that 
would force an acknowledgment of that fact. Hutchinson wrote what they were probably all 
thinking, that the proclamation would “have no effect and if discovery was made at present, 
it would not be possible to commit them.” Accordingly, the justices and selectmen followed 
the protocol: when Bernard summoned them into the Council Chamber and “earnestly 
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exhorted them to use all means in their power to preserve the Peace” they promised to do 
so.21  
In the streets, the day began well when Oliver publicly resigned his office. As the 
Boston Gazette reported, “the St—p M—r, in order to appease the Sensations which seemed 
to possess the Breasts of every one, at the Prospects of a future Stamp Duty, sent a Card to 
several Gentlemen, acquainting them that he had absolutely declined having any Concern in 
that Office.” Oliver, now on the right side of the debate, could be portrayed as a man of 
sympathy, aware of and responsive to the “Sensations” of the people. Oliver’s card “being 
publickly read upon ‘Change, it was tho’t all Uneasiness would subside.”  According to 
Bernard, however, Oliver’s resignation had not been entirely voluntary, even apart from the 
intimidation of the night before. “Several Gentlemen” demanded that Oliver make a 
“publick declaration” of his resignation; otherwise, they said, “his House would be 
immediately destroyed, and his Life in continual Danger.” It was only after this intervention 
that Oliver agreed to have the gentlemen read a declaration that he “would immediately 
apply for leave to resign, and would not act in the office, (as indeed it was impossible for him 
to do,) until he received further orders.”22  
 
Bernard believed he had “taken all … necessary Measures” to prevent “Mischief,” 
and retired at dusk to Castle William to write his letter to the Lords of Trade. Hutchinson 
was not so sanguine. “Towards the evening,” he wrote, “it was rumored about my turn 
would be next.” His friends asked him to leave his house. Hutchinson acknowledged the 
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danger by sending “my daughters and young son to lodge abroad” while himself staying and 
making fast the entrances “in the best manner I could.” The Boston Evening-Post 
acknowledged the rumor, that “a certain honorable Gentleman in high Posts, had forwarded 
the Stamp Act, by recommending it as an easy method of gulling the People of their Liberty 
and Property.” The plural “Posts” was an intentional revelation that the man in question 
was Hutchinson. One of the primary complaints against him had been that he held several 
offices—Lieutenant-Governor, Chief Justice—in what was to some colonists a clear example 
of a dangerous concentration of power in one man. Hutchinson thus embodied the worst 
tendencies of imperial overreach. But the reason given for the present anger with him was 
only that he had supported and encouraged the Stamp Act.23  
The people of the town again assembled that evening. This time, Bernard believed, 
the “Gentlemen” who had aided and abetted the previous night’s crowd were not present. 
The newspapers would give no indication one way or the other. Atop Fort-Hill the people 
erected the makings of a bonfire, an elaborate construction of “a Number of Stages with Tar 
Barrels, &c. in the Form of a Pyramid, in the Centre of which was a Flag-Staff, and a Union 
Flag hoisted.” Seeing the danger to the town, “the Justices and Selectmen” ascended Fort-
Hill to ask the people to disperse on the grounds that Oliver had resigned, “and had given 
Satisfaction to all persons concerned upon that Account.” At first “the Mob were very 
incredulous, or perhaps they were unwilling to lose their Frolick.” They dispersed—but only 
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temporarily. When they assembled again to ignite the fire, “proper persons” again went to 
speak with them, preventing mischief for the time.24  
The newspapers presented the gathering quite differently. The Gazette acknowledged 
the bonfire, but reported that, “’tis said the Stamp Master sent them a letter with the 
aforementioned Resolution of Non-acceptance, and Assurance of Endeavors to serve the 
Province, &c., upon which they thought proper to demolish the Bonfire and retire.” The 
Evening-Post described an even more harmless event: the assembled crowd merely “paid their 
Thanks to the Gentleman who resign’d by Huzza’s, &c.” In these accounts there was no 
evidence of any rift between the common people of the crowd and the gentlemen who had 
been with them the night before. Given the events of two weeks later, this particular 
fabulation could not be sustained.25  
The newspapers skimmed over the crowd’s final action for the night, in which they 
visited the house of the “honorable Gentleman” or “his H—r the L—t G—r’s,” “in order to 
enquire about the Truth of that Rumour.” “But not finding him at home,” the Evening-Post 
reported, “and being assured by some reputable Gentlemen there was no Foundation for the 
Report, they quietly dispersed.” The Gazette only contradicted the Evening-Post in order for 
the crowd to end with “loud Acclamations in every Quarter of the Town, on account of the 
Resignation of the Stamp Master; which, they were assured, was forwarded by Express to 
New-York, to go in the Pacquet from thence.” The crowd was quite aware that a resignation 
meant little without the authorities knowing about it.26  
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Hutchinson described a rather different experience when the crowd visited his house 
that night. First, they came not to talk but to act, not to the front door but to the service 
areas in the rear. “Several hundred came to the back part of my house and finding all fast the 
leader asked whether they should begin with the coach house or stables.” The crowd forced 
Hutchinson’s gates and went to the rear of the house, “which finding well secured they 
moved round” to the front of the house. “With furious knocking at the door [they] 
demanded entrance promising to do no damage,” the threat, presumably, being stronger 
than the execution.  The crowd “only wanted to speak to me.” More specifically, they 
wanted Hutchinson to “declare to them I had never wrote to England in favor of the stamp 
act.” If Hutchinson could swear this, “they would not hurt a hair of my head.”27  
The threats to Hutchinson echoed the acid test given in the Virginia Resolves: 
Resolved, That any Person, who shall, by speaking or writing, assert or maintain, 
that any Person or Persons, other than the General Assembly of this Colony, have 
any Right or Power to impose or lay any Taxation on the People here, shall be 
deemed an Enemy to this his Majesty’s Colony.28  
Had Hutchinson written to England in support of the Stamp Act, a tax laid by an 
unrepresentative legislature? If so, he was an “Enemy to this his Majesty’s colony” (a clever 
juxtaposition, invoking loyalty to the King at the same time as claiming the right to 
determine who was and was not truly loyal to the King!) And if Hutchinson was an enemy, 
he could (and should) be prevented, by violence if necessary, from hurting the community. 
Hutchinson, still hidden in his house, gave no answer and the crowd “began to break 
the windows.” It was left for Hutchinson’s neighbors to intervene. One “called out his 
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window and declared he knew I was not in town.” Another went further: “One grave elderly 
tradesman” ventured into the crowd “and seeing one of the mob lay hold of the pales asked 
what he was going to do.” The man replied “pull down the fence.” Hutchinson’s intercessor, 
perhaps shaking his head, “asked whether [Hutchinson] had ever injured him and then 
begged them to be silent and being a noted speaker in town meetings he soon engaged their 
attention.”29  
Hutchinson reported that the tradesman “challenged every one of them to say I had 
ever done them the least wrong, [and] charged them with ingratitude in insulting a 
gentleman who had been serving his country all his days.” This invocation of sympathy could 
not be wholly denied. Even the spokesman for the crowd “acknowledged they had a regard 
for me in my private character.” But private character must, he argued, be dissociated from 
public actions. The spokesman thus argued “it was said I was in favor of the Stamp Act.” 
Hutchinson would not lie (a point the tradesman must have had to concede, since he had 
based his rhetoric in Hutchinson’s character). So if the crowd “could know from my own 
mouth that I was not” in favor of the Stamp Act “they would be easy.”30  
The tradesman “replied that he would answer for me. I was in favor of no act that 
would hurt the country but yet it was unreasonable in them to expect, if I was at home, that 
I should be accountable to them.” Hutchinson’s defender “went on with his harangue until 
he brought” the crowd’s leaders “to give the word to move.” From there they went to the 
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Province House, looking for Bernard. Finding from his servants that he was at Castle 
William, “they gave three huzzas, and went away.”31  
Hutchinson expressed relief at the “raising of the siege,” but his words suggested that 
the crowd may have had some justification. He feared “if I had been obliged to answer their 
question I must either have enraged them or else given them a handle to justify their 
extravagant behavior.” Hutchinson, of course, believed that the colonists should submit to 
Parliament’s rightful authority and accept the Stamp Act.  Parliament, in other words, did 
have the “Right or Power to impose or lay any Taxation on the People here,” in the words 
of the Virginia Resolves.32  And Hutchinson’s immediate behavior may have raised more 
suspicions among the people. “For the sake of a more easy mind…as well as to shew some 
resentment,” Hutchinson immediately removed himself and his children to a country house 
“where I intend to remain a few days.”33  
 
In a long letter to the Board of Trade, Francis Bernard tried to make sense of the 
previous days’ events. Bernard believed that the Virginia Resolves had been the ultimate 
provocation to riot. At first, “two or three months ago, I thought that this People would 
have submitted to the Stamp Act without actual Opposition.” But everything changed 
when, in late June and early July, the northern newspapers published the Virginia Resolves. 
It was these that “proved an Alarm bell to the disaffected.” The Virginia Resolves inspired 
“an infamous weekly paper,” probably the Boston Gazette, which “swarmed with libels of the 
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most obnoxious kind.” Bernard considered the repetition of these “Vehemen[t]” libels to be 
“preludes to Action.” But he had expected that resistance, if it came, would begin closer to 
the first of November. Nor would it “be carried to such Lengths, as it has been.”34  
Ensconced safely in the Castle after the second day of rioting, Bernard spun a story 
about the participants in the riots and their motives. “The abettors of them say,” that the 
mob’s visit to Hutchinson’s and Bernard’s homes “were designed only to desire me & the 
Lt. Governor to write home to get the Stamp Act repealed.” Bernard thought those who had 
been out on the second night were “I am told, the Lowest of the Mob.” But the mob had 
many “Abettors of Consequence,” some fifty “Gentlemen Actors…disguised with trousers 
and Jackets on,” as well as “a much larger Number behind the Curtain.” The gentlemen, he 
had heard, had only participated on the first night, and then only to the point of burning the 
effigy. Those same gentlemen “took pains the next day to prevent any further Mischief being 
done to Mr Oliver or his house.”35  
Despite the moderate actions of the “Gentlemen,” Bostonians were fully prepared to 
continue with violence. They would refuse to allow the Stamp Act to be enacted. “Any Man 
who offers a Stamped Paper to sell, will be immediately killed.” Britain’s power would not 
suffice to stop them, for they would rather “die upon the place first.” Bernard admitted that 
he had dismissed these words at first, but that now, after the riots, he was forced to believe 
that the Bostonians meant what they said.36  
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Bernard tried to forestall any thoughts that the townspeople were in a general revolt 
against authority. It was clear to him that the mob’s actions were directed against only the 
Stamp Act. He had received no “personal insult.” The people did not complain that he had 
issued a proclamation against the rioters, “as it was considered a form of Government.” But 
if he had actually tried to put that proclamation into execution, “I should [have] become an 
Object of Popular Resentment my self.” The people accepted his authority—as long as it 
was used in support of ends approved by the community. And Bernard knew he had no 
power to change the state of affairs. The militia was not under his command and there was 
no “Company of Regulars” within 200 miles. Thus, Bernard knew he had “no Choice but to 
submit to indignity, and to acquiesce in this high insult upon the Authority of my 
Government, & wait for a more firm Establishment of it.”37  
 
Concluding his long letter, Bernard tried to place the events of the previous days into 
a larger context. He accepted the gentlemen “abettors’” position that their goal in visiting 
him and Hutchinson had only been to influence them “to write home to get the Stamp Act 
repealed.” But the visitors themselves had mostly been “the lowest of the Mob.” This 
contrast between gentlemen and the mob made this riot very different from others in recent 
times: “Everyone agrees that this riot has exceeded all others known here, both in the 
Vehemence of Action and mischievousness of intention, and never had any Mob so many 
abettors of Consequence as this is supposed to have had.” At least fifty “gentlemen Actors... 
disguised with trousers and jackets on” accompanied the crowd as far as Fort Hill to burn 
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the effigies, “& then departed, and had no hand in storming the House.” These same 
gentlemen were instrumental in keeping the crowd away from Oliver’s after he had 
resigned.38  
Bernard’s eyes had been opened to his own powerlessness. He acknowledged that 
“no personal insult” had been directed at him. But this was because they realized he could 
not do anything to stop the crowd. The crowd and its abettors were so secure in their power 
that they would allow Bernard to keep up the charade that he controlled the city. They 
allowed him to issue his proclamation ordering the capture of the rioters. This “gave no 
Offence, as it was considered as a Form of Government.” But if Bernard had actually 
attempted to carry out the proclamation, he was told, “I should soon become an Object of 
Popular resentment myself.” He had no military force with which to “oppose or correct an 
insurrection of this kind…there is not, that I know of, a Company of Regulars within 200 
miles of me.” Thus, Bernard had to “submit to indignity, and to acquiesce in this high insult 
upon the Authority of my Government.”39  
The balance of power in Boston meant that Oliver was free of blame in resigning his 
office as stamp distributor. Indeed, Oliver had acted as well as anyone could have. He only 
resigned “under the Terrors of the first Night, the expectation of great distress upon the 
second, his Wife and Children drove from their own House, and not safe in any other, 
himself devoted to Destruction by an enraged & merciless Mob, and no Power in the Place 
capable of protecting him.” By placing the safety of his family over “Considerations of 
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Profit,” by refusing to “set so mad & incensed a People at defiance,” Oliver had 
demonstrated his superior qualities—the qualities of the sympathetic man.40  
The riot had cemented Boston’s resistance to the Stamp Act. The “common talk” 
was that “the Stamp Act shall not be executed here, that a Man who offers a Stamped Paper 
to sell, will be immediately killed, that all the Power of Great Britain shall not oblige them 
to submit to the Stamp Act; that they will die upon the place first &c. &c.” Bernard had 
dismissed this talk before; now, his impotence revealed, he was convinced that the Stamp 
Act could not be enforced without “fresh Orders and Powers” from England. John Avery, in 
contrast, was jubilant: “What will be the Consequence? I know not neither do I care but 
hope that all the provinces will follow this laudible example & pray god that England asserts 
their Rights & Priveledges and may maintain them, & Die like Freemen rather than live like 
Slaves.”41  
 
One final report on the riot provides an illuminating contrast. The Massachusetts 
Gazette, owned by the official printers to the colony, had come under attack for not 
immediately publishing an account of the “Occurrences of Last Week.” The Gazette 
countered that—since they were “Tools to none”—they had not been given an account by 
the instigators. Nevertheless, the Gazette now consented to publish “as concise and true an 
Account of that Affair as is in our Power.” That account would be dry as could be, recording 
the bare bones of the event while skewering the participants. They noted the effigy meant to 
represent Bute, “a Jack-boot with a Head and Horns peeping out of the Top, said by some 
                                                 
40 Bernard to Board of Trade, 15 August 1765. 
41 Bernard to Board of Trade, 15 August 1765; Avery to Collins, 19 August 1765. 
 86 
of the Printers, to be the Devil or his Imp.” But making it clear that they had not been 
themselves part of the planning or privy to inside information, they wrote, “but, as we are 
not acquainted with that Species of Gentlemen, we cannot so well determine whether it was 
an exact Resemblance or not.” The patriotic subjects of the King who had come out to view 
the effigy were in the Gazette’s rendering, “So much … affected with a Sense of Liberty, that 
scarce any could attend to the Task of Day-Labour; but all seemed on the Wing for 
Freedom.” The task of demolishing the stamp-office was “soon effected, without receiving 
any Hurt, excepting one of the Spectators, who happened to be rather too nigh the Brick 
Wall when it fell.” Even the attack on Oliver’s house allowed the rioters to “bravely shew 
their Loyalty, Courage, and Zeal, to defend the Rights and Liberties of Englishmen.”42  
On the second day’s events, they merely wrote that at Hutchinson’s house, “upon 
being informed by some Gentlemen of Integrity and Reputation, that he had not only spoke 
but wrote” that he had not had any part in the Stamp Act, “they retired; and having patroled 
the Streets, returned to their respective Habitations, as quietly as they had done the Night 
before.” Coming a week after the events, when knowledge of the tumult both evenings 
would have been well-known throughout Boston, the Massachusetts Gazette’s obvious 
dismissal of the tensions in the town would have had the effect of highlighting them. 
 
In contrast to the Massachusetts Gazette, Andrew Oliver felt the need to directly 
disavow what the Boston Gazette had written, “that he had wrote home, that it would 
endanger the Life of any that did, it being contrary to the Rights and Privileges of 
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Englishmen.” Instead, he had only written that he “desired to be excused from executing the 
Office of Distributor of the Stamps, and that when they arrive he shall only take proper care 
to secure them for the Crown but will take no one Step for distributing the same at the time 
appointed by the Act.” Even this, he admitted, was only “given out by my leave in order to 
quiet the People.”  He still wanted to “bring things to rights: if I cannot issue the Stamps, 
the People themselves must be the Sufferers.”43  
Conditions in Boston were dangerous. The sheer mass of people involved in “the 
Opposition” meant that the state had little power to intervene, beyond “issuing a 
Proclamation, which it is supposed can have no Effect; and a Guard of six men to defend my 
House from Pillage after the Mob had quitted it the first night.” The gentlemen who had 
organized the first night’s events were beginning to see that they had created a danger to 
themselves. Oliver believed, perhaps wishfully, that they might consent to the use of 
stamped paper—“but they have so alarmed the lower sort of People that I am doubtful 
whether they could safely make use of them, however necessary.” He concluded that only 
the military could enforce the Stamp Act: “I am fully persuaded it will not be in the power of 
any Native to execute.” The people would try to destroy the stamps upon their arrival. 
Britain’s best hope was that Boston would prove to be the only defiant city: 
Much will depend on the behaviour of the other Governments: if no Acts of violence 
should take place there, the temper of our people may lower. As so much depends on 
this contingency, I dare not presume to give any opinion concerning the measures 
proper to be pursued by the Administration on this Occasion.44  
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Bernard, too, was concerned that the stamps be protected. He made arrangements 
for them to be secured by the Royal Navy and in Castle William. Opinion in the city ran 
strong against this. Townspeople asserted “that the Castle shall not protect the Stamps. 
Some say it will be stormed by thousands of People; others that the Garrison will give it up 
at first Summons.” The garrison was only sixty men strong. Bernard might increase it with 
militiamen, but that would “produce an Effect the very reverse of defending the place.” The 
little that could be done to strengthen the fort he would do.45  
Bernard passed on anecdotes from Boston to illustrate “the Fury, which at present 
possesses the People of Boston of all Orders and Degrees of Men.” Even the gentry of 
Boston had to watch their words. One gentleman had said he would submit to the Stamp 
Act. The response was swift: “a Day was fixed for pulling down his House, and it was 
prevented not without difficulty.” Another had “mentioned his Expectation, that some 
regular Forces would be sent into the Town.” He was threatened with the same treatment. 
An Anglican minister, “having in his Sermon obliquely condemned these Proceedings, has 
been threatened with the Resentment of the People.” Even more shockingly, “another 
congregational Minister, well known by his late polemical writings, has, as I have been told 
by several Persons, justified this Proceeding in his Sermon, and prayed for its Success.” 
Bernard’s hope was that most people were merely afraid to speak out, “and will appear on 
the other Side, when they can do it with Safety.”46  
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But Bernard feared that things would get worse, not better. The Sheriff had been 
asked by concerned friends to resign, for “it would soon become dangerous for a civil officer 
to appear.” Already there were plans for a “grand Jubilee” on the first of November, “when I 
suppose there will be much Mischief done, and Vengeance wreaked upon those who remain 
friends to Government.” Like Oliver, Bernard believed the best hope was that the other 
colonies would not act as had Massachusetts. Boston’s leaders, he thought, were 
encouraging the popular leaders elsewhere: “It is said at Boston, that the same Spirit prevails 
over the Country: But I much doubt it at present; how it may be brought about hereafter, I 
can’t say.”47  
In Boston, indeed, Bernard’s authority had become little more than a pretense. The 
people allowed him to act as Governor “in the Council Chamber, provided I don’t attempt 
it any where else.” They might not allow him even this were it not that they wished to avoid 
the appearance of open revolt. Only force, directed from Britain, would suffice to restore the 
correct lines of authority. And even that might not succeed. The mood on the streets was, 
“let the force from England be ever so great, it will be sufficiently opposed.” The Virginia 
colonel who in June had suggested alliance with France would have felt a kinship with his 
Boston counterparts.48  
 
A week after the well-organized effigy-burning and the successful intimidation of 
Oliver, Boston had slipped in a direction uncomfortable for both the gentlemen opposed to 
the Stamp Act and the crown officers who wanted to enforce it. The crowd, once risen, had 
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purposes that ran counter to those of their ostensible leaders. They were pleased with the 
nullification of the Stamp Act, certainly, but what of redressing other grievances? In the 
aftermath of the riot, then, tension arose on the edges between each of three points of a 
triangle: the crowd, representing the lower classes; the gentlemen of the upper classes; and 
the crown officers and their supporters whose social position was based in their relation to 
Britain. This situation could not continue for long. At the end of August, the crowd made its 
move. 
 The morning of 26 August Thomas Hutchinson returned to Boston from his 
country estate. Friends told him the news: a rumor was circulating that the custom house 
and admiralty officers’ houses would be attacked that night. They assured Hutchinson that 
he should not worry, since “the rabble were satisfied with the insult I had received” two 
weeks earlier “and that I was rather popular.” Indeed, few thought the rumors were more 
than idle threats.49  
At twilight people began to gather in King Street, upon the Exchange—directly in 
front of the Town-House. A few “boys and children” started a small bonfire. Some 
gentlemen congregating had them extinguish the fire, but it was soon lit again. This time a 
“Fire-Ward, perceiving it to rise to a dangerous Height,” tried to put it out or at least 
remove some of the fuel. First he was warned, then, persisting, “received a Blow, and such 
Tokens of Insult and Outrage,” that forced him to abandon the effort. As darkness fell, a 
signal was given: “a peculiar Hoop and Whistle” that summoned “a great number of 
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disguised Ruffians … armed with Clubs, Staves, &c.” They took up the cry of “Liberty and 
Property,” which Bernard interpreted as “their usual notice of their intention to plunder and 
pull down a house.”50  
The crowd first visited the house of Charles Paxton, surveyor of the port of Boston 
and marshal of the vice-admiralty court. There they found not Paxton but his landlord, who 
explained that Paxton had taken all his things and left. The landlord pointed out that “he 
had never injured them,” and invited them to his tavern for a barrel of punch. The crowd 
happily obliged.51  
Next marked was William Story, register-deputy of the court of vice-admiralty. His 
house was opposite the north side of the court-house. Perhaps fortunately for Story, he used 
the lower story of the house as his office. It was apparently that which the crowd was 
looking for, since they concentrated on the “public Files and Records of that Court.” These, 
along with his private papers and account books, were “exposed to Ravage and Destruction, 
and improved as Fuel to revive the expiring Flames.” The house was itself battered and some 
people looked in the area for Story “with an intention to kill him.” But in half an hour—
having fulfilled the principal goal of destroying Story’s admiralty-court records—they had 
decided to move on.52  
Benjamin Hallowell, comptroller of customs, was the third victim. His was a larger 
house, a “new and elegantly finished Building” on Hanover Street, and the crowd treated it 
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much as they had Oliver’s two weeks before. “After tearing down the Fences, breaking the 
Windows, &c. they at length entered the House, and in the most savage and destructive 
manner broke and abused his Furniture, Chairs, Tables, Desk, Glasses, China, and in that 
every Thing they could lay their Hands on.” From the cellar they drank as much wine and 
liquor as they could hold. Like the other houses that night, they laid hold of all the private 
and public papers and in this case (there perhaps being no fire burning) they merely 
“dispersed” them. At Oliver’s the newspapers and even the crown officers noted, little or 
nothing had been stolen. But at Hallowell’s, all agreed, the crowd “destroyed or carried off 
every thing of value,” including about £30 sterling in money.53  
The final target of the night was Hutchinson. Two weeks before the crowd had been 
inclined to go after him, but had been guided to Oliver’s and Fort-Hill instead. Hutchinson 
apparently felt that the danger was over—he had been implicated in neither the custom-
house affair or the Stamp Act. So, when the crowd began to gather, he was “at supper and 
my children around me.” Friends came to warn him and Hutchinson took action. He sent 
his children away and secured himself inside the house as he had done before. But Margaret, 
his eldest daughter, “repented her leaving me and hastened back and protested she would 
not quit the house unless I did. I could not stand against this and withdrew with her to a 
neighbouring house.”  Hutchinson subtly portrayed himself as the sympathetic man; himself 
willing to fight the forces arrayed against him, but valuing the lives of those under his 
protection more. Bernard in his letter to the Lords of Trade gave the same story.54  
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“The hellish crew fell upon my house with the rage of devils,” Hutchinson wrote. 
His son, in the “great entry” of the neighboring house, “heard them cry damn him he is 
upstairs we’ll have him.” When they did not find him in the house, they began to search the 
nearby area. Hutchinson and his family retired “thro yards and gardens to a house more 
remote.” He did not return until four in the morning, after the mob had left, to find that 
“one of the best finished houses in the Province had nothing remaining but the bare walls 
and floors. “ The crowd had removed the cupola and sent it crashing to the ground, They 
broke down the doors, the wainscot, and even the interior partitions, and were 
systematically removing the slates from the roof when the sky began to lighten.55  
As at Hallowell’s the crowd made off with Hutchinson’s goods: his plate, family 
pictures, “Wearing Apparrel,” close to £1,000 sterling, a “valuable and costly Library.” They 
“emptied the house of every thing whatsoever except a part of the kitchen furniture.”56   
But perhaps, for Hutchinson, the worst loss was that of his collection of 
manuscripts. Hutchinson had a reputation as one of the colonies’ great antiquarians. He had 
collected a vast store of private and public papers for use both in his official posts and for 
writing his multi-volume History of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. All these papers were 
“scattered or destroyed.” The Boston News-Letter judged this a crime against not just 
Hutchinson but also the colony: “the Damage in its Consequences may be esteemed 
publickly as well as privately, Injurious.”57  
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And Francis Bernard made of the papers’ destruction a symbol of the entire tragic 
event: 
But the loss to be most lamented is, that there was in one room, kept for that 
purpose, a large and valuable collection of manuscripts and original papers, which he 
had been gathering all his life-time, and to which all persons, who had been in 
possession of valuable papers of a publick kind, had been contributing, as to a 
publick Museum. As these related to the history and policy of the country, from the 
time of its settlement to the present and was the only collection of its kind, the loss 
of the publick is great and irretrievable, as it is to himself, the loss of the papers of a 
family, which had made a figure in this province for a hundred and thirty years.58  
After the first riot, the newspapers had made of Hutchinson a secondary figure. But 
now Hutchinson became a hero, the quintessential man of sympathy. Relaxing at dinner, 
“the evening being warm I had undressed me and slipt on a thin camlet surtout over my 
wastcoat.” The next morning the weather had turned chilly and Hutchinson, his wardrobe 
destroyed, was forced to borrow mismatched pieces from his friends. That day, the Boston 
News-Letter explained, the Superior Court was to meet. If Hutchinson did not attend, 
“notwithstanding his great distress,” there would be no quorum. He indeed came, though 
his regalia had been stolen or destroyed the night before. “His Brethren of the Bench, and 
the Gentlemen of the Bar habited in their respective Robes, and him in his only Suit! A 
Scene truly affecting to every humane and feeling Breast.”59  
The writer for the Boston News-Letter explained why Hutchinson’s behavior was so 
worthy of recognition: 
To bear one’s own Misfortune with Firmness, and to feel for others, (the Words on 
the Occasion of an honorable and worthy Gentleman, who has lately take his 
Residence among us) is the Part of true Philosophy; who then can blush, or be 
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ashamed of Sympathy with those who have so severely felt the Resentment of a 
misguided and merciless Rabble. 
Even after his house had been destroyed Hutchinson still felt the anger of some 
Bostonians. He intended to take his family to his Milton country house after the court had 
met. But on the road Hutchinson encountered several bands of “ruffians” who, he believed, 
had hid out in the country. They must have been looking for him—his coachman heard one 
say “There he is.” Listening again to his daughters, who “were terrified and said they should 
never be safe,” Hutchinson had the coachman turn around and return them to Castle 
William.60  
Meanwhile, Bernard was trying to organize a Council meeting at Cambridge, away 
from dangerous Boston.  But Oliver, in his role as secretary of the council, told Bernard that 
there would not be any problems in Boston, for “all the Gentlemen in the Place were ready 
to support the Government in detecting and punishing the Actors in the last horrid Scene, 
and there was a Town meeting appointed to testify their Abhorrence of it.” Further, it was 
rumored in the town that a “greater Mischief” was planned for the night of 27 September. 
The crowd had a list of fifteen houses to attack, including the Custom-house and “the 
Houses of some of the most respectable Persons in the Government.” The Council meeting 
was accordingly devoted to measures designed to prevent more rioting. Bernard called out 
the Boston militia and those of the neighboring towns. He encouraged the gentlemen of 
Boston to enroll in these companies as volunteers. Many did, especially in the Cadet-
Guards. This trustworthy group Bernard assigned to protect the custom-house and its 
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“several thousand pounds of the King’s money.” The precautions worked: the town was 
quiet, “except that the Cadets were obliged once to present their pieces, but did not fire.”61  
In the aftermath of the second Boston riot, the different actors tried to explain what 
had happened and to predict what would come next. 
Bernard tried to explain to the ministry. The first riot had been surprisingly 
“practicable and easy.” The government had been unable to stop it, nor could they take any 
action against the rioters since “the principal people of the town publickly avowed and 
justified the act.” The result had been that the townspeople felt free to dig up past offenses, 
public and private, committed by crown officers and to trumpet them “under the Mask of 
the publick cause.” The central grievance was that over a dispute with the Admiralty and 
Custom-house in 1761.  
A townsperson, with the initials B. H., had been in London and had seen the 
depositions filed there by the Massachusetts crown officers. When he returned to Boston in 
1763 or 1764 his story had “occasioned some murmuring” before dying out. But now “this 
Story has been revived…with fresh Circumstances of Acrimony and Inflammation” that 
chiefly involved accusations against the person involved in the former case—Thomas 
Hutchinson. B. H. now “instead of telling his story verbally, reduced it into writing, which 
was handed about the town.” Some merchants panicked, worrying that they had been 
named in the documents. The merchants’ specific fears, Bernard believed, stoked a hotter 
fury in Boston: “the Clamour, as usual, soon descended from the top to the bottom of the 
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Town, and several persons Houses began to be threatened.” It was this anger and desire for 
revenge that “was truly the principal if not the sole Cause of the second Insurrection.”62  
Bernard concluded that the merchants and the “Mob,” who had been allied in the 
attack on Oliver’s, were now at cross-purposes.  Bernard believed those who participated in 
the second riot were out to erode the hierarchy upon which society was organized, preferring 
to conduct a “War of Plunder, of general levelling, and taking away the distinction of Rich 
and Poor.” The merchants who had planned and facilitated the first riot “became now as 
fearful for themselves, as the most loyal person in the Town could be; they found, as I told 
some of them, that they had raised the Devil and could not lay him again.”63  
Yet still resistance to the Stamp Act held strong. Bernard had thought that the 
violence of the second riot might cause Boston to disavow the first. But instead “great pains 
are taken to separate the two Riots; what was done against Mr Oliver is still approved of as 
a necessary declaration of their Resolution not to submit to the Stamp-Act.” Their resolve 
was so strong that “even the cruel treatment of him and his Family is justified by its 
consequences, thus frightning him into a Resignation.” Indeed, Bernard’s government 
depended upon his accepting these conditions. If he refused to abide by them, “the civil 
Power will not be supported by the principal People of the Town, as it is assured it shall be 
now.”64 
Bernard believed, then, that the attack of 26 August was not about the Stamp Act at 
all. Thomas Hutchinson agreed. Like Bernard, he saw that the populace of Boston looked 
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differently on the two riots. “The encouragers of the first mob never intended matters should 
go to this length and the people in general express the utmost detestation of this 
unparallelled outrage.” But, he feared, the people would not learn their lesson about the 
“infinite hazard” of loosing violent men “in a government where there is not constant 
authority at hand sufficient to suppress them.”65  
For Bernard and Hutchinson to guess at colonists’ reasons for rioting was one thing. 
But the Boston Gazette—the paper published by Benjamin Edes of the Loyal Nine, directing 
group of the Sons of Liberty—agreed with, and expanded on, the crown officers’ assertions. 
“Most People seem dispos’d to discriminate between the Assembly on the 14th of the 
Month, and their Transactions, and the unbridled Licentiousness of this Mob; judging them 
to proceed from very different Motives, as their Conduct was most evidently different.” The 
sentiments of Bostonians were perhaps best illustrated by their faces: “The Countenances of 
people almost universally on the former Account, apparently discover’d an Approbation; on 
the latter, as might reasonably be expected, every Face was gloomy, and we believe every 
Heart affected.” Why the difference in colonists’ views? Here again the Gazette echoed 
Bernard and Hutchinson’s explanations, while holding its own opinions on what could and 
could not be justified.66  
At some Times and in some extraordinary Cases, the Cause of Liberty requires an 
extraordinary Spirit to support it, but surely the pulling down Houses and robbing 
Persons of their Substance, especially when any suppos’d Injuries can be redress’d by 
Law, is utterly inconsistent with the first Principles of Government, and subversive 
of the glorious Cause.67  
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The Stamp Act constituted an “extraordinary Case.” It was an internal tax, 
unconstitutional and with its legal remedies themselves unconstitutional. For the right of 
trial by jury had been ripped away in favor of trial by vice-admiralty court in far-flung 
Halifax. The grievances against the customs officers and Hutchinson could, theoretically , be 
settled by existing legal procedures. In other words, there was no need to resort to extralegal 
actions against them. Moreover, this misuse of extralegal action damaged its legitimate uses. 
Why should Bernard and Hutchinson draw a distinction between the Stamp Act and other 
grievances if the people themselves did not? 
Further, the Boston Gazette’s reasoning had clear precedent in the Virginia Resolves. 
The two most controversial resolves defined what should happen when their right to self-
taxation had been taken away. First, they were “not bound to yield Obedience” to any such 
law. Second, they had the right—possibly the duty—to determine that “any Person, who 
shall, by speaking or writing, assert or maintain, that any Person or Persons, other than the 
General Assembly of this Colony, have any Right or Power to impose or lay any Taxation on 
the People here, shall be deemed an Enemy to this his Majesty’s Colony.” And it is clear 
that, across the colonies, the people believed that they had a right to act according to this 
determination. The actions of Bostonians, as explained in the Boston Gazette, corresponded 
precisely to the injunctions of the Virginia Resolves. 
The Boston News-Letter, in its turn, pointed out what it saw as hypocrisy in the 
Gazette’s argument. The “strange and tumultuous spirit” of Boston after the second riot, they 
claimed with a good deal of sarcasm, must be distinguished from the “truly noble 
Opposition to the imposition of internal Taxes” by an unrepresentative British Parliament. 
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As rioters retreated from the ruins of Hutchinson’s mansion in the early morning of 
27 August, Newport’s merchants were erecting a scaffold and effigies on that city’s central 
common. They hoped for a demonstration to equal that which had forced Oliver’s 
resignation. What they would get instead was more like the one which had just ended. 
The merchants had been planning for the last week, since receiving news of the 
Boston riot. The 27th was chosen since that day would also be a “quarterly meeting of the 
Newport freeholders.” Both the rumored victims, lawyer Martin Howard Jr. and physician 
Thomas Moffatt, waited on Governor Samuel Ward and asked him to prevent the riot. 
Ward, in turn, called on the ringleaders Samuel Vernon and William Ellery and asked them 
to “prevail with their accomplices to forbear proceeding farther in that affair then dismissing 
them both He only requested their appearance before Him next morning to give an account 
of their mediations.”68  
Later Moffatt and Vernon conversed. Vernon professed personal respect for Moffatt 
but insisted on their right to carry on the demonstration, as “He and his Confederates 
proceeded upon just principles drawn from the absolute necessity of some proper sacrifices 
at this dangerous and very critical conjuncture…” The justification was twofold. Moffatt 
and Howard still insisted that Parliament maintained an absolute authority over the colonies 
and, further, continually tried to convince others of the same. Further, Howard, in a widely-
distributed pamphlet, had “branded the merchants of Rhode Island as smugglers which 
accusation alone deserves death.”69  
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Vernon here drew on a combination of local and colonial arguments. His argument 
that Moffatt and Howard spoke in favor of Parliament’s authority and that they tried to 
draw others to their side recalls the seventh Virginia Resolve as printed in the Newport 
Mercury: “Resolved, That any Person, who shall, by speaking or writing, assert or maintain, 
that any Person or Persons, other than the General Assembly of this Colony, have any Right 
or Power to impose or lay any Taxation on the People here, shall be deemed an Enemy to 
this his Majesty’s Colony.” Howard’s particular offense against the merchants was the 
culmination of a pamphlet war over the Sugar Act in late 1764 and early 1765, in which 
Howard took the side of Parliament against then-Governor Stephen Hopkins and Boston’s 
James Otis. By the end of the carnage, Howard had shown that Hopkins and Otis’s 
positions actually contradicted each other and Otis had raged against Howard and his like-
minded friends as a “little, dirty, drinking, drabbing, contaminated knot of thieves, beggars 
and transports, or the worthy descendants of such, collected from the four winds of the 
earth, and made up of Turks, Jews and other Infidels, with a few renegado Christians & 
Catholics.”70  
Perhaps Howard could have forestalled the events. He hinted that he had been given 
the opportunity to recant. But in an extraordinary, signed letter in the Mercury of 26 August, 
he refused: “The writer does not retract any Position contained in the Halifax Letter,” 
Howard wrote, “and therefore does not meanly solicit any Favour or Exemption from the 
Abuse intended him, because if his Person and Interest become the Objects of popular 
Revenge for these Sentiments, he thinks he shall never lament the Cause, whatever may be 
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the Consequences.” Howard sought to shield himself in the mantle of the sympathetic man. 
Newporters would decisively reject that gambit.71  
On the same day Howard’s letter appeared, a third person was asked to signal his 
acceptance of Newport’s community norms. Augustus Johnston had been named stamp 
distributor for the colony. Complicating issues, though, was that (unlike Howard and 
Moffatt) he was well-liked in the community. Johnston was also the colony’s Attorney 
General. Late on the night of the 26th, Johnston was visited at home by “two Gentlemen 
sustaining considerable Offices in the Colony, and with whom, I had lived in great 
Friendship.” They told him of the plans for an effigy-hanging the next day and warned him 
that he would be asked to resign. Johnston, perhaps inspired by Howard’s defiance, flatly 
told his visitors he would refuse to resign. Nor would he leave town for his own safety.72  
The men left. Early the next morning a crowd erected a gallows near the Colony 
House, where the Newport freeholders would meet that day. Around ten o’clock the crowd 
reassembled, this time bearing effigies of Howard, Moffatt, and Johnston. The people put 
halters around the effigies’ necks, heaved them onto a cart and paraded them throughout the 
town, ending at the gallows “where they was hung up by the Neck and Suspended near 15 
feet in the Air.” This happened, according to Johnston, “at the very Instant, the People were 
choosing their Representatives.” So that none could mistake who the stuffed figures were 
meant to represent, they had labels affixed to them. Johnston got off easily, having only an 
inscription “the Stamp Act” attached to his breast and a copy of the Act itself in his hand. 
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But Moffatt and Howard, though only supporters of and not officers under the Stamp Act, 
were demonized, all the insults from the previous year’s pamphlet war once again levied 
against them. Moffatt was labeled “that infamous, miscreated, leering Jacobite.” Other labels 
and a boot with a devil peeking out from it called attention to Moffatt’s Scottish birth and, 
therefore, his connection to the hated Earl of Bute. From his mouth hung a paper with the 
words “It is too late Martinius to Retract, for we are all Aground,” a reference to Howard’s 
defiant letter to the Mercury.73  
If Howard had tried to appropriate for himself the role of sympathetic gentleman, 
how could his claim be denied? The organizers’ answer was to remind the people of the 
crimes he had allegedly committed. Howard had petitioned Britain to retract Rhode Island’s 
charter and to make it a royal colony and had written Benjamin Franklin to ask for his help 
in getting an office under the Stamp Act. James Otis in his Brief Remarks on the Defence of the 
Halifax Letter had alleged a further crime: that Howard, when beginning his law career, had 
stolen business from his teacher, the well-respected James Honeyman. The label on the 
Howard effigy’s breast therefore read “that fawning insidious, infamous miscreant and 
paracide Martinius Scriblerus”—“paracide” perhaps referring to both Howard’s attack on 
colonial rights and his crime against Honyman. Howard’s letter to the Mercury was also 
referenced: a label reading “what tho’ I boast of independance posterity will curse my 
memory.” A “New Song” was nailed to a post of the gallows, while another note warned that 
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“That Person who shall Efface this Publick Mark of Resentment will be Deem’d an Enemy 
to liberty and Accordingly meet with Proper Chastisement.”74  
Thomas Moffatt thought that the ceremonial hanging of the effigies was not as well 
received by the people as the organizers had hoped. By eleven o’clock, when the Governor 
and the freeholders went into the Colony House, the people had dispersed. Only three 
figures, trying to appear anonymous in great coats, “flappd hats,” and carrying bludgeons, 
stood before the “Theatre and figures.” These Moffatt identified as Vernon, Ellery, and 
fellow merchant Robert Crook—confirming his belief that these merchants were the drivers 
of the plot, not any unrest over constitutional issues from the people. The logical end to an 
effigy-hanging was a bonfire built on the effigies, but the merchants worried that the people 
would not turn out. Therefore, they “sent into the street strong Drink in plenty with 
Cheshire cheese and other provocatives to intemperance and riot.” The crowd gathered 
again and, after sunset, cut down and burned the effigies on the spot. Unlike in Boston, 
when Oliver’s was attacked, there was no violence that night. “The whole was conducted 
with Moderation,” wrote the Newport Mercury. But customs commissioner John Robinson 
divined a darker reason. The three men who had been chosen as victims had left town and 
taken refuge aboard the HMS Cygnet.75  
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Thinking the threat passed, the three men returned the next day. Rather than take 
the previous day’s events as an indication they should lie low, at least one chose to appear in 
public. That afternoon Martin Howard and John Robinson, either by themselves or 
accompanied by two other gentlemen, were accosted by a man familiar to them.  
The colonial newspapers suggested that Howard and Robinson met an unnamed 
person, who “in Consequence of a private Pique” berated them one-on-two or one-on-four 
and demanded satisfaction. Robinson, on the other hand, wrote that he and Howard were 
“attackt and Collared … by a person at the head of a small party of the Mob.”76  
Samuel Crandall, a Newport craftsman, apparently had a prior history with 
Robinson. With an entourage that Robinson described as “a small party of the Mob,” 
Crandall reproved Robinson, and “insisted on satisfaction.” Robinson wrote that he then 
retreated to his own house (the Boston Evening Post reported that he ran directly to the 
Cygnet). While Robinson made haste away, Howard while Howard faced down Crandall and 
his friends. Howard, high-handed, chastised Crandall for his “Insolence.”77  Howard never 
wrote down his version of events.  
Howard was always a defender of proper deference to authority. But Crandall and 
his friends were in no mood to acquiesce. Whatever deference was owed to Robinson, an 
appointed crown officer enforcing what were at worst distasteful trade duties, was not to be 
granted to Howard, a private person who vigorously defended the hated Stamp Act. Thus 
the anger first directed at Robinson now turned against Howard. 
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As in Boston, early evening saw a larger crowd gather, this time fueled by the added 
offense of Crandall’s treatment at the hands of Martin Howard. Thus, Howard was the 
natural first target. And at around eight in the evening the crowd marched on his house. 
The narratives of the Newport riot are confused. It is apparent that a large crowd 
went back and forth between Howard’s and Moffatt’s several times during the night, each 
time doing more damage until the houses were left ruined. The interior woodwork was 
destroyed, windows and window frames shattered. Even the Mercury acknowledged that at 
Howard’s they “broke the Windows and Doors all to Pieces, damaged the Partitions of the 
House, and ruined such Furniture as was left in it.” They destroyed furniture, china, and 
looking glasses; they carried off Howard’s clothing, linens, and even his bed; and they 
plundered the wine stored in his cellar. At Moffatt’s they “committed Outrages equally 
terrible.” Moffatt wrote that the rioters “were even so brutal after hewing down the 
mahogany cases as to throw what books they could not carry off or otherwise destroy into 
the well with all my writings Physical instruments and many other articles which I highly 
valued.” At the end of the evening the crowd returned to Howard’s and “Saw’d down two 
Trees which Stood before his door and Bro’t them and Stuck them up in two Great Guns 
which have been fix’d at the Bottom of the Parade some Years as Posts.”78  
Yet, while this was happening, there seems to have been a second campaign taking 
place, one of threats rather than direct violence. At different points during the night a crowd 
visited the various customs officers. They went to the house of Benjamin Wickham, where 
the custom-house was based, and demanded to see Robinson. The Mercury wrote that they 
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entered through the windows, while a letter from Robinson and John Nicoll in the next 
week’s Mercury said that they “tumultuously surrounded the House … armed with Clubs, 
&c.” But they accepted that Robinson had by now made his way to the Cygnet and left 
without doing any damage. They went to Nicoll’s but found he had retired to the Cygnet as 
well.79  
The crowd also visited Johnston’s. According to Johnston, while the crowd was at 
Robinson’s his friends began removing the furniture from his house, but “a set of Miscreants, 
who attended the Mob with the hopes of Plunder, entered my House and carried off a great 
part of my Goods &c but as yet am not able to ascertain my loss ‘tho it must be 
considerable.” Yet later, the crowd visited again, this time demanding Johnston’s resignation 
as stamp master. Johnston said he went to meet them, thinking that “as I had before been 
popular in the Town had hopes that I could prevail upon them to desist” from the rioting, 
but friends prevailed upon him not to put himself into the way of danger—nor to expose 
himself to a situation where he could be forced to resign his office.80  
At Johnston’s, the colonial newspapers explain, the crowd did indeed desist. The 
Boston Evening-Post explained that they “were stopt and parley’d with by a Gentleman who 
informed them that the house was not the property of Mr. Johnston.” The crowd accepted a 
“quantity of Liquor” but “insisted that the Gentleman should deliver up Mr. Johnston’s 
effects the next day, which were then in the House” should Johnston not resign as stamp 
master. The Mercury tightened the narrative, but also suggested that Johnston had himself 
agreed to resign. The crowd had “surrounded the House of the then Stamp Master; but 
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upon Promises of his resigning that Office, they offered no Violence to his Habitation.” In 
the Mercury’s telling there was no second “Gentleman” to treat with the crowd.81  
It seems likely that Newport saw two crowds roaming the streets that night. One 
concentrated on destruction: heading back and forth between Howard’s and Moffatt’s, with 
perhaps a detachment removing furniture from Johnston’s. The second crowd went to treat 
with the customs officers and with Johnston, with the very real threat of violence serving as 
backdrop. 
And, the next morning, the physical effects of violence were plain. Howard and 
Moffatt’s houses had been devastated and they, Johnston, and Robinson had retreated 
aboard the Cygnet. Yet the chaos generated by the two crowds, intended to cow their 
victims, had also served to confuse the people of Newport: they thought that Johnston had 
resigned or at the least agreed to formally resign the office of stamp master. And, as expected, 
Johnston did submit a written resignation that day. 
In their reporting on the first riot in Boston, the Boston Gazette and Boston Evening-
Post had downplayed the dangers. Violence had been relatively ordered and controlled, 
directed against only those who had directly supported the Stamp Act. And in their 
reporting on the second riot, the same newspapers had decried the violence directed at other 
imperial officials, especially Hutchinson, who had nothing to do with the Stamp Act. 
The Newport Mercury had opposed the Stamp Act from the beginning. And its 
publisher had been the first to print the most inflammatory Virginia Resolves. Thus, it might 
be expected that, like the Boston papers, the Mercury would have applauded the attacks on 
                                                 
81 Boston Evening-Post, 2 September 1765; Newport Mercury, 2 September 1765. 
 109 
Howard, Moffatt, and Johnston, while decrying the threats to the other customs officers. 
Yet the Mercury’s report neglected to mention the threats to Robinson and Nicoll. It was 
not until a week later, on 9 September, that they published a letter by the two customs 
officers chronicling the threats they had faced that night. 
Two things happened in between to change attitudes among the better sorts in 
Newport. First, they received news of the second Boston riot. When planning their own 
crowd action, Newport’s merchants presumably envisaged it as being just like that in 
Boston’s from 14 August. Though the attack on Hutchinson’s took place a day before the 
Newport effigy-burning, the Newport organizers would not have known about the escalation 
of affairs until a day or two later. Most likely, even if there were rumors, they would have 
had to wait for full details until the Boston Gazette and Boston Evening-Post wrote up the 
event. And those accounts were not published until 2 September—the same day the Mercury 
went to press. 
So the people of Newport thought their own crowd action would be interpreted in 
the light of the successful, disciplined events of 14 August in Boston. Instead, they soon 
found, it could not help but be interpreted in the light of the transgressive riot of the 26th. 
The attack on Hutchinson’s showed that Boston’s Sons of Liberty did not have the control 
they thought they did.  
Newport’s merchants may have attempted to subvert themselves the principles of 
violent resistance laid out by the Virginia Resolves and subscribed to by the Boston Gazette. 
By taking advantage of the violence against the supporters of the Stamp Act to extract 
concessions from the customs officers, they played on a certain lack of clarity in everyone’s 
mind regarding the proper use of violent actions.  
 110 
The second thing that happened to change the Mercury’s view was that threats of 
violence would next be used against them. The day after the riot, the Newport crowd 
remained riled up. A young seaman, John Webber, proclaimed himself the leader of the 
crowd and instigator of the previous night’s riot. He was quickly detained and brought on 
board the Cygnet. But the crowd (perhaps inflamed by the parallel to impressment) again 
gathered and demanded Webber’s release, to which his captors agreed.  
The Mercury had little interest in releasing the details of what was a rather 
embarrassing situation for the merchant leaders of the crowd. Their description portrayed an 
almost civilized situation. The seaman “like Massianello” declared himself as a leader of the 
mob. To “prevent any further Evil, some Gentlemen” seized him and transported him to the 
Cygnet. But then a crowd collected and “it became necessary to bring him on Shore again.” 
The seaman then promised to leave the colony, was released, and “the Night passed without 
any Tumult.”82  
Johnston’s account differs. What was for the Mercury a triumph of reason and 
negotiation was for him something altogether more passionate and chaotic. According to 
Johnston, the seaman “was Insolent to several Persons, some of whom were the very people 
concerned in beginning the Riot, by preparing the Effigies.” These men thought, Johnston 
continued, that by bringing Webber aboard the Cygnet they could “atone for the part they 
had acted.” As they brought Webber aboard, though, he “exclaim[ed] that he was betrayed 
by the very people who set him to work.” The crowd again collected, Johnston agreed, but 
the details of the Mercury’s blandly passive locution “it became necessary to bring him on 
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Shore again” Johnston now revealed. The mob had threatened to “destroy the Houses of 
those persons, who had seized him.”83 
The situation descended into farce. The gentlemen went back aboard the Cygnet and 
explained to the captain that Webber “was the wrong Man, and that the Authority in the 
Town were in Pursuit of the Ringleader, and that as soon as he was taken, he should be sent 
on board.” Leslie, deceived, released Webber.84  
But Leslie’s own account suggests that much more happened that even Johnston was 
willing to acknowledge. Leslie’s account follows Johnston’s to the point of Webber’s release 
from the Cygnet. But then, 
the moment the fellow got on shore, he insulted them all, and threatened their 
houses. They begged and prayed him to be satisfied, gave him money, and ordered 
him clothes, and everything he would have. The Sheriff was so abject as to say to 
him, ‘What would you have of me? I will do everything to satisfy you; I will lay 
myself down, and let you tread on my neck, if that will satisfy you.’85  
Now gentlemen, including Godfrey Malbone, scion of Newport’s wealthiest family, 
offered to “oppose force to force” if the crowd could not be persuaded to disband. The latter 
method, however, was successful, and the night remained quiet—at least there the Mercury 
was not eliding the truth. 
That day, the 29th, Johnston had submitted a written resignation. But it appeared he 
had no intent of honoring it. His friend Moffatt later wrote that Johnston had described it as 
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“an ambiguous ineffectual declaration” extorted from him, and thus Johnston felt it was not 
binding.86  
Either news of Johnston’s thinking reached Newport or it was realized that the text 
was indeed ambiguous and ineffectual. The Congregational minister, Ezra Stiles—who had 
been radicalized by the Stamp Act—apparently went to the town and made his misgivings 
public. The only sources on this are from the Crown officers and Stamp Act defenders—
Johnston, Moffatt, and Capt. Leslie of the Cygnet. 
Moffatt painted a picture in which on the morning of 30 August Stiles “came into 
the street” (rather than preaching inside to a congregation) and “declared the instrument of 
resignation artful base insufficient and harrangued upon its defects in form and method 
pointed out that there was no clause obligatory that it was not avouchd and that not 
withstanding of it Mr Johnson might execute the office.” Moffatt himself had acknowledged 
that the resignation was a false one, so the crown officers and their defenders could hardly 
fault Stiles for his words. Instead they disparaged him for stepping beyond the bounds of 
civility. Johnston writes (presumably of Stiles) that “one of whom who from his station in 
Life better things ought to be expected, objected to it, and said in a publick Manner, it was 
no resignation at all, and that I ought to be obliged to write to the Lords of the Treasury, 
that I would not accept of the Office.” And Leslie, who must have known Stiles barely if at 
all, wrote that he “harangued the mob: ‘Why! this paper is nothing; it will not do; by all that 
he says here, he may resume his office when he pleases; this is no attestation to it.’” Stiles 
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was only halted when a gentleman “checked him by asking ‘How he could behave so 
unbecoming his function?’”87  
The Mercury never mentioned Stiles’s oration; in the Mercury’s narrative, the city was 
largely at peace, with all the principals reconciled—at least the genteel ones. The gentlemen 
of Newport were now united against the threat from below.  
For John Webber was again threatening violence:  “Destruction to the Town, more 
particularly to the Persons and Houses of those who seized him the preceding Day, unless 
they made him Presents agreeable to his Demands.” But Webber had the misfortune to run 
into Augustus Johnston in the street. Johnston “heroically seized upon him; and some 
Gentlemen running to his Assistance, they carried him off to Gaol.” Webber was now 
isolated: “nobody appeared to rescue him, nor to say a Word in his Favour.”88  
Johnston’s own account matched that of the Mercury. Leslie, though, offered a 
darker picture of Webber’s captivity. Webber refused to give evidence against the merchants 
who instigated the riot because, “says he, very wisely, I shall be tore to pieces by those who 
set me on but if my Person can be secured I will say what I know.” In the end, there would 
be no real attempt to prosecute the merchants. 
 
So the stamp distributors in Boston and Newport had been forced to resign. This 
meant that there would be no stamped paper available in Massachusetts or Rhode Island 
come 1 November. New commissions could only be granted by the Stamp Office in London. 
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Perhaps a governor could grant a temporary commission, but the risk to house and home 
was hardly worth the potential reward. And, even had there been willing stamp officers, 
Samuel Ward of Rhode Island was firmly set against the Stamp Act, while Francis Bernard of 
Massachusetts had seen the fate of his lieutenant governor’s house—and he had merely been 
accused of supporting the duty, not of directly enforcing it. 
Ships from Britain were always landing new arrivals in the port towns, but by August 
their passengers included the stamp officers for the other colonies.  The colonists knew their 
names and could wait for their arrival. And the stamp officers, for their part, quickly heard 
about Boston and Newport. 
James McEvers, distributor for New York, found the news of the assault on Oliver’s 
house to be most alarming. Even before the attacks on Hutchinson and the Newport 
writers, he feared for his property and his business, if not yet for his life. He concluded that 
the “general Clamour” and the “discontent of the People” meant that it would be 
“extremely dangerous for any person to execute the office of stamp masters, which has 
become so very odious to the people, that the very name is mentioned with the greatest 
contempt & detestation.” He asked a friend in London to help him receive a release from 
his office. Yet his panic was not total; he asked that, should it be too late to have him 
released and a new distributor appointed in time for 1 November, that he be retained in 
office, for “the first month or six weeks service in the office will be the most dangerous & 
disagreeable part of it.” But, later that day, McEvers retracted even that hedge and told his 
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London friend that he had been forced to resign “in order to prevent the most dreadful 
consequences that will probably happen otherwise, very soon.”89  
Whatever the threats had been, as soon as his resignation was secured the 
newspapers were quick to praise McEvers: 
We congratulate our Countrymen upon the late Resignations of the Stamp Officers -
------ and especially the Friends and Well wishers of the Gentleman appointed to 
that Office in this City. The Number of his Friends and Well wishers, which was 
considerable before, is greatly increased by this Resignation; which has entirely 
cleared his Character from the Imputation of joining in the Design to enslave his 
Country; for we are well assured, as his Appointment was without his Solicitation or 
Knowledge, so his Resignation was voluntary, and not the Effect of any Menace or 
Disturbance, nothing of which has yet appeared in this Place.90  
With his resignation secured, McEvers was allowed to save face and appear a patriot. 
Meantime, New Jersey’s stamp distributor William Coxe was blissfully unaware of the 
pressure being laid upon McEvers. As late as 24 August Coxe was writing plans to the 
Treasury in Britain for increasing the revenue from the Stamp Act. But on 2 September, 
witnessed by William Humphreys and Philip Francis, he scribbled a resignation on a scrap of 
paper. Apparently he had succumbed to subtle intimidation. When he tried to rent a house, 
it was said, the “Gentleman” who owned it refused him “unless he would insure the House 
from being pulled down, or damaged.” William Franklin, royal governor of New Jersey, 
could not understand why Coxe had felt forced to resign. He had heard of no threats. Yet, 
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Franklin felt, he could easily enough find a new distributor, should that be allowed, “one 
that will execute the Office, with little or no Trouble.”91  
New Hampshire had word that their distributor, George Meserve, would arrive 
sometime in mid-September. As unrest grew, his friends made it clear to the public that they 
would not allow him to take up the office.92   
Meserve’s ship made port in Boston. Before he could disembark he was brought a 
letter from “a number of the Principal Gentlemen of this town” warning him that the people 
would not allow him to leave the ship until he had resigned his office. The Boston Gazette 
allowed, as had been the case with McEvers, for Meserve to retain his dignity. The Gazette 
told of how Meserve came on shore and “declared, as he was the unhappy Man who had 
personally accepted of an Office odious to his Countrymen, he freely resigned it, and 
determined never to act in that Capacity: Upon this three Cheers were given by a vast 
Concourse of People, which were repeated at the Head of the Wharf, and again on the 
Exchange.”93  
Meserve, too, was less than sincere in his resignation. He believed that by the first of 
November the people would realize they could not do business without stamped paper. 
“Never was an Act better made,” he wrote the Stamp Office, “to execute itself than this is.” 
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Instead, on 1 November, he would be taken bodily out of Portsmouth and forced into an 
even more public resignation.94  
Connecticut, so quick to receive news from Boston, held its first protests against its 
stamp distributor soon after Oliver’s resignation. In towns on the Thames River, east of 
New Haven and Hartford, Jared Ingersoll was burned in effigy. At New London the crowd 
denounced Ingersoll in the words of the Virginia Resolves, shouting at the figure, “There 
hangs a traitor, there’s an Enemy of his Country.”95  On 19 September a well-organized 
crowd of five hundred men in Wethersfield intercepted Ingersoll on his way to Hartford for 
a meeting of the Connecticut Assembly. The crowd refused to let him leave until he had 
resigned his office; he read a declaration already prepared for him and repeated the 
performance before the Assembly.96  
 
By the middle of September, then, the ministry’s plans for enforcing a Stamp Act 
were at a standstill. The colonists had identified a weakness: the stamps had to be 
distributed by a small number of men, one in each colony. If they could prevent that one 
man from taking up his duties, the Stamp Act could not go into effect. 
And the colonists had been able to target that weakness. The Virginia Resolves 
provided justification for violence against stamp officers and defenders of the Stamp Act. The 
riots in Boston and Newport served as proof they would not hesitate to use violence. The 
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house attacks committed in the two cities translated into real threats for the other colonies. 
Where mobs had walked in Newport and Boston, it was sufficient for the potential for a 
mob to rise for other stamp masters to resign. There was, then, a consistent pattern in the 
threats against the stamp officers. 
 
But the next attack on the Stamp Act would be, not a threat against a single stamp 
officer, but one against all of them. On 21 September the hawkers on the streets of New 
York appeared with a new paper, halfway between newspaper and broadside. A wild success, 
copies of the paper made their way north to Boston where it was reprinted.  
Though first distributed in New York, the paper had no true geographical location 
attached to it. It was entitled the Constitutional Courant and it advertised itself as being 
printed by “Andrew Marvel, at the Sign of the Bribe Refused, on Constitution Hill.” The 
heading “Join, or Die” was paired with Benjamin Franklin’s segmented-snake woodcut.97  
The newspaper was shorter than usual. It had one sheet instead of two, so was the 
length of the “extraordinary” editions that many printers added to their papers during the 
Stamp Act crisis. The Courant contained four items: an introductory note and a concluding 
note from “Andrew Marvel,” and two essays, by “Philoleutherus” and “Philo Patriae” 
respectively.  
The essays in the Constitutional Courant are best considered as parts of a whole, 
serving a larger purpose than either alone. One explained the present through the past; the 
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other used the present state to strategize for the future. That by “Philoleutherus” looked 
back on the violence of the past month, celebrated it, and offered justification. It put the 
attacks on stamp officers into a larger context of resistance to slavery. “Philo Patriae’s” essay 
was ostensibly more moderate. It acknowledged that the violence of the riots was excessive. 
But this was merely a rhetorical trick, for the author immediately laid out all the reasons by 
which violence was not excessive. Instead, Philo Patriae wanted to look forward, to the 
coming months in which the Stamp Act would be in place, and to lay out a strategy for 
resistance. 
Central to the rhetoric of the two essays was the threat of slavery. Philoleutherus, in 
fact, invoked the physical markers of slavery as the opening of his essay: 
At a time when our dearest privileges are torn from us, and the foundation of all our 
liberty subverted, everyone who has the least spark of love to his country, must feel 
the deepest anxiety about our approaching fate. The hearts of all who have a just 
value for freedom, must burn within them, when they see the chains of abject slavery 
just ready to be riveted about our necks.98  
Colonial authors had repeatedly demonstrated that the colonists were fully British 
subjects, with all the rights of British subjects including self-taxation. The Stamp Act 
represented the first time London had tried to attack those rights. Since such a situation had 
no precedent, Philoleutherus asked, “What then is to be done? Shall we sit down quietly, 
while the yoke of slavery is wreathing about our necks? He that is stupid enough to plead for 
this, deserves to be a slave.” The conclusion was unwritten, yet clear. To avoid slavery, one 
must refuse to surrender. And to avert the Stamp Act, the colonists must continue their 
struggle against it.  
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The bombastic introduction gave rise to a slow build. Philoleutherus hoped that the 
king would exercise his “royal care and benevolence” and not allow the sacrifice of the rights 
of some of his subjects. The colonists therefore had to “besiege the throne with petitions and 
humble remonstrances.” The upcoming congress proposed by Massachusetts and to be held 
in New York was thus of great worth. Yet, some public office-holders—“mushroom 
patriots”—had refused to endorse that congress. Did they not recognize the threat? 
For “liberty and property are necessarily connected together. He that deprives of the 
latter without our consent, deprives of the former. What is a slave, but one who depends 
upon the will or another for the enjoyment of his property?“ This was the threat of the 
Stamp Act. If the colonists allowed themselves to be stripped of some property, they were 
abandoning the right to defend any of their property. In the past it had been single tyrants 
who had enslaved peoples—but “fellow subjects” could do it just as easily. Further, 
Parliament, in rejecting the colonists’ petitions on the Sugar Act, had shown the 
precariousness of the situation. Even a Turkish peasant or a common criminal had the right 
to have his petition heard. 
Philoleutherus had again returned to slavery; after praising the colonists’ attempts at 
petitions he had shown that such petitions were not enough to maintain their freedom. King 
and Parliament were themselves benevolent but, in this case, had been misled. And if 
Parliament transgressed “the bounds prescribed them by the constitution” the colonists 
would “owe them no more subjection in this respect, than the Divan of Constantinople; to 
seem to acknowledge such a claim, would be to court our chains.” The young King, once he 
realized the implications of the Stamp Act and saw the vigor of the colonists’ resistance, 
would surely demand repeal: 
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Be assured, my countrymen, whatever spirit we manifest on this juncture, it cannot 
be offensive to our sovereign: He glories in being King of freemen, and not of slaves. 
To shew that we are freemen, and resolve to continue so, cannot displease, but must 
endear us to him. 
Neither King nor Parliament, but only “the blackest villains” could be displeased by 
colonial resistance. Yet too many were “thinking of nothing but tamely yielding their necks 
to the yoke,” especially in the provinces south of New York. For these colonies to submit 
would be to reject the example shown by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. 
There, colonists had risen up against the stamp officers. Some officers had, nobly, refused to 
serve. Others had been “intimidated into a resignation, by those hardy sons of liberty.” But a 
third group “resolved to keep the detested office. These men were the danger, for they were 
the key to enslaving America. Philoleutherus spoke to them directly: 
We cannot be enslaved without you reach out a helping hand: If you emulate the 
noble example of some of your fellow officers, whose disinterestedness will endear 
them to generations yet unborn, the chains of thraldom cannot be put about our 
necks, at least the duration of our freedom will be prolonged. Dare you then bear a 
part in hastening its final extinction?  
No: those who would reject bondage must fight. Philoleutherus concluded: 
Can you expect to escape the unseen hand of resentment, awakened by injuries like 
these? Assure yourselves the spirit of Brutus and Cassius is yet alive; there are [those] 
who dare strike a blow to avenge their insulted country. Know ye vile miscreants, we 
love liberty, and we fear not to shew it. We abhor slavery, and detest the remotest 
aiders and abettors of our bondage: but native Americans, who are diabolical enough 
to help forward our ruin, we execrate as the worst of parricides. Parricides! ’tis too 
soft a term: Murder your fathers, rip up the bowels of your mothers, dash the infants 
you have begotten against the stones, and be blameless;-but enslave your country! 
entail vassalage, that worst of all human miseries, that sum of all wretchedness, on 
millions! This, this is guilt, this calls for heaven’s fiercest vengeance. But rouse, rouse 
my countrymen, let the villain that is hardy enough to persist, do it at his peril. Shew 
them we have resentment no less keen than our Eastern brethren; will you tamely 
suffer the execution of a law that reduces you to the vile condition of slaves, and is 
abhorred by all the genuine sons of liberty? Let the wretch that sleeps now, be 
branded as an enemy to his country. 
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The final sentence, with the phrase “an enemy to his country” echoed the seventh 
and final Virginia Resolve, the resolve that had brought turmoil to the Virginia House of 
Burgesses and threats of revolution to taverns from Williamsburg to Boston, the resolve that 
stated that supporters of the Stamp Act should “be deemed an Enemy to this his Majesty’s 
Colony.” From colony to country, the necessity of struggle against the Stamp Act, born in 
Virginia, had become received wisdom across British North America. 
As Isaac Barré and Patrick Henry had both found, a powerful rhetorical trick was to 
step right up to a line, gesture at crossing it, and to retreat. The Constitutional Courant was 
laid out along similar lines. After the bombast of Philoleutherus’s final paragraph came a 
return to measured rationality in an essay by “Philo Patriae.”  
Philo Patriae acknowledged that the colonists had done wrong. The violence of the 
riots in Boston and Newport had been excessive, and because of their excess had hurt the 
good cause of principled opposition to the Stamp Act. But were the colonists, rightfully 
angry, really to blame for that violence? No—the true instigators of the riots were the aiders 
and abettors of the Stamp Act. For if they were willing to advocate the use of arbitrary 
power, should they not have expected the same to be turned against them?99  
Yet, violence by itself would serve no good purpose. The colonists should instead 
“throw all possible obstructions in the way of its taking effect, and to treat with the utmost 
ignominy and detestation, all those enemies and betrayers of their country’s most sacred 
rights, who officiously endeavour to inforce it.” For if they were to pay a stamp tax, “that 
moment we commence as errant slaves as any in Turkey.” And, as in Turkey, civilization 
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would soon fail. Surely it would be better “to die in defence of our rights, than to leave such 
a state as this to the generations that succeed us.” 
Philo Patriae concurred with Philoleutherus that neither the king nor Englishmen 
who “understand and value their own rights” could plausibly be angry if the colonists 
asserted theirs. For, surely, the colonists’ rights to liberty and property faced a great threat in 
the Stamp Act, the possibility of being reduced to a “slavish state … if we ever suffer it to 
take place among us.”  
This “slavish state” was no mere metaphor. Submission to the Stamp Act meant 
submission to any decree of which Parliament could conceive. “If the English parliament can 
lay these burdens upon us, they can also, if they please, take our whole property from us, and 
order us to be sold for slaves, or put to death.” But surely Parliament should only have such 
power over the places they had been directly chosen to represent. And since most members 
had do property in America, they had no interest in preserving liberty there. 
Thus, Philo Patriae argued, the “spirit of opposition to the Stamp Act” in the 
colonies was in no way a “rebellion against lawful authority or disloyalty to our king.” For 
the colonists loved their King and Parliament; they were, after all, one people with those of 
the mother country. And yet, this was no reason to yield their rights and privileges. Without 
the “advantages” of the English constitution, “why should we desire to continue our 
connection? We might as well belong to France, or any other power; none could offer a 
greater injury to our rights and liberties than is offered by the Stamp Act.” 
The danger of the Stamp Act, then, was such that the methods of resistance were 
fully justified. But the Stamp Act was never fully debated, and, Philo Patriae felt, Parliament 
would surely repeal it soon.  “Mean while let us never, for one moment, acknowledge that it 
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is binding upon us, nor pay one farthing in obedience to it, for it was made by a power, that, 
by the fundamental laws that both they and we acknowledge, hath no jurisdiction over us.” 
The crafters of the Stamp Act were, it was rumored, soon to be removed from their 
offices. And those stamp officers who still refused to resign would lose their protection. A 
new ministry would not look kindly on them “for their activity in so odious an office.” Good 
statesmen knew that if liberty could be taken away in America, the same could—and 
would—happen in Great Britain. 
Philoleutherus had finished his essay with bombast; Philo Patriae, in contrast, 
offered King and Parliament a way out. Repeal the Stamp Act, and all would be chalked up 
to the machinations of evil ministers and a trusting Parliament. The English constitution 
would have proven, again, that it was self-correcting. Yet, on the question of what to do 
next, the two writers were in agreement. Until the Stamp Act was repealed, the colonists 
must resist it with all the vigor they could muster. Submission was slavery.100  
 
News of the Courant spread quickly. The Boston Evening-Post wrote of the 
excitement the paper had raised, described the masthead with the “Join or Die” emblem and 
included an excerpt and the printer’s introduction. The Evening Post concluded, “There is 
such a Demand for the above mentioned Paper in these parts, that, we hear, it will soon be 
republished.”101  
Cadwallader Colden, as always, was alert to the danger. He had been fearful of the 
colonists’ rhetoric throughout the summer. Two days after the publication date on the 
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Courant’s masthead—but almost certainly before he had seen it—Colden wrote to Henry 
Conway of “virulent Papers … filled with every falsehood that malice could invent to serve 
their purpose of exciting the People to disobedience of the Laws and to Sedition.” Always 
priding himself on his rationality, Colden could not, for some time, “imagine these Papers 
could have the effect on the Minds of the People which I found they afterwards had.” But 
similar papers had inspired the Boston riots, which in turn had led to McEvers’s resignation 
as stamp master for New York. There was only one conclusion to be reached: it was a 
conspiracy: “a secret Correspondence has been carryed on throughout all the Colonies; & 
that it has been concerted to deter by violence the Distributors of Stamps from Executing 
their office, and to destroy the stamped Paper when it arrives.”102  
Yet if he could distribute the stamps on November 1, he felt, “the present Bustle will 
subside.” Colden, without realizing it, had followed the same line of thought as the writers 
of the papers he so despised, for they too had concluded that any successful enforcement of 
the Stamp Act would be a death blow to the opposition.103   
Colden had no effective way to prevent the publication of “seditious papers.” He 
would be opposed by the mob and by his peers. The temper of the town was towards unrest, 
and any prosecution of the publishers might cause a riot. Moreover, he suspected it was the 
“most popular Lawyers” who had written the offending remarks, “Countenanced by some of 
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the Judges & others in the highest trust in the Government.” Colden enclosed a copy of a 
recent paper—not the Courant—to illustrate his points.104   
The Courant, then, confirmed all Colden’s suspicions of a “secret Correspondence” 
among the colonies. On 1 October he sent a copy to Benjamin Franklin in London and on 
the 12th he shipped one to Conway. With each copy he explained the circumstances behind 
its publication. Post riders had distributed the papers along their usual routes. They had 
received the papers at Woodbridge, New Jersey, where James Parker had a printing press. 
The same distribution along the post roads had taken place in each of the nearby colonies, 
with the postmaster kept ignorant of the happenings. The printer Franklin, Colden hoped, 
could identify the press by the types in the Courant.105  
Thus, the Constitutional Courant provided a bookend to the crowd actions in the 
northern colonies. It put the Stamp Act into a larger context, assessed the colonists’ efforts, 
and pressed them to continue their work. The Courant’s narrative of the previous months 
showed the colonists that, without doubt, the logic of the Virginia Resolves was correct. If 
the Burgesses had declared who the “enemies” of the country were, the Courant showed how 
those enemies should be fought.  
At the same time that plans to reprint the Courant were afoot in Boston, 
representatives from nine colonies were meeting in the city of New York. They were there to 
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agree upon a united colonial response to the Stamp Act. Colden saw this as another hint of 
conspiracy. He no doubt feared that they would affirm the message of the Virginia Resolves 
and the Constitutional Courant, setting an official imprimatur on the rhetoric of violent 
resistance to slavery. As it turned out, he would not need to worry.106   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Stamp Act Congress and the Sons of Liberty 
 
In the first two chapters we have seen, first, how the Virginia Resolves excited the 
colonists against the Stamp Act and, second, how the colonists responded with violence and 
threats of violence against the stamp officers and their supporters. So when, in the wake of 
the riots, representatives from nine colonies gathered in New York to draft a united 
statement to send to King and Parliament, one might have expected them to follow suit: to 
closely follow the Virginia Resolves and to utterly refuse submission to the forces that had 
imposed the Stamp Act. The colonists would toast the patriotic commissioners with the 
same vigor as they had celebrated Isaac Barré’s speech, the Virginia Resolves, or the 
resignations of Andrew Oliver or Augustus Johnston. 
None of this happened. The Stamp Act Congress spent nearly two weeks in 
deliberation and produced an obsequious set of fourteen declarations—declarations of 
thought, not resolves of action. The boilerplate of the Virginia Resolves was present—the 
general assertions of the colonists’ rights. But the resolves that had so excited the colonists, 
that had established the supporters of the Stamp Act as “enemies” and implicitly endorsed 
violence against them, were gone. Nor were the Congress’s proceedings greeted with joy. 
Indeed, they were barely greeted at all. The Congress did not make public its debates or the 
resulting documents. It seems that none of the delegates kept minutes of the debates, and 
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the Declaration of Rights and Grievances and the petitions to King and Parliament were not 
published until 1766. 
Yet the most important work on the period, Edmund and Helen Morgan’s Stamp Act 
Crisis: Prologue to Revolution, holds up the Stamp Act Congress as an unparalleled example of 
democratic consensus. Edmund Morgan reiterates in the preface to the third edition that 
Stamp Act Crisis had been intended to “reaffirm the significance of ideas in society, 
particularly political and constitutional ideas.”1 The two concepts—democratic consensus 
and the preeminence of ideas—were inextricably bound. For the Morgans, a people’s ideas 
were accurately reflected in their democratic institutions. The Stamp Act Congress 
commissioners had been selected by the colonial assemblies and the assemblies had 
themselves been elected by the people. Therefore, the Congress’s resulting declarations must 
remain a mirror to the deepest beliefs of the colonists on political and constitutional ideas. 
The commissioners in 1765 might have even agreed. 
This chapter, in contrast, argues that the Stamp Act Congress represented not the 
visible culmination of a colonial consensus but a retreat from an emerging consensus. The 
first part examines the Congress with an eye towards why it resulted in such uninspiring, 
unrepresentative declarations when more dynamic possibilities were present. The second 
part argues that the Sons of Liberty represents the further logical outcome of the passions 
behind the Virginia Resolves, the crowd actions of the summer and fall, and the essays in the 
Constitutional Courant. Rather than the Morgans it reaffirms the view of Carl Becker: “No 
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one was likely to be profoundly stirred by this declaration of the Stamp Act Congress, in this 
month of October when the spirited Virginia Resolves were everywhere.”2 
 
In early June of 1765 the Massachusetts Assembly appointed a committee to 
recommend a proper route of protest against the Stamp Act. The committee, returning, 
advised that the Assembly call for a congress of representatives from all the colonies. The 
Assembly accepted the recommendation and sent a circular letter out through the colonies. 
The letter proposed that committees chosen from the colonial assemblies “consult together 
on the present Circumstances of the Colonies and the Difficulties to which they are, and 
must be reduced, by the Operation of the Acts of Parliament for levying Duties and Taxes 
on the Colonies.” The Massachusetts men had the end result of this congress in mind: “a 
general, and united, dutiful, loyal and humble Representation of their Condition, to his 
Majesty and the Parliament, and to implore relief.”3 
The circular letter was cautious in tone. The Massachusetts Assembly assumed that 
the colonies would submit to the Stamp Act. Rather than advocate resistance, its members 
simply wanted to produce a petition signed by representatives of all the colonies. Their hope 
was that Parliament would not dismiss such a document as they had those of the individual 
colonies in late 1764. It was not until the end of June that the Virginia Resolves arrived in 
New England and the political winds shifted. 
                                                 
2 Quoted is Carl L. Becker, The Eve of the Revolution: A Chronicle of the Breach With England (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1918), 8. 
3 Journal of the Honourable House of Representatives, of His Majesty’s Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New-
England, Begun and Held At Boston, in the County of Suffolk, on Wednesday the Twenty-Ninth Day of May, Annoque 
Domini, 1765. (Boston: Green and Russell, 1765), 108; Proceedings of the Congress At New-York (Annapolis: Jonas 
Green, 1766), 1. 
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Massachusetts proposed that the Congress be held in New York, which could be 
reached in a few days time from the colonies between New Hampshire and Maryland. The 
Congress would begin the first Tuesday of October—which was also the first day of that 
month. The colonial assemblies were asked, should they approve of the Congress, to appoint 
three members each and to send advance word to the Massachusetts Assembly.4 The 
response of the colonies was indeed favorable. Boston papers reported on 5 September that 
“We hear that the Meeting of the Commissioners from the several Provinces will be general; 
to the great Pleasure of every Inhabitant of this, where it was first proposed.”5 
Nine colonies on the continent did send representatives. Of the “original thirteen” 
New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia failed to send delegates. The New 
Hampshire legislature, beholden to Governor Wentworth, sent regrets and encouragement. 
The three southern colonies did not have meetings of their lower houses during the hot 
summers and thus had no time to select and instruct delegates. Neither did Nova Scotia, 
Quebec, or East or West Florida send delegates—the three latter colonies having no 
assemblies to appoint representatives.6  
Of the delegations that did arrive three had only limited powers. The Connecticut, 
New York, and South Carolina representatives were obligated to return the proceedings of 
the congress for approval by their legislatures—this wholly contrary to the intended purpose, 
of sending Britain a petition signed by representatives of all the colonies. Delaware’s 
assembly had not met during the summer but representatives from each of the three counties 
                                                 
4 Proceedings of the Congress At New-York, 1. 
5 Pennsylvania Gazette, 19 September 1765. 
6 Gipson, Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 330. 
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approved an unofficial delegation that would, they assured the congress, certainly have the 
power to sign for the colony. Only five colonies, then, had sent a delegation properly chosen 
by their elected legislature—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland.7  
The makeup of Massachusetts’s own delegation was of great importance. As the 
colony to propose the congress, Massachusetts men would certainly have influence over the 
proceedings. Thus, Governor Francis Bernard, a conservative, desired to have men of his 
own choosing in the delegation. The Assembly voted for James Otis Jr., Col. John 
Worthington, and Col. Oliver Partridge. Worthington, uncomfortable with the idea of 
defying British authority (he would later become a Loyalist), declined. Timothy Ruggles was 
elected in his place. Bernard was gleeful about the choices: “It was impossible to oppose this 
measure to any good purpose and therefore the friends of Government took the lead in it … 
Two of the three [delegates] are fast Friends to Government, and prudent and discreet Men, 
such as, I am assured, will never consent to any undutiful or improper application to the 
Government of Great Britain.” Ruggles and Partridge were indeed “prudent and discreet,” 
but even Otis was not such a danger as he might seem. He had proposed the congress and so 
could hardly be left out of it. But in his public behavior (if not his pseudonymous essays), 
Otis had begun to acknowledge Parliament’s supremacy. Perhaps any worries Bernard had 
were assuaged when, upon seeing the Virginia Resolves, Otis declared them “treasonable.”8  
                                                 
7 Proceedings of the Congress At New-York, 2-11. 
8 Journal of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 110; Francis Bernard to Board of Trade, 8 July 1765, 
House of Lords Papers, HL 209/318, Library of Congress transcripts, Washington, D.C; Morgan, and Morgan, 
Stamp Act Crisis, 109. 
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The first order of business was for each of the delegations to produce its 
appointment. This ritual was of the utmost symbolic importance. The representatives were 
in New York to oppose an act that they believed had been laid upon them in direct 
contravention to their rights. They believed that only the colonists or their elected 
representatives could lay internal taxes upon them, whatever might be the case with trade 
duties or of other forms of legislation. Thus, they needed to show each other and, eventually, 
the world, that they had been appointed by duly elected representative bodies, that they 
were proper representatives of the people on this great stage.9  
Most of the legislatures, in their appointments, simply repeated the words the 
Massachusetts assembly had used in its call for a congress. But the colonial legislatures also 
had some ideas of their own, ideas that they laid out in their letters of appointment and in 
resolves passed at the same time as they chose their delegates. The Massachusetts legislature 
emphasized that the representatives must not acquiesce to any petition that accepted the 
doctrine of virtual representation. Delaware’s representatives were asked to give special 
consideration to the colonists’ “Privelege of a Trial by their Peers.” And, forebodingly, 
Pennsylvania required its representatives “to take Care, that such Addresses in which you 
join, are drawn up in the most decent and respectful Terms, so as to avoid every Expression 
that can give the least occasion of Offence to his Majesty or to either House of 
Parliament.”10  
Pennsylvania’s injunction to humbly approach the King and Parliament was in direct 
contrast to the mindset of the Rhode Island representatives. When that colony’s assembly 
                                                 
9 Proceedings of the Congress At New-York, 2-11. 
10 Proceedings of the Congress At New-York, 2-9, quotes from p.9 and p.8. 
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selected Metcalf Bowler and Henry Ward it did so with the understanding that the congress 
was intended to “agree on the most probable Methods to obtain Redress for the injured and 
oppressed British Colonies on this Continent.” At the same time the Rhode Island assembly 
passed a set of six resolves closely modeled on those from Virginia that had caused such an 
outbreak of the spirit of liberty. The Rhode Islanders, acting in the wake of riots that had 
themselves followed the injunction of the Virginia Resolves to treat all those supporting 
internal taxes as enemies of the country, did not repeat that resolve. But Rhode Island’s 
penultimate resolve echoed the penultimate resolve of the Virginians as printed in the 
northern newspapers: “That his Majesty’s liege People, the Inhabitants of this Colony, are 
not bound to yield Obedience to any Law or Ordinance, designed to impose any internal 
Taxation whatsoever upon them, other than the Laws or Ordinances of the General 
Assembly aforesaid.” And, further, Rhode Island officials were instructed to ignore the Stamp 
Act: “they are hereby directed to proceed in the Execution of their respective Offices, in the 
same Manner as usual: And that this Assembly will indemnify and save harmless all the said 
Officers, on Account of their Conduct agreeable to this Resolution.”11  
The Maryland legislature did not go so far as to adopt the Virginians’ assertion that 
they did not owe obedience to the Stamp Act. But, like Virginia and Rhode Island, they 
drew their constitutional line in the sand at internal taxes. Marylanders “have always enjoyed 
the Right of being Governed by Laws to which they have consented in the Article of Taxes 
and internal Polity” and had never yielded up those rights. Therefore Maryland’s legislature 
resolved that it had the “Sole Right to lay Taxes and Impositions on the Inhabitants of this 
                                                 
11 Pennsylvania Gazette, 26 September 1765; Newport Mercury, 16 September 1765. 
 135 
Province or their Property and Effects And that the laying imposing levying or Collecting any 
Tax on or from the Inhabitants of Maryland under Colour of any other Authority is 
Unconstitutional and a Direct Violation of the Rights of the Freemen of this Province.”12  
Already, then, the different delegations were burdened by their legislatures with 
different assumptions about the goals of the congress, the particular wrongs they were to 
right, and the vehemence with which they should express their views to Britain. The wide 
differences among the instructions given by the colonial assemblies, together with a relatively 
conservative body of delegates that was yet hampered by their own inability to agree, may 
have destined the documents produced by the Stamp Act Congress to be bland and 
uninspiring. 
The next order of business was to elect a president of the congress. Here the race 
was between two of the Massachusetts men, James Otis and Timothy Ruggles. Ruggles won 
what was apparently a close contest. This result would have pleased Francis Bernard and, by 
extension, the conservatives across the colonies, for Bernard had instructed Ruggles before 
the Congress “to get the Congress to recommend submission to the Stamp Act until 
Parliament could be persuaded to repeal it.” Delaware’s Thomas McKean attributed 
Ruggles’s victory to the support of the large New York delegation—they had sent five men, 
while New Jersey and Rhode Island only sent two. Perhaps this was seen as unfair; 
throughout the rest of the Congress each colony, rather than each delegate, would receive a 
single vote.13 
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Looking back nearly fifty years later, McKean remembered the 1765 Congress as 
cautious. “Indeed,” he wrote John Adams, “some of the members seemed as timid as if 
engaged in a traitorous conspiracy.”14 
From the inside, Delaware’s Caesar Rodney confirmed that the delegates argued over 
“the British Constitution, and the Rights and Privileges of the Colonists under that 
Constitution as Subjects of Great Britain”—in particular, the “Prerogative Power of 
Parliament.” Thomas Gage’s description of the debates, or of what he was told by the 
delegates, was similar: “The Question is not of the Inexpediency of the Stamp Act, or of the 
Inability of ye Colonys to pay the Tax, but that it is unconstitutional & contrary to their 
Rights, Supporting the Independancy of the Colonies & not subject to the Legislative Power 
of Great Britain.”15 
Over three weeks, the delegates argued over these questions in closed debates. Yet 
there was one point that was not under serious debate: that the Stamp Act was 
fundamentally illegitimate. It was an internal tax for the sole purpose of raising revenue, with 
no pretense to regulating trade, and it had been imposed by Parliament rather than the 
colonial assemblies. Yet if they could agree that it was illegitimate, they could not agree on 
why. What particular qualities of the Stamp Act made it such a violation? And since the 
                                                 
Society of Massachusetts, 2007), IV, 72; Thomas McKean to John Adams, 20 August 1813, in The Works of John 
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Conway, 12 October 1765, in The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage With the Secretaries of State, 1765-
1775, ed. Clarence Edwin Carter (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1931), 69-70. 
15 Appointment of Caesar Rodney and Thomas McKean to the Stamp Act Congress, 21 September 1765, in 
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reasons they laid out for its illegitimacy would lead naturally to positions on other laws such 
as the Sugar Act the delegates had to tread carefully. 
Indeed, there was far less unity over the nature of the Sugar Act. Some thought it a 
trade duty and thus within a category that Parliament had the right to impose. Of these, 
some no doubt thought it in practice unfair and were happy to protest on practical grounds 
for its repeal. A more nuanced argument held the Sugar Act illegitimate since it was 
specifically intended to raise revenue rather than control trade. It was, therefore, an external 
tax rather than a trade duty. This argument—that external taxes were unconstitutional—
would become more accepted in the succeeding years after the Townsend duties were 
enacted. 
All or almost all the delegates believed that, in theory, Parliament did not have the 
constitutional right to impose an internal tax. But this did not mean that the colonists 
should not obey. Timothy Ruggles, for example, wanted the Congress to recommend 
submission to the Stamp Act until Parliament repealed it. Further, they should only protest 
as individual colonies, not as a united group. James Otis also thought the colonists should 
submit but that this was merely a pragmatic decision—they would be quite justified in 
refusing to pay stamp taxes. But again, it is doubtful that he took this position at the 
congress, for he was remembered much later for his words there in the colonists’ cause.16 
There was a general sense that Parliament could impose trade duties to regulate the 
commerce of the empire. Here the argument was whether the Congress should explicitly 
acknowledge Parliament’s power. In an early draft of the Declaration of Rights John 
                                                 
16 C. A. Weslager, The Stamp Act Congress: With an Exact Copy of the Complete Journal (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1976), 130-31. 
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Dickinson wrote that all acts of Parliament were obligatory on the colonists except those 
which violated the colonists’ freedom. Other delegates thought this gave away too much. In 
the end, they accepted a formulation drafted earlier by Connecticut’s William Samuel 
Johnson that the colonists owed “due subordination” to Parliament—leaving the specifics of 
that due subordination untouched. C. A. Weslager has argued that by this the delegates 
intended to say that Parliament had the right to regulate trade and to exercise legislative 
authority in the colonies so long as their actions did not conflict with taxing or the other 
prerogatives of the colonial assemblies. Yet it was very definitely not Gage’s worst fear—that 
the congress would try to clearly define the relationship between Parliament and the 
colonies.17 
But could Parliament impose trade duties with the explicit purpose of raising 
revenue? It is not clear that most colonists ever thought through this question. They were 
focused on the distinction between internal and external taxes and were therefore less 
concerned with the purpose of the tax than the way in which it was levied. It was John 
Dickinson who tried to cut through the fog by explicitly defining a tax as “an imposition on 
the subject for the sole purpose of levying money,” a definition he believed was accepted by 
the rest of the congress. But how could this help? The Sugar Act might have had the purpose 
of raising revenue from the colonies, but it was not the sole purpose—it was also a trade 
regulation. So was the Sugar Act an unconstitutional external tax or a constitutional trade 
duty, if one viewed as onerous? 
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Dickinson believed Parliament had the right to regulate trade but not to levy 
internal or external taxes for the purpose of raising revenue. The delegates from the northern 
and middle colonies largely agreed with the first assertion. But the southern delegates—
particularly South Carolina’s Rutledge and Lynch—believed that Parliament could not levy 
taxes for raising revenue, for regulating trade, or for any other purpose.18 New Yorkers and 
cousins Robert R. Livingston and Philip Livingston thought the congress should formally 
acknowledge Parliament’s right to impose trade duties for the purpose of regulating trade. 
Why, he asked, would England want colonies otherwise? And if the colonies conceded this 
point, Parliament might be more willing to compromise on the more important question of 
internal taxes. But again the South Carolina delegates and Delaware’s Caesar Rodney 
opposed this concession.19 
Whatever rights the colonists possessed must have a source. Yet the delegates were 
unable to agree on how they had obtained those liberties. The argument was between those 
delegates who wanted to focus on the rights bestowed in colonial charters and those who felt 
such an argument was insufficient. Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut had 
charters that specified that their colonists had the rights of natural-born Englishmen. Rhode 
Island, Maryland, and Pennsylvania had referred explicitly to their charter rights in protests 
against the Stamp Act. Even James Otis had advanced the idea of charter rights in his 
writing. But Christopher Gadsden opposed too great a reliance on charter rights in the 
declarations of the congress. Each colony, he argued, had its own charter: did that not mean 
that each colony should protest individually? And John Dickinson and James Otis both 
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believed that the colonists should appeal to natural rights—those, after all, could by 
definition not be taken away.20 
Beyond arguments over Parliament’s powers and over the nature of the colonial 
rights which circumscribed those powers, more questions arose: How obeisant should the 
colonists be towards King and Parliament? How much authority should they acknowledge? 
What recourse did the colonists have to push back against those who tried to trample on 
their liberties? These questions, more than anything, would define the difference between 
the declarations made by the Stamp Act Congress and the prevailing sentiments among the 
colonists. 
The original call for a congress, and the appointments and instructions that followed, 
emphasized that the congress must acknowledge the authority of George III and his 
Parliament. And indeed, the declarations of the 1765 Congress began with a standard 
voicing of deference. In particular, they promised “all due subordination” to Parliament. In 
the context of the debates in the Congress, the wording was a defeat for the conservative 
delegates. Yet the Virginia Resolves had been more radical still in their assertions of precisely 
what subordination Parliament was due and what was the prerogative of the colonial 
legislatures.21  
                                                 
20 The Pennsylvania resolutions against the Stamp Act, crafted by Dickinson, specified that “the Constitution of 
Government in this Province is founded on the natural Rights of Mankind, and the noble Principles of English 
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The two documents established their arguments by recourse to a similar structure 
that would now be familiar on both sides of the Atlantic. Both began by asserting the rights 
under which the colonists denied Parliament’s ability to constitutionally levy a stamp tax. 
And both drew on the British constitution as the safeguard and guarantor of those rights. 
The Declarations held that the colonists possessed all “the inherent Rights and Liberties of 
[his Majesty’s] Natural born subjects, within the Kingdom of Great-Britain.” Similarly, the 
Virginia Resolves stated that “the first Adventurers, Settlers of this his Majesty’s Colony and 
Dominion of Virginia, brought with them, and transmitted to their Posterity, and all other 
his Majesty’s Colony, all the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that have at 
any Time been held, enjoyed and possessed by the People of Great Britain.”22  
But the Virginia Resolves also went on to cite the colony’s two charters as granting 
them “all Liberties, Privileges and Immunities of Denizens and Natural Subjects.” The 
Stamp Act Congress rejected this line of argument because not all the colonies had such 
charters and, more importantly, it seemed logical that an argument from charter rights 
implied that each colony should petition individually. The third alternative put forth at the 
Congress had been a protest grounded in the more general theory of “natural rights.” But 
that argument did not find its way into the Declarations, nor had it been invoked in the 
Virginia Resolves.23 
The differences among the colonies, then, were still great enough that the only 
justification they could agree on was the argument from charter rights. Each colony might 
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have had a more trenchant argument against the Stamp Act, but the consensus across 
colonies was less certain than the consensus within any colony. 
The colonists’ rights established, both documents agreed that those rights had been 
violated by the Stamp Act. The Declarations held, “it is inseparably essential to the Freedom 
of a People, and the undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Taxes be imposed upon them 
but with their own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives.” And the Virginia 
Resolves called “the Taxation of the People by themselves, or by Persons Chosen by 
themselves to represent them … the Distinguishing Characteristic of British Freedom.” 
Thus, the colonists’ freedom—and their Britishness—was bound up with their right of self-
taxation.24 
Both, again, agreed on the logical corollary of the colonists’ right to self-taxation: 
“That the only Representative of the People of these Colonies, are Persons chosen therein 
by themselves, and that no Taxes ever have been, or can be Constitutionally imposed on 
them, but by their respective Legislature,” wrote the Congress. It was only the colonial 
legislatures—those bodies elected by the people—that could tax the colonists. Similarly 
Virginia’s Burgesses had declared that “the General Assembly of this Colony,” with the 
king’s consent, “have the Sole Right and Authority to lay Taxes and Impositions upon It’s 
Inhabitants.” Yet the Burgesses redacted this declaration the next day—perhaps for the 
direct challenge to Parliament that followed it, “That every Attempt to vest such Authority 
in any other Person or Persons whatsoever, has a Manifest Tendency to Destroy 
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AMERICAN FREEDOM.” But the whole was printed in the northern newspapers as if the 
Burgesses had passed it.25 
The Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress also dealt with specific burdens placed 
on the colonies, both by the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, that the Virginia Resolves had 
not met. First was the issue of virtual representation. In the months since the Virginia 
Resolves had been penned, the colonial newspapers had reprinted essays from London 
newspapers that attacked the colonists’ rights. British writers now argued that the colonists 
had no cause to complain about Parliamentary taxation, for they were “virtually 
represented” therein in the same manner as many areas of England. The Massachusetts 
assembly had instructed Ruggles, Otis, and Partridge to oppose any suggestion that this 
argument was valid. Further, there had been rumblings that Parliament might admit several 
members from the colonies. The colonists rejected this argument as well, on the grounds 
that a handful of representatives a month’s travel from their constituents could not possibly 
do justice to the colonies’ needs. The Congress agreed, for their Declarations stated that 
“the People of these Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances cannot be, 
Represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain.”26 
The delegates to the congress wrote that “Trial by Jury” was the right of “every 
British Subject in these Colonies,” that the expansion of Admiralty courts subverted the 
colonists’ rights, that the duties under the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act would not only be 
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“extremely Burthensome and Grievous,” if not actually impossible to pay because of the 
chronic lack of specie in the colony.27 
Further, the delegates wrote that the colonists were essential to the manufacturing 
industry—and thus the revenue—of Great Britain, for all the profits of their trade went to 
purchasing goods. And the duties and taxes would “render them unable to purchase the 
manufactures of Great-Britain.” They left the conclusion unsaid but surely meant to imply 
that the Stamp Act and trade duties must lead of their own accord to the crippling of 
Britain’s steady revenue stream from the colonies, rather than, as the acts intended, increase 
that revenue.28 
The delegates skillfully tied together their arguments on rights with those based in 
economic realities with their twelfth declaration, “That the Increase, Prosperity, and 
Happiness of these Colonies, depend on the full and free Enjoyment of their Rights and 
Liberties, and an Intercourse with Great-Britain mutually Affectionate and Advantageous.” 
Britain’s well-being, they had established, was wedded to the revenue from vibrant, growing 
colonies that consumed British manufactures. Now the delegates argued that the colonies’ 
happiness and growth depended on their “enjoyment” of their rights—the rights the 
delegates had just asserted. Thus, Parliament needed to affirm the colonists’ rights for the 
sake of the empire’s continued prosperity.29 
So the Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress and the Virginia Resolves were 
similar in those assertions that dealt with the basis and the implications of colonial rights. 
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These were the Resolves that Virginia’s burgesses had actually passed. And the Declarations 
gave specific examples of how their rights had been violated and of how those violations hurt 
Britain as well as America. But the Virginia Resolves as distributed through the colonies 
went beyond discussion of rights to assert what could be done in defense of those rights. 
This was the greatest difference between the two documents: the violent methods of 
resistance advocated by Henry’s resolves implied a very different relationship to a Britain 
that enforced the Stamp Act than did the reliance on petitioning authority implicit in the 
Declarations. 
The fifth Virginia Resolve stated that taxes imposed by Parliament the colonists 
“destroys” American freedom. This was the resolve that the Burgesses had first passed, then 
repealed. The Declarations, too, established that such a tax was unconstitutional. Yet in the 
context of the Virginia Resolves, this fifth statement served as a rhetorical pivot. By moving 
from the abstract discussion of taxes and rights to the vivid language of destruction, it took 
the Resolves from an abstract exposition of rights towards concrete steps for asserting those 
rights.30 
The Virginia Resolves asserted, first, a direct challenge to Parliament’s authority: 
Virginians had no need to pay taxes laid by anyone other than their elected assembly. 
Second, the Resolves declared that those who said or wrote that Virginians should submit to 
such taxes were “enemies” of the colony. The colonists, in short, had a right to resist the 
Stamp Act, and there were no limits specified to the extent of legal resistance. In contrast, 
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the Declarations of the Congress merely asserted that the colonists had a right—and a 
duty—to petition for redress.31 
With the Declarations accepted, the congress next had to prepare petitions to the 
authorities in Britain. All agreed that an address must be sent to the King. But South 
Carolina’s representatives Gadsden and Lynch argued that nothing should be sent to the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons. Christopher Gadsden explained that the 
Commons had refused to accept the colonies’ earlier petitions against the proposed Stamp 
Act “as we neither hold our rights from them or the Lords.” Moreover, the address to the 
King could simply ask the monarch to “lay the matter before the Parliament.” The South 
Carolinians’ proposal was voted down and appeals sent to the two houses of Parliament as 
well as the King. Gadsden commented that since “union is most certainly all in all, the 
Memorial to the Lords and Petition to the Commons were supported by us here equally 
with as much zeal as if we had voted for them at the Congress.”32 
Like the Declarations, the petitions were conservative in their language. They 
acknowledged “due subordination” to Parliament. The petition to the Commons included 
additional arguments on the threats to trade made manifest by Parliament’s actions. It was 
in the Commons that the colonists could expect the greatest support and it was there, where 
merchants and manufacturers held seats, that this argument might sway the most votes.  
If the original goal of the Congress had been to present a united front to Britain, the 
final disposition of the documents made the colonies seem anything but in accord. Delegates 
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had come to New York from nine counties, but those from the host colony, Connecticut, 
and South Carolina were not empowered to sign. They would have to present the 
Declarations and petitions to their respective assemblies before adding their names.33 
That had been known before the congress had settled down to business. But what 
came next was a surprise. Two delegates, including the president of the congress, refused to 
sign. New Jersey’s Robert Ogden and Timothy Ruggles of Massachusetts “for Reasons best 
known to themselves, if they had any, refused to sign, and abruptly left the Congress before 
the Business was compleated.” The rest of the commissioners and their home assemblies saw 
Ruggles’s and Ogden’s actions as duplicitous. Ruggles, in particular, could have changed the 
course of debate at any time in his role as president. Ruggles would be censured by the 
Massachusetts Assembly, while Ogden would soon resign as speaker of New Jersey’s.34 
The Stamp Act Congress did not immediately release its Declarations or petitions. 
The justification proffered was that it would be a mark of disrespect for them to be generally 
distributed before their intended audience in Britain could have the opportunity to accept 
them. Already, though, enough news of the dissension at the Congress had seeped out for 
colonists to be suspicious. There were high hopes before the delegates had met; now they 
were no longer willing to commit to whatever path the commissioners had chosen. The 
Boston Post-Boy, itself publishing on unstamped paper in defiance of the Stamp Act, argued:  
Commissioners from almost all the colonies had held a congress at New-York, to 
agree upon and send home such remonstrances, petitions, &c. as might be thought 
proper to obtain a repeal of the stamp act—But whatever might be the result of their 
proceedings, the generality of the friends to liberty, did not choose that it should 
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ever once be thought that the enjoyment of their rights depended merely upon the 
success of these representations or the courtesy of those to whom they were made.35  
The Stamp Act Congress, then, was a great disappointment to the colonists who had 
come to their opposition to the Stamp Act through reading of Isaac Barré’s impassioned 
speech in the papers and the Virginia Burgesses’s stand against the “enemies” of the colonies. 
The riots of August and the forcing of stamp officers’ resignations had been the natural next 
step for those who saw the struggle against the Stamp Act as a struggle against slavery. The 
dithering they detected from New York suggested that the Congress had taken this 
progression backwards, not forwards. There was a growing colonial consensus, but it was not 
for the negotiated compromises of the Stamp Act Congress. 
Weslager argued that, though it was true the Congress had inspired neither the riots 
against nor the resignations of the stamp masters, it had led to one important outcome: it 
provided a basis and an inspiration for non-importation agreements among merchants in the 
largest colonial cities. The economic threat posed by these boycotts was then instrumental 
in the decision by Parliament’s decision to repeal the Stamp Act in early 1766.36  Chapter 4 
will show, however, that even this result of the Stamp Act Congress had little effect on the 
eventual repeal. 
In the meantime, without knowing what had been said in New York and sent across 
the ocean, colonists continued the process begun in the attacks on the stamp officers, to join 
together in extralegal organizations to defend themselves against the threat of slavery. These 
new groups used violence, threats of violence, and the rhetoric of slavery to enforce unity in 
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the name of nullifying the Stamp Act. In the process, they would unite the people of single 
communities while creating alliances among many. 
 
When Isaac Barré stood before Parliament, and, as the colonists read it, “with eyes 
darting fire, and an outstretched arm … with a voice somewhat elevated, and with a 
sternness in his countenance, which express’d, in a most lively manner, the feelings of his 
heart” he named the colonists as “sons of Liberty.” This speech served to inspire his 
American readers, and those who resisted the Stamp Act took Barré’s epithet and made it 
their own.  
The Sons of Liberty began as small cohorts in the seaboard towns. But they quickly 
made contact with one another. The mechanism for contact may have been previously-
existing mercantile relationships. When merchants in their local Sons traveled to another 
city they saw a different response to the crisis and were in a position to either offer support, 
or, as necessary, ask for it. In November 1765, New York’s Joseph Allicocke wrote his friend 
and fellow New York Son John Lamb when Lamb was in Philadelphia. In New York there 
was a rumor that Philadelphians were using stamped papers. Many New Yorkers and New 
Jerseyites were prepared to march to Philadelphia to stand fast with their Pennsylvania 
brethren against tyranny. They would “Swarm like the Industrious Bees, to assist with Heart 
and Hand to scourge the base Enemies of our Country and our greatest Darling LIBERTY 
whensoever or wheresoever may happen, that they should be so depraved as dare to meddle 
with the Infernal Stamps.” But in New York the situation was not so bad, for the stamps 
were in no danger of being used and newly installed Governor Moore had shown himself to 
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be “a man of good Sense, and much inclined to such measures as will promote Peace and a 
good Understanding with us.”37  
A note Allicocke attached testified to the previously-existing relationships. He asked 
Lamb to distribute a enclosed document (unfortunately not preserved) “with Speed, privacy, 
and usual Secrecy” to John Hughes, the “Coffee-House,” and a third place of Lamb’s 
choosing. Allicocke knew that, given the vagaries of locating Lamb in a city not his own, he 
might not receive the letter. Thus he asked another merchant, John Bayly, should he wind 
up with the letter, “to follow the above Instructions implicitly; in Pain of the Welfare of his 
Tea Pot.” Here Allicocke was speaking directly to a friend, one with whom he had no doubt 
shared food and drink as well as the vessels in which such things were served.38 
Much of the tension stemmed from the knowledge that elsewhere in the empire the 
Stamp Act had been enacted. Halifax in Nova Scotia was closest to the Northern seaports. 
Though earlier reports had held that “the Inhabitants are very uneasy with the Beginning of 
their Slavery, and it was thought they would not be holden of their Chains long,” such hopes 
did not come to pass. By February hopes were dimmer, for Boston printers received several 
Halifax newspapers, “with a bloody red Stamp on each, as terrible as Death to Printers, 
being two Daggers through a crown, or under it, and the Points toward the Word America 
on the Top.” Even the crest showed the Stamp Act as malicious: it had thrust through 
British liberty towards its next victim, America.39 
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In Georgia, too, the news was bad. Reports trickled northward through Charleston 
that the Stamp Act was in operation, if only for “the clearing out of Vessels” from Savannah. 
But echoing their northern cousins, Georgia merchants and others had “entered into Bonds” 
to refuse all other uses of stamped paper. A detailed missive from that colony warned readers 
that continued resistance was necessary: 
Our Liberty here is at a very low ebb. When we received the first accounts of the 
opposition made to the stamp act to the northward, the same spirit took place here, 
and there seemed to be a general dislike to it; but of late some of our merchants 
(finding their interest concerned) who at first exclaimed most against the act, drew 
off, and have even endeavoured to suppress the spirit of liberty, by gaining over the 
greatest part of the ship masters to their side. The number of the sons of liberty are 
too few here to make any head against the other party, which is supported by the 
rangers of this province. 
Protests had been quelled by the Governor’s guards and the stamp distributor had 
arrived and was waiting in Fort Halifax for the right moment to emerge. “I am afraid as 
matters now stand we shall have stamping enough tomorrow or next day,” concluded the 
correspondent. “ Any opposition will now be fruitless, as those yet hearty in the cause of 
liberty, are but few in number.”40 
The Sons’ first priority, therefore, was to prevent the enactment of the Stamp Act. 
To do so they would have to keep their communities united against it. In the previous 
chapter we saw how the nascent Sons used the rhetoric of sympathy and of slavery against 
the incumbent stamp officers and their supporters. This language, its success proven, would 
be deployed throughout the winter and spring of the coming year. So too would coercion 
and threat, echoes of the attacks on stamp officers’ houses before 1 November. But 
previously these methods had depended on an obvious target—the men who had accepted 
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stamp offices and were present and visible in the colonies. Now the Sons had to maintain the 
same passion among themselves and their people without the focus of a direct threat. 
The attacks and threats of attack against the stamp officers had worked. Nobody 
could be found to accept an office; it was difficult even to get someone to accept 
responsibility for the stamps. The communal actions had also created a spirit of community, 
both locally and (through, especially the print media) beyond. The Sons of Liberty therefore 
kept up these public ceremonies. Before the center of the ritual had been the burning of an 
effigy. But without a stamp officer to threaten, what could be the focus of their ire? The 
answer became the stamped paper itself. 
Up and down the coast the Sons of Liberty created spectacles whenever a stamped 
paper was found. All of that in the colonies from New Hampshire to South Carolina had 
been accounted for—it was stored in a coastal fort or stowed away in a Royal Navy ship. But 
stamped paper still circulated throughout the British Atlantic. Throughout the colonies the 
customs system required each ship leaving a port to have a properly authorized pass. These 
passes were one of the many documents on which a stamp tax was now levied. In the 
colonies where the Stamp Act had been nullified the ports were either closed or ships left 
without stamped passes. But where the Stamp Act was enforced—Halifax, the Caribbean 
islands, even Georgia—captains left port bearing stamped passes. 
When these ships landed at Boston or New York or Philadelphia, then, they bore 
the physical manifestation of the hated stamp tax—the stamped papers themselves. The 
Sons of Liberty took full advantage. 
On the night of Thursday 12 December a ship arrived at New York bearing bad 
news from Quebec: the Stamp Act had been enforced in that colony. The ship carried “a 
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stamped Let Pass … from Governor Murray.” None of the readers would have seen a 
stamped paper before so the newspapers carefully described the hated object: “It bears the 
same Stamp as an English Bill of Lading, with the Word AMERICA, at the Top, and at the 
Bottom, V. SHILLINGS:, the Words of the Pass in Manuscript.” The Sons had apparently 
taken the pass from the ship’s captain and placed it on display in a coffeehouse, where it 
became practically the site of a depressing field trip: “Numbers, with dejected Countenances, 
went to see the same.”41 
A few days later the Sons of Liberty again drew attention to the stamped paper, this 
time with a more traditional effigy-hanging. They “exhibited to the Publick the Effigies” of 
Lord Colville, George Grenville, and Quebec’s Governor Murray, “the latter for signing a let 
Pass or Stamped Paper which is the first Stamp that has made its odious appearance in this 
City.”42 Murray’s signing of the stamped pass was a physical endorsement of the hated 
Stamp Act and put him on the same level as an enemy to the colonists as were the most 
dangerous ministers or the stamp officers themselves. 
Boston’s Sons would make an even more public display of a stamped pass. They took 
the clearance from a ship captain who had just arrived from Jamaica, “fixed it on a Pole, and 
carried it to the low end of the Court House, where they put the Pole in the Stocks, and 
exposed the Paper to public view.” After some hours in the stocks it was time for the final 
penalty. “The Executioner then carried the guilty Criminal to the Center of King Street, and 
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with a lighted Match set Fire to one of the S——p A—ts, and with that burnt the Offspring 
of that Hydra-headed Monster.”43 
As in New York, the Sons emphasized a material connection between the stamped 
paper and the people who abetted the Stamp Act. Both were “Criminals” subject to sanction 
by the people. Treatment differed: it would not have been prudent to put the well-
connected Andrew Oliver in stocks, and after all, the goal had been to get him to turn 
against the Stamp Act and back towards the community, not punish him. But they had 
processioned his effigy by the courthouse on 14 August before setting fire to it atop Culp’s 
Hill. Here, without direct threat to any person, they were able to use stocks before the 
courthouse and the public space in the center of town for the same purpose. This burning of 
a pamphlet and a parchment would have been over quickly. 
Newport’s Sons of Liberty, protected by the elected governor of Rhode Island, had 
little fear of retribution from crown officers or colonial officials. Accordingly, when they 
exhibited stamped papers they could do so with more drama than most. The Newport 
Gazette, mouthpiece of the Sons, set the scene. It arose from a “dispute,” perhaps a tavern 
argument. A “Son of Tyranny” had argued that “all the Artillery, and Means of Defence, 
with which this and the other Government were furnished, ought and would eventually turn 
and recoil upon themselves, whenever the Trial should in Fact be made, of forcing the 
supposed Badges of Slavery upon us.”44 
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Would the colonists give in if the Stamp Act were enforced at gunpoint? The Sons of 
Liberty took the opportunity, not to make an example of the speaker, but rather to run an 
“experiment”: 
two large Cannon (given to the Public by a patriotic Gentleman, and which, from 
this Time, may be emphatically called, the Cannon of LIBERTY) were some Time 
past placed at the Foot of our Parade; and on Saturday last, about Sunrise, two of 
the Badges of Slavery, brought hither from the West Indies and Georgia, were seen 
in the Mouth of these Cannon, and remained there full six Hours, without any Part 
of them being in the least injured; but on a sudden, the detestable Papers were 
instantly disgorged, as a loathsome Vomit, the angry Flames raised, and committed 
their Ashes to the Care of the four Winds, which seemed at that Time, in a patriotic 
Contention, to prevent their revisiting the Earth again: But what is most remarkable, 
and it is thought no inauspicious Omen, the Cannon appeared instantly to be 
immovable fixed, as a Monument and Bulwark of Liberty, and perpetual Terror to 
our Adversaries, and (without a Metaphor) would baffle and defy a Thousand of the 
sturdiest Sons of Tyranny in Europe or America, with all their Teeth and Claws, to 
remove. And we will for once venture to prophecy, those Cannon will never be 
turned upon the Town to annoy it.45  
It was not only stamped passes that were made into objects of scorn, but other 
stamped papers as well. Some of the first stamps to circulate widely in the colonies that had 
nullified the Act were on editions of the Halifax Gazette from early November. Bostonians 
missed an early chance to burn these papers when the captain of the Nova Scotia packet 
discovered that, unbeknownst to him, the printer had arranged for his stamped newspapers 
to be put on board. Captain Green “immediately burnt them on board, which prevented 
those to whom they were directed from treating the papers in the same, though in a more 
public Manner.”46 
Another bundle of Halifax Gazettes would find its way to Philadelphia, where the 
Sons of Liberty devised an elaborate ceremony to surround its consignment to the flames. 
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By Capt. Davidson we also received a STAMPED News-Paper of the 2d of 
November. It being the first Stamp which had shewn its ugly form in this province, 
in the evening it was exposed to public view at the Coffee-House, and then 
suspended, not by a golden, but an iron chain, to which was affixed a pair of hand-
cuffs, in the middle of the room; the Company, which was very large, then formed a 
circle, and fire was set to the paper, with a wish it might be the last ever seen in 
America, to which the whole Company gave their hearty approbation by three 
huzzas.47 
Setting fire to the newspaper would have called to mind the autumn’s effigies—and 
of course both straw-men and stamped paper burned extraordinarily well. Similarly, the 
“iron chain” and “pair of hand-cuffs” that held the Gazette were a visible reminder of the 
rhetoric of slavery around which defiance of the Stamp Act was based. 
Of course, colonists might take preemptive action to make sure that stamped papers 
never came into use. At midnight on 9 January, a “Company of Armed Men” boarded a 
merchant brig in New York harbor. They forced the ship’s crew to surrender the keys to the 
cargo hold, “searched the Vessel from Stamp to Stern, and seized the Stamped Papers” for 
New York and Connecticut. They loaded the ten boxes of stamped papers onto a boat, 
rowed them to the “Ship Yards,” and “broke the Packages to Pieces, and with some Tar 
Barrels, and other Combustibles, made a Bonfire of them and their Contents.” Newspaper 
reports took care to mention that afterwards there was no other mischief—the goings-on 
were confined to one specific, purposeful event.48 
Even stamped papers that were not in use held an attraction. After the merchant 
vessel Ellis wrecked on the Long Island coast, a small bundle of stamped papers was found 
on the beach. These were brought to New York, where the Sons seized them and “purified 
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[them] at the Coffee House … before a Thousand Spectators.” Other stamped papers were 
simply sent to rot in the forts and naval vessels, where, in Boston’s case, “no officers here 
would venture to take them into Possession, or to offer one of them to be executed.”49  
The Sons of Liberty had made the stamped papers themselves into objects to be 
scorned, with rituals enacted around their uncovering, exhibition, and their destruction by 
fire. But this did not mean the cessation of earlier rituals. In the autumn the colonists had 
prevented enactment of the Stamp Act by forcing appointed officers to resign their posts and 
swear oaths that they would never accept such an office. Now the Sons of Liberty continued 
that practice by continually reiterating the fate of those who accepted a stamp 
distributorship or who expressed a willingness to use stamped papers. 
In Elizabeth, New Jersey, the townspeople erected a “large Gallows … with a Rope 
ready fixed thereto.” They vowed “that the first Person that distributes or takes out a 
Stamped paper, shall be hung thereon, without Judge or Jury.” Similarly, Windham, 
Connecticut raised a post, “called LIBERTY … decorated with various Inscriptions, 
importing that it shall be DEATH to any Person who shall presume to use any Stamp 
Papers.”50 These public sites were descendants of Boston’s Liberty Tree, which continued to 
represent resistance to the Stamp Act in that city throughout the crisis.51 
Archibald Ritchie, a Virginia merchant, boasted at the Richmond county court that 
“he was determined to Clear out his Vessels on Stampt Paper; at the same Time, saying, that 
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he knew where to get such Paper.” Spoken at his colony’s most public gathering, his words 
could not fail to provoke. A meeting was called at nearby Leedstown “to consider of what 
Measures it would be necessary to take against a Man who was thus attempting to introduce 
a Law so destructive to the Community.” The first measure was preventative, an association 
among the merchants to bind them all to resist the Stamp Act. The second was directed 
against Ritchie. They prepared a declaration for the absent Ritchie to sign and swear to, 
which expressed remorse for the “high Insult” of threatening to clear his vessels on stamped 
paper and swearing never to do so “unless the Use of such Paper shall be authorized by the 
General Assembly of this Colony.”52 
If Ritchie refused to take the oath, they resolved, 
his Person should be taken and stripp’d Naked to his Waist, tied to the Tail of a 
Cart, and drawn to the public Pillory, where he should be fixed for One Hour, and if 
in that Times he did not comply, that he should be brought up by the whole 
Company to Leeds Town, there to be farther determined on, as should seem 
Expedient to the Friends of Liberty.53  
News of Ritchie’s outrage had spread. The next day when the Northern Neck 
merchants again gathered, this time to accost Ritchie at Hobbs’ Hole, they were joined by 
men from the south side of the Rappahannock. They totaled four hundred in all and made 
use of those numbers to impress. They “drew up in two lines in the main street of the 
Town” while a committee went to Ritchie’s house and demanded that he swear to the 
declaration they had prepared. Ritchie balked but the Sons of Liberty would not be refused. 
Finally, “he, in Presence of the whole Company, with his Hat off, and with an audible Voice, 
first Read, and then Swore” to the prepared declaration. Similarly, when Simon Metcalf was 
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suspected of holding “some Office in the Stamp Way” the New York Sons of Liberty would 
not be assuaged until the young newcomer swore an oath that he was not tainted with such 
associations.54 
The Sons of Liberty were willing to coerce not just those proclaiming they would use 
stamps, but those suspected of supporting or abetting the Stamp Act. When a rumor 
reached Boston’s Sons that a Captain Kirkwood had brought stamped papers from England 
they “waited on him … to know the Truth of said Report.” Kirkwood said he had refused to 
carry the stamps from England. The Sons accepted his offer to swear an oath to that effect 
and actually brought him to the court house to swear before a justice “before a great 
Number of Witnesses, who dispersed in good Order, after three Cheers were given.” In this 
case no explicit threats were necessary, but as the Sons-sympathetic newspaper explained, 
such vigilance was necessary for those “ever intent on the Good of their Fellow Subjects, and 
determined to use their utmost Efforts to prevent even the Appearance of Slavery.”55 
And again, when a Captain Thatchew arrived from Jamaica with, reports said, a 
“Clearance on stamped Paper,” Boston’s Sons sent one of their own to the docks. Their 
representative bore a warrant that authorized him to “go and demand in their names those 
Marks of Creole Slavery; and when you have obtained them, commit to the Flames in King 
Street, this day at One o’Clock; and for doing so this shall be your Warrant.” The Sons were 
consciously inverting the authority structure of the colony. It would be the sheriff or a 
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customs officer that would receive a warrant. But with moves such as these the Sons of 
Liberty stated their authority as community leaders outweighed the official channels.56 
But not all crumbled under coercion. Those with other authority at their backs 
might resist the Sons’ threats. Not surprisingly, it was in New York where the Sons directly 
confronted a Royal Navy officer. Lieutenant Hallam of the Garland had “expressed himself 
much to the disadvantage of the Americans, by advancing that their Proceedings were equal 
to the Proceedings in Scotland in the Year 1745, and other Invectives of the like Kind, 
which falsely eludes to a Disaffection in them to the best of Kings.” The Sons might be 
opposed to British policy but at this late date, when rumors of the repeal were becoming 
more and more common, they could not tolerate accusations of Jacobitism and treason. 
Accordingly they demanded Hallam sign an oath repudiating his statements—but Hallam 
denied ever having said such things. The Sons then took “Affidavits” from those who had 
reported Hallam. Even faced with these depositions Hallam “refused giving any 
satisfaction.”57 
The Sons of Liberty were reduced to issuing threats. “Should he meet the just 
Resentment of an undeservedly provoked People, it will be of his own seeking, and he must 
abide by the Consequences. Yet they acknowledged they could not carry out these threats. If 
Hallam stayed aboard the Garland, he would be safe “as the Sons of Liberty would to a Man 
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join in preserving the Properly of their Sovereign, and by no Means attempt to commit the 
least Outrage against his Crown and Dignity.” Yet they framed it as loyalty to the King. In 
doing so the Sons threaded the needle: they disproved Hallam’s accusations while still 
avoiding an escalation of the situation. The Sons explained that they “would carefully avoid 
every Step that may have a Tendency to any Act of Disloyalty, as much as any of his 
Majesty’s Subjects whatsoever, or wheresoever.” As will be shown in chapter 4, by the end of 
March the Sons of Liberty knew that the Stamp Act was almost certain to be repealed, 
indeed might already have been repealed. Now, unlike in the autumn there was now little 
incentive to provoke, and where resistance had once been a mark of loyalty (for George III 
wanted, they said, to be king of freemen rather than slaves), now forbearance was an equal 
sign.58 
The adept New York Sons of Liberty could quickly adapt to circumstances when a 
target did not behave as they expected. But those to the north in Albany did not have such 
success.  
The Albany Sons of Liberty summoned merchant Henry Van Schaack to a meeting 
late on the evening of 4 January 1766. When he arrived the Sons—numbering, he said, 
thirty to forty—told him they had heard a rumor that he had applied for a stamp 
distributorship. They demanded Van Schaack swear an oath that he would never accept 
such an office. He flatly denied ever doing so, demanded (without success) to know who the 
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supposed informer was, and finally refused and said he would extend such an assurance in 
writing.59 
This did not satisfy the Albany Sons. Where in other towns the Sons were 
experienced, well-connected men, skilled at negotiation, the Albany Sons were young men, 
the sons of well-to-do merchants. Perhaps they had begun the whole thing on a lark, not 
expecting resistance. But now they felt they could not back down. Over the next several days 
they harassed Van Schaack. They continued to demand an oath, put up broadsides with 
drawings of Van Schaack hung in effigy, and finally attacked his house and possessions.60 
Van Schaack asked the town magistrates for help. These men, themselves the fathers 
of many of his tormentors, advised him to take the oath. But Van Schaack refused to do so 
unless the magistrates did the same. This angered them, for later when he returned to them 
he found “the door of justice … shut up against me.” In the end Van Schaack took the oath, 
though declaring it “illegal arbitrary and oppressive, exacted from me by a set of men who 
stile themselves Sons of Liberty but in my opinion it would be more just if they were to call 
themselves Sons of Tyranny & ignorance.” The next week James McEvers, formerly 
distributor for New York before his own resignation, published a letter in the New York 
newspapers assuring readers that, indeed, Van Schaack had never applied for an office under 
the Stamp Act.61 
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These instances of coercion and threat, then, were spread throughout the colonies. 
There were episodes in New Hampshire, Georgia, and all the provinces in between. Each 
episode served to shore up community sentiment against the Stamp Act by destroying the 
stamps themselves or by threatening the possessions and the bodies of the stamp officers. 
Those who might use stamps or justify their use were made public figures to be shamed. 
Those opposed could celebrate their own virtue and their restraint in not carrying out their 
violent threats. 
During the period before the first of November, when the problem was to force the 
stamp officers already in place to resign their posts, both anti-Stamp Act colonists and the 
embattled officials could follow the progress of the resistance movement in the colonial 
newspapers. The debate began with the riots in Boston and Newport and the hunt for Jared 
Ingersoll in Connecticut and continued with protests against John Hughes in Philadelphia, 
James McEvers in New York, John Mercer in Virginia, and George Saxby in South Carolina. 
It was quickly apparent to all that the protests were working. On one side, the stamp 
officers knew it was not worth defending their post while all about them their peers were 
abandoning theirs. On the other, the colonists could take advantage of the actual violence in 
Boston and Newport to threaten more violence against their own stamp officers. The 
newspaper writers, too, showed the way for stamp officers to repent by providing them a 
path back into the good graces of the community—through the language of sympathy. 
Those newspapers that continued to print after the first of November were even 
more set against the Stamp Act than before. After all, publishing on unstamped paper was 
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now a crime. Before, voices in favor of submission had been few and dwindling. Now, 
anything they might say in their turn would be filtered on its way to the wider public by 
editors explicitly opposed to them. The very Stamp Act intended to raise revenue from the 
colonies prevented its defenders, not from speaking in its favor, but from disseminating their 
message to a larger audience. The public relations war was probably lost anyway, but the 
Stamp Act prevented even a rearguard action. To take several examples from above, the 
Newport “Son of Tyranny” could hardly expect to have the Newport Gazette print anything 
in his defense. Even in such a case as that in Albany, where a group of young “Sons of 
Liberty” lacking authority were faced down by a man innocent of the charges against him, 
the public record only contained the reading of events most favorable to the Sons. 
So the “imagined community” of patriotic colonists grew with every report of effigies 
burnt and oaths extracted. But the total disappearance of one side of the debates—brought 
on, ironically, by the enactment of the law that side wanted to defend—meant that the 
colonial newspapers in late 1765 and early 1766 were hardly a “public sphere” of reasoned 
debate. There was no longer a way to question with others across the colonies the proper 
rights granted by the British Constitution, the colonial charters, or even natural law. Nor 
could the proper deployment of the language of sympathy be debated. One narrative, and 
one only, survived. 
The Sons of Liberty across the colonies surely encouraged newspaper editors to 
publish such narratives in which they brought the unrighteous to justice. But equally, they 
would not have wanted their more secretive doings to be made public. In particular, the 
Sons concealed their efforts to create an underground network for direct communication, 
more rapid than the printed news. 
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Like most private communication between merchants, the Sons’ transactions would 
have to be through manuscript letters. Yet the mechanism of transmission was a problem. 
They doubted that the imperial post could be trusted. For amid the previous year’s attempts 
to centralize imperial authority had been a bevy of new post office regulations. The new laws 
established rates that, while not high, had like the stamp duties to be paid in sterling 
coinage. The system, moreover, was based around a small number of chief post offices, each 
with a larger network of local offices.62 
Compared to the Stamp Act, the Sugar Act, or proposals to billet troops in private 
homes, the new postal regulation were not the greatest threat to the colonists. But Virginia’s 
Landon Carter retained his suspicions. In retrospect, Carter argued, the establishment of the 
post office in America was an unconstitutional tax and a subtle encroachment on colonial 
liberties. Only the South Carolina assembly “foresaw the evil tendency of such a 
precedent.”63 
Carter’s essay, first printed in the Maryland Gazette, made its way across the colonies. 
If his worries were constitutional—was the postal service an unbearable internal tax?—those 
of the Sons of Liberty were all too concrete. Could the postal service be trusted to deliver 
the Sons’ letters without reading the contents? 
The Sons concluded that the postal service could not be trusted     . They were 
helped to this decision by incidents like one involving the transmission of a letter (whether 
through the official post or other means is unknown) between Boston’s Sons and 
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Connecticut’s John Durkee. Sending the letter on to his New York counterpart Isaac Sears, 
Durkee wrote “I am like to find the Villain who broke open the letter [and] hope he will 
meet with due punishment.”64 
 
There is no indication that Durkee ever discovered who broke the wax seal on the 
Bostonians’ letter—nor if it was a malicious act rather than an accident caused by rough dirt 
roads. But the New York Sons were sufficiently alarmed to take precautions and to warn 
their correspondents to do the same. Replying to the Connecticut Sons, they wrote “You’ll 
please to be very cautious by whom you communicate; the like will be offered on our part. If 
any unfavorable accounts should transpire, well authenticated, we desire you should send a 
special messenger.”65 
Nor did suspicions abate as the likelihood of a repeal grew. Even in late March and 
early April, the New York Sons warned against correspondence by other than “a private 
Conveyance, for reasons that will occur to you.” And in proposing a Congress of Sons of 
Liberty to Boston’s Sons, they asked the Bostonians to reply only “by the first safe 
opportunity”—in other words, to use a trusted merchant or independent rider rather than 
the official post.66 
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There was, perhaps, grounds for these suspicions. Certainly the colonial officials 
opposed to the Sons were aware that something was happening outside their power. As early 
as September, Cadwallader Colden had grumbled that “it is evident that a secret 
Correspondence has been carryd on throughout all the Colonies; & that it has been 
concerted to deter by violence the Distributors of Stamps from Executing their office, and to 
destroy the Stamped Paper when it arrives.”67 Colden had also been alarmed by the quick 
distribution of the Constitutional Courant at about the same time. That had been done by the 
post riders along their usual routes, and without the knowledge of the postmaster.68 
Both Colden and the Sons of Liberty, then, were alarmed by conspiracies. They took 
the few facts they had—uprisings in several colonies and the appearance of a seditious 
newspaper for Colden; a broken seal and a preexisting suspicion of centralized power for the 
Sons—and fabulated these into something more. But Colden was soon removed from day-
to-day power by the arrival of new governor Henry Moore, who was less willing to see these 
happenings as evidence of conspiracy. Colden, though, had not been wrong. For the New 
York Sons now pursued their nascent alliances with less fear of official intervention. 
The Sons of Liberty had begun as independent groups in urban centers. But as they 
began to reach out to each other relationships of authority formed among them. New York’s 
Sons seemed to always be at the center of activity. It was a New Yorker, John Lamb, who 
first made contact with Philadelphia’s Sons. And New York took steps to assert its 
preeminence over its southern neighbor. In February, when rumors arrived in the northern 
city that Pennsylvania stamp master John Hughes was still thinking about distributing 
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stamped paper, New York’s Sons wrote to Philadelphia’s, threatening to halt all commerce 
with them should they not finally remove Hughes.69 
Soon after establishing relations with the Philadelphia Sons, New York’s entered 
into a “reciprocal agreement” with those of Connecticut. The two sides pledged their 
support to each other and, further, to quickly bring other colonies’ Sons of Liberty into their 
pact. True to their word, Connecticut soon extended the chain to Boston with a similar 
agreement.70 To the south, Philadelphia’s Sons perhaps felt their credibility damaged by 
their apparent lack of control over Hughes. They requested advice from their New York 
counterparts on forming a committee for correspondence and assured the New York Sons 
that they would communicate further with the Sons of Liberty to their south.71 
But New York’s Sons was already taking steps in that direction. They had sent a 
circular letter to all towns as far south as Charleston. With this letter the New Yorkers went 
beyond the slow process of individually contacting Sons town-by-town and tried to unite 
Sons of Liberty across the colonies. The stated goal was to enter into a union for the 
preservation of rights, in particular the rights to trial by jury and to self-taxation that were 
threatened by the Stamp Act. Yet the rhetoric was that of defense against slavery. It asked 
the colonists “in the sacred name of Liberty, and the Regard you owe the British 
Constitution” to assemble true-born Sons of Liberty into associations “in imitation of our 
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Brethren in Connecticut, Boston, &c.,” and to enter into resolves “for the Preservation of 
Liberty and perfecting an Union (upon which under God depends our existence as 
freemen.)” The Sons needed to be united in their struggle, and an important part of that 
would be to see that others were doing the same. Thus, Sons should distribute their resolves 
far and wide “as far as your Influence exists.” They should make sure to send the resolves to 
the New York Sons as well. For their part, the New York Sons would maintain the struggle 
by violence if necessary. They and their “Brethren to the Eastward” pledged “not to be 
enslaved, by any Power on Earth, without opposing Force to Force.”72 
New York’s effort was successful. By the second week of March a committee in 
Baltimore had written to the New York Sons. Then group in Providence in the colony of 
Rhode Island soon followed. And smaller groups began to spring up in the towns 
surrounding New York. During February and March of 1766, New York’s Sons received 
warm letters of commiseration from circles in Oyster Bay, Huntington, White Plains, and 
Middletown in New York, Penington and Upper Freehold in New Jersey, and Fairfield and 
Preston in Connecticut. 
Sons, of course, continued to visit each other in person as well, possibly in the course 
of mercantile dealings or other legitimate business. A guest of Boston’s Sons in February 
described how they valued their commitment, in terms of the number of men they had 
willing to fight against any imposition of the Stamp Act: 
I am but just returned from Boston where I had the Honour of being introduced to 
ye Sons of Liberty -- I produced proper Credentials & gave them due Information -- 
They were highly pleased with ye Conduct of their Western Brethren & are 
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Delighted at ye proposed Union. After I was admitted in their most Honourable 
Privy Council & took my Seat at ye Board accordingly, they acquainted me that they 
were as Fixt as Fate in their Opposition to the Stamp Act & all its Abetters that they 
can at two Hours Notice bring 3000 men under the Tree of Liberty who would go 
any where for ye Preservation of ye Constitution & that there is above 40,000 in 
that Province & New Hampshire who are Determined to take up Arms for ye same 
Purpose if Necessary.73  
And New York’s Sons, too, conceived of a day when correspondence should give way 
to action. At the beginning of April New York proposed to Boston a that, should word be 
received that the Stamp Act is to be enforced, “there ought to be a Congress of the Sons of 
Liberty, in order to form a general plan to be pursued by the Whole.” They suggested the 
same to the Providence Sons: “But perhaps the time is drawing near when all commercial 
intercourses must cease as the only means of retaining our freedom, Which if that is the case, 
we conceive a personal interview (previous to it) indispensable.”74 
By the time news of the Stamp Act’s repeal reached the colonies, the Sons of Liberty 
formed a network from at least Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to at least as far south as 
Wilmington, North Carolina, with New York’s Sons as the central node. They corresponded 
with speed through means outside the usual post routes. Many of these Sons of Liberty 
wrote and published their own sets of resolves as well. The New York Sons had asked this of 
them, but many had already begun, even doing so the previous year. Invariably, these local 
sets of resolves resembled more the Virginia Resolves than they did the Declarations of the 
more recent Stamp Act Congress. They reflected the Sons’s understanding of the Stamp Act 
as a threat of slavery, as something that must be fought against—by violent struggle if 
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necessary. They, not the Stamp Act Congress, were heir to Isaac Barré, the Virginia 
Resolves, and the Constitutional Courant. 
 
Sons of Liberty in Windham, Connecticut pledged ten days after the enactment of 
the Stamp Act that they would resist the Stamp Act:  
But as the stamped papers being, by the hands or means of our rulers, or those who 
sustain offices of trust over or among us, or distributing or receiving of them by the 
lowest peasant, may be of the most fatal consequences, thereby to inforce said act; 
we do hereby declare and publish this our settled and deliberate purpose, as a free 
people, that we will, by all due and effectual means, prevent the use, distribution or 
receiving of said papers, stamped according to said act.75  
Soon after Connecticut and New York’s Sons had entered into their “reciprocal 
agreement” the New York circle made a similar public promise. They stated “That we will 
go to the last Extremity, and venture our Lives and Fortunes, effectually to prevent the said 
Stamp Act from ever taking Place in this City and Province.”76 
Two smaller towns in New York’s hinterlands followed suit. The Sons of Liberty in 
Penington assured readers that “the People of Hunterson County West Jersey, think 
themselves Free and are determined to Live or Die so.”77 Nearby Huntington justified their 
vigor of their resolves by the corresponding danger of the Stamp Act. If they were to submit, 
they determined, “we and all our Posterity will be as absolute Slaves, to all Intents & 
Purposes.”78 
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Writing at the same time as the two northern towns, the Sons of Wilmington, North 
Carolina echoed the rhetoric of slavery and struggle. Like Penington’s Sons, they found 
themselves “preferring death to slavery” and despite their loyalty to the King, chose to 
“mutually and solemnly plight our faith and honour, that we will at any risque whatever, and 
whenever called upon, unite, and truly and faithfully assist each other, to the best of our 
power, in preventing entirely the operation of the stamp act.” They signed their association 
on 18 February; the next day they began a march on the port of Brunswick, picked up a 
crowd of over a thousand people on the way, and on the 21st forced the customs officers of 
the colony to swear “that they would not, directly or indirectly, by themselves, or any other 
person employed under them, sign or execute in their several and respective offices, any 
stamped papers, until the stamp act should be accepted of by the province”—thus reopening 
the port to trade. The Wilmington correspondent hastened to assure his readers that there 
was no “injury offered to any person, but the whole affair conducted with decency and spirit, 
worthy the imitation of all the SONS OF LIBERTY throughout the continent.”79 
A similar association was signed in Westmoreland County, Virginia, before a crowd 
action against a local merchant. Sons of Liberty in Leedstown,  
roused by Danger and alarmed at Attempt foreign & domestic to reduce the People 
of this Country to a state of abject and detestable slavery by destroying that free and 
happy  constitution of Government under which they have hitherto lived … bind 
ourselves to each other, to God, and to our Country, by the Firmest Tyes that 
Religion & Virtue can frame, most sacredly and punctually to stand by, and with our 
Lives & Fortunes to support, maintain and defend each other, in the Observation 
and Execution of these following Articles. 
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They resolved to  “pay no Regard to Danger or to Death.” And they defined their 
targets in familiar terms: “if therefore any Person or Persons shall attempt by any Action or 
Proceeding to deprive this Colony of those fundamental Rights we will immediately regard 
him or them as the most dangerous Enemy of the Community.” The Westmoreland Sons of 
Liberty were explicitly invoking the language of the Virginia Resolves—but the earlier 
document’s “Enemy of the Colony” had been transformed into the more fluid “Enemy of the 
Community.”80 
In Cecil County, Maryland, Sons of Liberty insisted that internal taxes imposed by 
Parliament and the dissolution of the right to trial by jury was “contrary to the Spirit of the 
English Constitution, destructive of our just Rights and Privileges, and tending to the 
Slavery and Ruin of us and our Posterity.”81  Middletown, New Jersey, also justified their 
opposition in terms of slavery. Their resolves have not survived, but were apparently forceful 
enough to draw a passionate response from the New York Sons. They concluded that since 
there’s “more real Dignity in ruling Freemen than Slaves”—and since slavery is “a state so 
utterly incompatible with the Happiness of the Human Race” the colonists’ “preservation of 
our Liberties” is “the most essential Service that we can render his Majesty, our fellow 
Subjects,  our selves, & Posterity.” The King, once he understood the stakes, would surely 
approve their actions. And since the Sons’ cause was the cause of “all the British Subjects, in 
every part of the British Dominions, and of every man who deserves Freedom, Consequently, 
if we give up essential Liberty, for the sake of temporary Safety, we deserve neither Liberty 
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nor Safety, nor indeed could any Government confide in such a dastardly tribe, that would 
sell their birthright for a mess of pottage.”82  
Norfolk, Virginia, was the major port closest to the Capitol in Williamsburg where 
Patrick Henry had introduced his resolves. Nearly a year later, it was clear that sentiment 
against the Stamp Act in the region had not abated. Nor had the rhetoric against it changed; 
if anything it had become more violent, and it laid out with greater detail the association 
between struggle and slavery. The Norfolk Sons of Liberty declared that they, “unwilling to 
rivet the shackles of slavery and oppression on ourselves, and millions yet unborn,” had 
entered into resolutions. These resolves included a defense of the rights of self-taxation and 
jury trial, “for if we quietly submit to the execution of the said Stamp Act, all our claims to 
civil liberty will be lost, and we and our posterity become absolute slaves.” They pledged to 
fight rather than submit: they would “sacrifice our lives and fortunes, in concurrence with 
the other Sons of Liberty in the American provinces, to defend and preserve those invaluable 
blessings transmitted us by our ancestors.” And in a final, telling move, the repeated the 
injunction of the seventh Virginia Resolve against “enemies of this Colony.” But they 
changed the key clause:  
Resolved, That whoever is concerned, directly or indirectly, in using, or causing to 
be used, in any way or manner whatever, within this colony, unless authorized by the 
General Assembly thereof, those detestable papers called the Stamps, shall be 
deemed, to all intents and purposes, an enemy to his country, and by the Sons of 
Liberty treated accordingly.83  
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The change from the Burgesses’ “enemy to this colony” to Norfolk’s “enemy to his 
country” reflects the growth of the resistance to the Stamp Act. The Burgesses had spoken 
for Virginia (or, rather, the resolves had been published as if the Burgesses had spoken for 
Virginia). But the Norfolk Sons of Liberty claimed the right to speak not only for Virginia, 
but for all the colonies. Their resolves, like the Virginia Resolves before them, would make 
their way into the newspapers across the provinces. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Repeal and “Rejoicings” 
 
By April, then, resistance to the Stamp Act across the colonies had its own norms, its 
accepted forms of action. The direct efforts of the Sons of Liberty, and their resolves 
published and republished throughout the colonial newspapers, had made clear that the 
struggle to prevent the Stamp Act from being enforced was universal. The Sons had silenced 
resistance within their local purviews—and had shown themselves willing to travel beyond 
those localities to assist wherever a stamped paper or a potential distributor might appear.  
But also by April, the newspapers beginning to arrive from Britain gave the Sons—
and all those in America watching for signs of a repeal—great hope for success. Reports said 
that petitions prepared by the merchants and manufacturers trading to the colonies had been 
accepted by Parliament; that Benjamin Franklin had acquitted himself well in defending the 
colonists’ rights; that on the floor of the House of Commons, the great Pitt had broken 
Grenville on the wheel of his rhetoric. Vote counts in Parliament were trickling in, and they 
were nearly all positive. 
Along with these positive reports came warnings from friends in Britain. The “riots 
and tumults” of the previous months had no place now that repeal was near, they said. Nor 
should those in America continue to insult Parliament. Instead, when they celebrated the 
repeal they must do so in a manner that made them appear thankful and humble—otherwise 
they would alienate Britain. 
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These friends thus demanded of the colonists a behavior very different from their 
militant resistance of the previous months. The colonists had unleashed violence on stamp 
officers and men thought to be potential stamp officers, while thousands of nascent Sons of 
Liberty had declared that they would resist the Stamp Act as slavery. Yet it was these same 
Sons of Liberty who followed the directives from Britain and celebrated the repeal 
peacefully. More, they rewrote the history of their own resistance. They raised the great men 
of Parliament and the King to positions of heroism. They effaced the colonists’ own roles in 
resisting the Stamp Act. And the rhetoric of slavery and struggle faded into the 
background—but it did not disappear entirely. Some representations persisted in the words 
penned and printed about the repeal and in the material culture of the celebrations. And 
some who maintained that Parliamentary statutes beyond the Stamp Act were also 
unconstitutional, with hesitation, began to expand the reach of the slavery metaphor beyond 
the accepted bound of internal taxes imposed by an unrepresentative legislature. 
 
As the colonists had followed closely news and rumors of the imposition of the 
Stamp Act in the spring of 1765, so too in the winter and spring of 1766 did they avidly scan 
newspapers and letters for any clues to the eventual repeal of that same act. By following the 
evolution of their incomplete, and often incorrect, understanding, we can better see how the 
colonists made the transition from resisting to celebrating their potential enslaver.  
The colonists knew well that the path to the repeal of the Stamp Act within the 
British government was long and torturous. First the House of Commons had to create a bill 
to repeal the Act. Then first the Commons and then the Lords had to pass the bill before it 
finally went before the King for the royal assent.  
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Even with their understanding of the procedures Parliament must follow, the 
colonists knew that any attempt to scry the proceedings of that legislature as it debated a 
repeal must be twice fouled. First, of course, was the time-lapse imposed by the ocean that 
separated the colonies from Britain. Any news they received, especially this early in the year 
when winter storms raged in the Atlantic, would be six or more weeks out of date. And the 
order in which ships left London or Bristol by no means corresponded to the order in which 
they arrived in the colonies. 
Second, the Commons and Lords both chose to conduct their debates in secret. As 
had the Virginia Burgesses in May of 1765 when debating what would become the Virginia 
Resolves, they formed themselves into “committees of the whole,” led by a temporary chair 
rather than the usual speaker. No official notes were taken of these debates, nor were any 
accounts published—save for an unauthorized narrative of Parliament’s examination of 
Benjamin Franklin.1 As a result, watchful Americans had to glean what clues they could from 
secondhand reports from interested friends with contacts in Parliament. 
With such unsure knowledge, the colonists watched for the milestones they knew to 
expect in the proper course of the passage of an act of Parliament: introduction, three 
readings, and passage of a repeal bill in the Commons; its carrying to the Lords for the same 
steps, and finally the royal assent. And they had to carefully gauge the reliability of each 
report that they received. The social status of the writer and the recipient became essential 
proxies for certainty of knowledge. 
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Even before Parliament was to meet, rumor was fast winging its way from London to 
the colonies. The publisher of one New York newspaper, finding too much to print, tried to 
sum it up for his readers. The British people stood with their fellows across the Atlantic. 
They “applaud us for the Spirit we have shown, in opposing these Measures.” Merchants 
were alarmed by the small orders of goods from the colonies and the even smaller 
remittances in payment for earlier orders. These merchants wanted not just the Stamp Act 
repealed, it was said, but other restrictions on trade lifted. The present ministry understood 
the merchants’ unease, and would soon “endeavour to get the Stamp Act repealed, which 
had thrown the whole English Nation into the most terrible Convulsions.”2 
But before a benevolent ministry could steer a repeal bill through Parliament, the 
King had to call the Parliament into session. And, unlike the debates over the bill itself, the 
proceedings during which Parliament began the slow process towards repeal were public 
knowledge. The colonists would closely read the detailed accounts of the opening of 
Parliament for clues to the eventual fate of the Stamp Act. 
News arrived by the third week of February that, on 17 December 1765, the King 
had called for Parliament to assemble. This date was sooner than usual, but the meeting 
could not be delayed, for (as the King explained in a speech) “matters of importance ha[d] 
lately occurred in some of my Colonies in America.”3 An “Eminent Manufacturer” explained 
to his colonial correspondent, 
what will be the Consequence no one can tell: I believe the great Difficulty lies, to 
know how they can relieve you, and yet kept up the Authority of Government. The 
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Parliament thinks it a bad Example and Precedent to repeal that Act, because the 
People murmur at it; and they rather fear the Consequences, in case they insist upon 
its being put in force.4 
The battle to repeal the Stamp Act would, surely, be difficult, for Parliament had to 
maintain both order and the appearance that it had never been in danger of losing such 
control. 
A letter dated 26 December 1765 brought word that the battle was put off for a 
little longer. Parliament had adjourned until 14 January 1766. Yet accounts of the King’s 
speech and the way in which Parliament had responded suggested significant opposition to 
any repeal of the Stamp Act. “Mr. G----e [Grenville] expressed himself very warmly on the 
late Behaviour of the Americans, stiling their Transactions in Opposition to the Stamp Act, 
Open Rebellion, instead of Late Occurrences, which the King termed them in his Speech.” 
However, not all members of Parliament agreed, for Grenville’s outburst caused “sundry 
Members to cry ‘To the Tower! To the Tower!’”5  
 
When Parliament resumed in the new year, it was again Grenville, already scorned 
by the colonists, who would continue to serve as their foe.  On 14 January 1766, at the 
opening of the session, the King delivered a speech to Parliament; the Lords and Commons 
each responded the next day. The address and replies had been carefully negotiated by the 
royal ministers and the leading men of Parliament beforehand.6 The King’s speech asked 
Parliament to look into the disturbances in the colonies, and, if necessary, to consider 
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alteration in the “commercial œconomy” of the colonies. Parliament responded with grace 
and deference, yet without committing themselves to any particular path. 
It was two months before those in America would receive news of what happened at 
these Parliamentary sessions. Yet the reports that finally came were enough to revive any 
flagging of resistance that might have been taking place. Letters from London printed in 
New York on 20 March described the first day of Parliament’s session. Grenville had 
“inveighed bitterly against the colonies” but Pitt had responded with a brilliant speech, two-
and-a-half-hours in length, which had won repeated praise in London.7  
The colonists followed as closely as they could the torturous machinations of 
Parliament. Yet, separated by an ocean and reliant on second- and third-hand 
correspondence from unnamed sources, they could not grasp the whole of Parliament’s 
proceedings, of the negotiations and votes among hundreds of members. They thus fastened 
on strong personalities; they represented the opposing sides—those who wanted to enforce 
the Stamp Act versus those who wanted to repeal it—through personification. Grenville 
reprised his turn as villain, the role in which he had already been cast during the riots. And, if 
Isaac Barré had been the primary hero in Parliament during the original debates over the 
Stamp Act, it would now be William Pitt, the “Great Commoner,” who came to represent 
the forces supporting the colonies. 
Yet the details of Pitt’s performance were scarce at first. No full description would 
arrive until early May. In the meantime, colonists had to follow the rumors of Parliamentary 
machination. Fortunately for them, the way in which they received news about the progress 
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of Parliament towards a repeal seemed to quicken as the days went on. It had been the third 
week of February when they read about the King calling Parliament into session on 17 
December. And a month later, on 20 March, they first read about Parliament’s return on 14 
January. Now the pace of rumors increased, but those rumors would turn out to be, in some 
cases, deceiving.  
In early April came the first supposed news that Parliament had repealed the Stamp 
Act. The merchants J. and R. Day in London wrote to a Baltimore correspondent, “We 
sincerely congratulate you on the repeal of the Stamp Act, which thanks to God is just now 
resolved here by a great Majority in Parliament.”8 This news quickly spread and was 
reprinted in several newspapers. Yet it soon turned out that this had merely been the 
Commons’ vote on 7 February against a motion by Grenville to enforce the Stamp Act. A 
significant moment—but not the repeal.  
And, at the same time, there was sobering news. Letters from 13 February, arriving in 
Boston on 17 April and quickly reprinted, suggested that Parliament might not be so quick 
to repeal the Stamp Act. Both houses of Parliament had resolved “that the King, Lords, & 
Commons of this Realm, have always had, and ought to have, the undoubted right to tax the 
colonies.” There had been only a very few dissenters, including Pitt and Barré in the 
Commons and several others in the Lords. Other resolves had established Parliament’s 
disapproval of the “Riots and Tumults” in the colonies and blamed them on “certain 
Resolves of the several Assemblies.” Further, Parliament had rejected the petitions of the 
Stamp Act Congress, concluding they were from “persons improperly joined.” The writer 
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believed that, had the colonies petitioned separately, they would surely have been heard. 
Thus, the correspondent suggested, whatever came about would be due to the petitions and 
the testimony of the merchants and manufacturers of Britain, and not those of the colonists.9  
As for those representing the colonists before Parliament, their appearances were not 
going well. When London merchant (and agent for New Hampshire) Barlow Trecothick 
said he thought nothing could reconcile American opponents to the Stamp Act, it “inflamed 
Grenville’s party,” who called Trecothick and his fellow-travellers “traitors.” The ministry, 
itself for repeal, feared that Bute had inflamed the King against it. The bishops were, it was 
said, “for carrying Fire and Sword to America,” before America grew strong enough to defy 
them.10    
The uncertainty in these rumors was not as great as it had been during the previous 
year, when the colonists were waiting to find out if a Stamp Act had been enacted and, if so, 
precisely what measures it contained. This time around their correspondents in London 
continually reassured them of the likely outcome.  
And, indeed, the same papers contained far more hopeful news. The ministers had 
gone before the King to discuss the repeal. At that meeting the King insisted that if the 
Stamp Act could not be enforced without bloodshed it should instead be repealed. So the 
King could be counted on the colonists’ side. 
The dramatic details of how Grenville’s motion to enforce the Stamp Act must 
surely have excited the colonists further. The papers revealed there had been much debate 
about the motion, capped off by a speech by the aged General Howard: 
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Old General Howard stood up, at his Martial Appearance, a profound Silence 
ensued, he spoke (I don’t pretend to give you the words, only the Substance) to this 
Effect, that he shuddered at the unnatural Motion, he hoped in God it would not 
Succeed, lest he should be ordered to Execute it, and before he would imbrue his 
Hand in the Blood of his Countrymen, who were contending for English Liberty, he 
would if ordered, draw his Sword, but would sooner sheath it in his own Body.11  
The news the colonists read about the repeal, then, was chosen and summarized by 
printers in the colonies from the multitude of often-contradictory reports and letters from 
correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic. And those printers, in themselves trying to 
make sense of the information at hand, returned to the reliable patterns from the previous 
months. The Stamp Act could only be enforced through military means, for the Sons of 
Liberty would surely resist. Grenville and the bishops of England understood this, but 
thought the colonists should be subjugated. But so did virtuous men like Howard, who 
would not raise his weapon against his “Countrymen” fighting for “English Liberty.” The key 
figure was, as always, the King, who, it seemed, was coming down on the side of Howard 
and of the repeal. 
And soon the mood turned for good. A week later came news, via letters dated 22 
and 25 February, that Commons had voted for repeal. After three and a half hours of debate, 
at three in the morning, the House of Commons had approved a motion to repeal the Stamp 
Act by the vote of 275-167. The majority of 108 votes would become a recurring motif in 
colonial celebrations.12  By 21 April Boston had more detailed news. The vote had been early 
in the morning of 22 February, following a “great Debate relative to the Right of Parliament 
in taxing the Americans.” Yet that had only been the first reading, and the devious Grenville 
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still had the opportunity to interfere. On the morning of the 24th he took advantage of the 
absence of many members “to make a Motion that the Bill might be recommitted to a 
Committee of the whole House.” The attempt to derail the repeal was thwarted when some 
absent members were alerted, who “immediately sent messengers, and wrote Letters to their 
Friends, which brought them directly to the House.” Grenville’s motion failed, it was 
reported, by the same majority of 108 as the motion to repeal had passed two days earlier. 
The third and final reading in the Commons was far less dramatic. The bill to repeal the 
Stamp Act was passed on 4 March with a majority of 128. The next day it was presented to 
the House of Lords, “where it was met with a very favourable Reception. ―It was on 
Thursday, the 6th, read a second Time, and it was thought it would pass at the third 
Reading, and meet with the Royal Assent before the End of the next Week.”13  
 
But then, a gap in the news. Would the King assent to the repeal? No word was 
forthcoming. But, as if to whet their appetites, came fuller accounts of earlier events—in 
particular the debate between Pitt and Grenville. These accounts served to accentuate the 
emotions the colonists felt towards what now seemed a certain repeal.  Moreover, they saw 
the fulcrum of the debate as a direct approval of the path they had taken in resisting the 
Stamp Act. And, with the news that Pitt’s defense of the colonists actions and that others in 
Britain had accepted Pitt’s arguments, the colonists had an opening to cease that resistance 
with honor and instead to celebrate King and Parliament as deliverers of the repeal. 
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Pitt, though, needed a foil. He had that in George Grenville. That minister argued 
that what he termed “disturbances” had begun in July,  
and now we are in the Middle of January. Lately they were only Occurrences (the 
word used in the King’s Speech on the 17th December); they are now grown to 
Disturbances, to Tumults and Riots, I doubt they border on open Rebellion, and if 
the Doctrine I hear today be confirmed, I fear they will lose that name, to take that 
of Revolution: this Government over them being dissolved, a Revolution will take 
Place in America.”14  
In his response, Pitt rejected this argument. He said “The Gentleman tells us, 
America is obstinate, America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoyce that America has resisted. 
Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to consent to be 
slaves, would have been fit instruments to make Slaves of the Rest.”15   
Pitt’s declamation elicited an instant and spontaneous reaction from his audience. 
The correspondent explained, “You have seen, when a large Company have been made to 
feel altogether an electrical Shock, such was the effect on the whole House of Commons, 
and the Galleries, when Mr. Pitt pronounced, I rejoyce that America has resisted!”16  
Here was confirmation that the colonists had not been wrong, neither in their 
reading of the Stamp Act as illegal and unconstitutional, nor in their decision to resist 
through violence. The great Pitt had adopted their argument that to submit to the Stamp 
Act would be to submit to slavery, and that struggle against it was not just a necessary 
response, but something for every Briton to celebrate. 
Correspondents, too, told of how Pitt’s rhetoric had been invaluable to their cause. 
One explained that “The Stamp Act is now in a fair Way to be repealed in a few Days, 
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owing to Mr. PITT’s outdoing his usual Outdoings in the Cause of Liberty and his Country.  
… [A]ll the Powers of that great Man were exerted against a very strong Party, and has made 
more Friends among those who know and love the Interest of their Country, and more 
Enemies among the Green villians than ever.” Pitt deserved to be celebrated by the 
colonists: “if every Province in America does not erect a lasting Mark of public Honour to 
the Saviour of Great Britain and themselves, they never deserve to be assisted again when on 
the very Brink of Destruction.”17  
A second writer emphasized Pitt’s physical heroism in even coming to Parliament: 
“Mr. Pitt continued in the House all the time, though so lame with the gout as to make use 
of crutches; when he left the house he was huzza’d by many then present.” And a third 
confirmed: “About eleven o’clock Mr. P― (who went to the house in flannels and with 
crutches) arose, he spoke an hour in favour of the Repeal, and in the course of his speech 
paid great compliments to Mr. Con―y and Mr. B―ke.”18  
 
When news of the King’s assent and the repeal arrived it did so quickly. The first 
hint might have been a third-hand account arriving in the colonies on 10 May that as of 30 
March, “the Bill for the Repeal of the Stamp Act had passed the House of Lords, and gone 
through all the usual Formalities, and that troublesome Affair was not entirely settled.”19  
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Such uncertain news, while hopeful, could not be taken as official. That final confirmation 
could only be the arrival of the repeal act itself, passed by Parliament and signed by the King. 
That act arrived nearly simultaneously in several of the large cities. Boston received 
word on 16 May “from London with Copy of the Act for Repeal” and immediately 
dispatched messengers north and south. Those messengers arrived in Portsmouth and 
Newport the next day, in Plymouth and in Hartford on the 18th, and finally New York on 
the 20th. On the 19th Philadelphia first heard of the repeal; their messenger to New York 
arrived the same day as the one from the north.20  
 
The colonists were sure to hold large celebrations for the repeal—“rejoicings” was 
the word they used— as they did for annual events like the King’s birthday. But what mode 
should they use, given that they had so recently been in conflict with Britain? The letters 
arriving from London implored restraint. These letters arrived from merchants and ministers, 
from those close to the halls of power. The men to whom they were addressed were those in 
positions to influence their countrymen. That the recipients took the warnings seriously, and 
passed on the directive to good conduct, can be seen by the fact that they worked with the 
printers of the colonial newspapers to publish the letters well before word of the King’s 
assent to the repeal had arrived. In this way, the influential colonists both warned their 
countrymen against celebrating injudiciously, showed their London correspondents (who 
would eventually read the colonial newspapers) that they had taken the warnings seriously, 
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and, perhaps, protected themselves against blame should crowd violence or other difficult-
to-foresee events take place. 
Among the correspondence, perhaps the most important was that a committee of 
merchants in London trading to America. They asked that the colonists not insist that by 
repealing the Stamp Act Parliament had ceded the right to impose such a tax. The 
merchants told their New World correspondents to portray themselves in a way that 
allowed their friends to say “We are in the right—is it not as we said? See the Colonies 
regained to this country by our moderation—regained with their loyalty, their affection, and 
their trade?”21   
The riots of the previous year, and the threats made against stamp officers, were now 
considered a point against them in London circles, such that Parliament felt its honor 
attacked. Thus, the colonists should react in such a way as to emphasize “the restoration of 
peace to the colonies; union, trade, and reciprocal advantages to them and us.” But, the 
merchants warned, “if violent measures are continued, and triumphs on the point gained; if 
it is talked of as a victory: if it is said the Parliament has yielded up the right; then indeed 
your enemies here will have a complete triumph. Your friends must certainly lose all power 
to serve you.” The result would be that the “Tax-Masters” would regain influence and act 
again.22  Or, as another correspondent put it, “if your Opponents come into Power, what 
then becomes of Public Safety, mutual Security, and the Common Good?”23  
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Other correspondents sent similar sentiments. A “Reverend Divine” asked them to 
be “truly thankful and humble, and frugal, and not insult the Parliament in their Rejoicings, 
for this would render you odious to those who have been your Friends.” A gentleman who, it 
was said, had worked for repeal explained that if the colonists celebrated the repeal as 
“victory over the Mother Country” they would be “ruined,” for they would “lose the 
greatest part of your Friends by such a Conduct, and effectually disable the few who remain 
from serving you.” And these friends could still serve them, for they were “labouring to put 
the Commerce of America, on a much better footing than it has been.”24  
One final correspondent warned readers that it would be the leaders of resistance in 
America, not the followers, who would be blamed should the celebrations go wrong. Those 
leaders must use their “Influence” to make sure the celebrations “mix discretion with this 
great Joy, that you do not exult as Conquerors, but receive the Blessing (now confirmed to 
you) with Thankfulness and Gratitude….It therefore behooves all those who have any 
Influence, to exert themselves in inculcating a becoming decent Behaviour, a Behaviour that 
will do Honour to your Friends, and cause your Enemies to stand Abashed.”25  
If the colonists wanted to “do Honour” to their friends across the Atlantic, that had 
only to look at the reports coming from the mother country for examples of the proper 
methods. The provincial newspapers published these alongside the injunctions to avoid 
inappropriate celebration.  
Britons, like Americans, followed each step of the progress of the repeal. In London, 
after the House of Commons made their first vote for repeal, “there was a universal joy to be 
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seen in the countenance of every lover of trade in this city, on the hopes of the Stamp Act 
being repealed, that the merchant as well as the mechanic may once more be able to pay 
their just debts, and the manufacturers be enabled to employ the poor. … The bells in most 
churches rang from morning to night,” and houses and coffeehouses put up illuminations—
including one decorated with exactly forty-five lights, a reference to John Wilkes’s North 
Briton no.45 that had become a key text for opposition to Parliamentary misrule. And “the 
captains of the ships in the West-India trade, displayed their colours on board their 
respective vessels in the Thames.”26  
In Bristol, there was a great celebration over the “favorable turn in American affairs.” 
There, “the bells throughout the City rang incessantly the whole Day, and in the Evening 
were uncommon Bonfires: Several Houses were illuminated, the American Coffee-House in 
particular, from whose Windows the Merchants trading to that Quarter of the World, 
generously threw Money to the Populace, who in return appeared decently thankful.”27  
But the greatest celebrations were reserved for news of the King’s assent. One 
writer—likely a merchant trading to the colonies—described the progress of the day as it 
happened. It began with a meeting of “about 100 American Merchants” for breakfast at the 
King’s Head Tavern. From there they traveled in a procession of “about Sixty Coaches and 
Chariots” to Parliament, where they were accorded the great honor of viewing the reading of 
the repeal bill to the King: 
when we got there, we were conducted to the Robe Chamber, where waiting till 
about Half after One o’Clock, the King came, amidst the Acclamations of 
Thousands, when he was immediately robed and crowned; after which the several 
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Acts lately passed in Parliament were read; amongst the rest, the Total Repeal of the 
Stamp Act: Immediately on hearing which his Majesty smiled, and seemed very much 
pleased, as were all those present; (none were admitted but American Merchants) 
after which the King went to the House of Lords, and signed the Repeal; and then 
returned to the Robe Chamber, and was uncrowned and unrobed; after which he 
returned to his Palace, amidst the Shouts and Huzzas of a crouded Multitude. 
The merchant party then repaired to the Queen’s Head tavern, where began the 
celebrations that the colonists would later echo. “in the Evening a Number of Houses were 
illuminated, one in particular had 108 Candles, it being the first Majority in the House of 
Commons for the Repeal of the Stamp Act.” Other merchants set church bells ringing, and 
then rejoined the larger party at the Half Moon tavern, “where the Committee of Merchants 
had a very grand Entertainment prepared; many loyal Toasts were drank, and the Evening 
concluded with the greatest Pleasure and Satisfaction.”28  
The illumination of houses, the ringing of bells, the loyal toasts: these would be chief 
components of celebrations on both sides of the Atlantic. But where the Britons had 
concluded their evening with the “greatest Pleasure and Satisfaction” the colonists would 
emphasize that theirs had been peaceful and conducted with order—an intentional contrast 
to the riots and tumults of the previous fall. 
 
It was in Boston where violent resistance to the Stamp Act had begun; it was Boston 
that first received the news that the Act had been repealed. When on 16 May a ship bearing 
both an official copy of that repeal and a London Gazette confirming the King’s assent arrived 
in Boston harbor. The Boston Gazette described the reaction:  
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It is impossible to express the Joy the Inhabitants in general were in … the Bells 
were immediately set Ringing, and the Cannon fired under Liberty Tree and may 
other Parts of the Town. Colours were displayed from the Merchants Vessels in the 
Harbour, and the Tops of many Houses. Almost every Countenance discovered an 
unaffected Gaiety on the Establishment of that Liberty which we were in the utmost 
Hazard of losing.29  
Such spontaneous celebrations upon arrival of the news happened in many towns. 
But beyond expressing joy, the specific means by which Boston celebrated included several 
through which the news of the repeal—or at least news that there was news—could be 
carried to anyone within sight or hearing of the city. The bright flags on high masts and tall 
houses showed anyone who cared to look that something important had happened; the bells 
and cannons could be heard for miles and thus spread word to many more.  
One town that might have heard the bells and cannon of Boston was Medford, five 
miles to the northwest. Medford, too, held a spontaneous celebration, centered on “the 
Dwelling house, Summer house, &c. of the Hon. Brigadier General Royall.” Royall’s 
buildings “were very handsomely illuminated, a Number of Chambers were fired, Rockets 
discharged, and Fireworks displayed, with many other Demonstrations of Joy.” Where in 
London it had been the committee of merchants that had dined, in Medford it was the 
military company of the town, who, “being that Day raised, they repaired in the Evening to 
the Brigadier’s House, and were generously entertained.” The correspondent also reported 
that “a Number of other Houses … were illuminated, a large Bonfire made, and such 
Expressions of Joy were shewn, as became a free and loyal People.”30  
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Abington, Massachusetts used similar means as did Boston to communicate news of 
the repeal. The day after the arrival of news at Boston, on 17 May, “two Strangers, with the 
Glorious News of the Repeal of the Stamp Act” passed through Abington. The 
correspondent to the Boston Gazette wrote, “They were received as though they had been 
Angels; our Houses and our Hearts spontaneously opened to receive them. Abington’s 
people immediately proclaimed the News “by the Beat of Drum, and the Ringing of our 
Bells.” But in Abington the celebration immediately took on religious overtones. By means 
of drums and bells “were collected a large Number of People (considering we were in the 
midst of Planting) who in a decent Manner assembled with their Minister on the Green, and 
there gave publick Thanks to Him by whom Kings reign.” Nor was the thanks to heaven 
merely a general statement. For Abington’s celebrations did not forget what the real danger 
of the Stamp Act had been.  God was praised for the specifics of “rais[ing] up Friends to the 
Colonies, powerful enough to bring about a total Repeal of the Stamp Act, that would have 
entailed Slavery on us and our Children yet unborn, had it remained in Force.” The day in 
Abington ended with toasts to “the King and Royal Family, Mr. Pitt, Lord Cambden, 
General Conway, Col. Barre, and all the Friends of Liberty in England.”31  
 
The spontaneous celebrations of Medford and Abington reveal well the immediate 
emotions of the moment: unbridled joy. But two of the larger urban areas, Boston and 
Newport, instead took their time for a later, larger display. In these ceremonies it can be 
more clearly seen what sort of message the colonists wished to express beyond that of joy 
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and thanksgiving. These greater repeal ceremonies reflected their view of the correct relation 
between America and Britain.  
Boston held their grand repeal ceremony on 19 May, three days after the news had 
arrived. It started at one o’clock in the afternoon, when “the Castle and Batteries, and Train 
of Artillery fired a Royal Salute; and the Afternoon was spent in Mirth and Jollity.” But it 
was in the evening when the greater part took place. Then “the whole Town was beautifully 
illuminated:—On the Common the Sons of Liberty erected a magnificent Pyramid, 
illuminated with 280 Lamps” and painted with significant emblems. Atop the pyramid was 
fixed a box of fireworks. And close by was a staging area for the launching of even more 
fireworks. The whole was set up “near the Work House, in the lower Room of which they 
entertained the Gentlemen of the Town.”32  
So the Sons of Liberty had fireworks and food and drink for some of the better sorts 
of Boston. But at the same time, seemingly both in competition and cooperation with the 
Sons, John Hancock was doing precisely the same thing. Hancock entertained “the genteel 
Part of the Town” while rolling out for “the Populace … a Pipe of Madeira Wine.” He, too 
“erected at the Front of his House, which was magnificently illuminated, a Stage for the 
Exhibition of his Fireworks, which was to answer those of the Sons of Liberty.”33  
If there had been any doubt, it quickly became clear that all had been coordinated 
between Hancock and the Sons. The evening festivities opened as the sun set, with “the 
Discharge of twelve Rockets from each Stage; after which the Figures on the Pyramid were 
uncovered, making a beautiful Appearance.” Fireworks were shot off from dusk until eleven 
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at night from both stages: “the Air was filled with Rockets--- the Ground with Bee hives and 
Serpents--- and the two Stages with Wheels of Fireworks, of various Sorts.” And it was not 
only the two houses of Hancock and the Sons that were open during the fireworks, for “Mr. 
Otis, and some other Gentlemen, who lived near the Common, kept open House, the whole 
Evening, which was very pleasant; the Multitudes of Gentlemen and Ladies, who were 
continually passing from one Place to another, added much to the Brilliancy of the Night.” 
At eleven o’clock came the final part of the celebration, “the Signal being given by a 
Discharge of 21 Rockets, the horizontal Wheel on the Top of the Pyramid or Obelisk was 
played off, ending in the Discharge of sixteen Dozen of Serpents in the Air, which concluded 
the Shew.”34   
Governor Bernard had been threatened as an enemy to the colonies during the fall, 
when it was believed he had supported the imposition of the Stamp Act. But during the 
intervening months reliable correspondents in London had told the colonists that it had not 
been so, that instead Bernard had vociferously opposed the Stamp Act. The celebrations of 
the repeal provided an opportunity for Bernard to show himself in harmony with the King’s 
subjects in Boston. As the Sons of Liberty were preparing the evening’s fireworks and 
foodstuffs, Bernard and the Council “met at the Province House on Monday Afternoon, 
where his Majesty’s Health, and many other loyal Toasts, were drank.” That evening, as the 
celebrations were in full swing, Bernard and the Council made a public appearance. They 
“walked in the Common, to see the Fire works, Exhibitions, &c. who were well pleased with 
the Regularity the Inhabitants carried on their Demonstrations of Loyalty and Joy on this 
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happy Occasion.” Indeed, the Boston Gazette emphasized the harmony in Boston between 
the King’s viceroy and his subjects, making sure to “inform the World, that every thing was 
conducted with the utmost Decency and good Order, not a Reflection cast on any 
Character, nor the least Disorder during the whole Scene.”35   
Yet the “Rejoicings” were not over. For the next night, another ceremony took 
place. Monday’s festivities had emphasized the joy of the colonists at the repeal, with, 
perhaps, particular thanks given to the King. Tuesday’s celebration, in contrast, emphasized 
Parliament’s role in delivering the American colonies from the Stamp Act. In the evening, 
“all the Gentlemen in the Town contributed Lanthorns to illuminate Liberty Tree, till the 
Boughs could hold no more, which made a most beautiful and splendid Appearance.” The 
total number of lanterns hung was 108, commemorating the majority by which the House of 
Commons had voted to repeal the Stamp Act. The houses surrounding the Common hung 
on their windows “illustrated Figures as large as the Life, the Colours all in a Glow with the 
Lights behind them, representing the KING, the immortal PITT, CAMBDEN, BARRÉ, 
&c.”—all the members of Parliament who had supported the cause over the past year. It 
was the houses of Capt. Dawes and the merchant Thomas Symes that held the portrait of 
Pitt, and to support the point they added an inscription:  
Hail, PITT! Hail, Patrons! Pride of GEORGE’S Days, 
How round the Globe expand your Patriot Rays! 
And the NEW WORLD is brighten’d with the Blaze.36  
King George might have ushered in the celebration with his assent to the repeal, but 
it was the colonists’ supporters in Parliament who had made that assent possible. 
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Newport’s Sons of Liberty took another week after receiving news of the repeal 
before holding their celebration of the repeal. Their “Rejoicing” was therefore the most 
elaborate of all, and the most meticulously planned. And it also lasted the longest, for “the 
Populace were so impatient that, before One o’Clock in the Morning, all the Bells in the 
Town were set a ringing, Drums were beat, Music played, and Guns were discharged.” At 
sunrise the planned festivities began, with the simultaneous unfurling of visual and auditory 
signals across the city:  
At Sunrise a Signal Gun was fired, and the Flag hoisted, at Fort George; immediately 
Ensigns were displayed upon the Tree of Liberty --- at the Bottom of the Parade --- 
upon the Tops of Houses - -- on the Shipping in the Harbour --- and at the 
Batteries at the South and North End of the Town.”37   
That afternoon brought more celebrations. Fort George “fired a Royal Salute” at 
noon, answered by volleys from the batteries to the north and south of the city. And at three 
o’clock came a grand procession, in which “his Honour the Governor, attended by the 
Committee of the Sons of Liberty, the Civil Officers of the Government, and Gentlemen of 
the Town, was escorted by the Officers of the Militia, with Colours flying, and Drums 
beating, in grand Procession, to the Court House, where a Number of loyal and patriotic 
Toasts were drank.” As each toast, whether to King, Pitt, or other worthies, was made, a 
“Trumpet sounded an air, and five Cannon were discharged; and Joy and Gratitude sparkled 
in every Face.”38  
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In the evening Newport, like Boston and other towns before it, bathed itself in 
artificial light. Some houses had candles in the windows “equaling in Number the Majorities 
in both Houses of Parliament.” And the “grand wide-spreading Tree of Liberty, hung full of 
Glass Lanthorns, made a most brilliant, magnificent Appearance.” But despite the 
decoration of the houses and on the Tree of Liberty, the center of the celebration remained 
the courthouse and the long Parade below it. Fireworks, arcing over the Parade from a stage 
just below the courthouse, lasted until midnight, “when Wheels and Fountains closed the 
most grand, and most beautiful Scene, that ever was exhibited in this Colony.”39  
 
Newport and Boston’s celebrations both exhibited emblematical paintings, works 
that portrayed figures and landscapes representing some aspect of either the repeal or the 
colonists’ proper relation to Britain. The emblematical paintings made for Newport’s was a 
large work, displayed prominently. “From the front Steps of the Court House,” reported the 
Mercury, “was exhibited a beautiful Piece of Painting, eight Feet wide, and fourteen Feet 
high, consisting of four Compartments.”40   
The first compartment was clear enough: “In the lower Compartment, to shew the 
Advantages which Liberty gives to Commerce, was drawn a fine Prospect of the Harbour of 
Newport, with the Ships Pitt, Conway, Grafton, &c. entering it deeply laden, and with 
Colours flying.” The painting of Newport’s deep-water harbor thus reflected the present day, 
where “Ensigns were displayed…on the Shipping in the Harbour.” But it renamed those 
ships after the men of Parliament who had voted for the repeal. A second compartment also 
                                                 
39 Newport Mercury, 2 June 1766. 
40 Newport Mercury, 2 June 1766. 
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featured virtuous Parliamentarians. There “stood the Goddess of Liberty, surrounded by the 
Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Conway, the Marquis of Rockingham, Lord Cornwallis, 
Lord Paulet, Lord Shelburne, Lord Torrington, General Howard, and Colonel Barre.”41  
The central panel was given over to King George in his greatest moment, signing the 
assent to the repeal. The king was depicted “in his Royal Robes, sat enthroned, and, with a 
most gracious Aspect, pointed to a Scroll … inscribed, in Capitals, ‘Stamp Act Repealed, 
1766. G. R.’” Yet the King was not alone on this panel, for two great parliamentarians 
shared space with him: “At his Majesty’s Right Hand, with one Hand on his Breast, his 
Thoughts distended with the Patriot Virtues, and with the other holding forth Magna 
Charta, stood the firm, determined Friend of Constitutional Liberty, the Immortal Pitt. --- 
At the left Hand of his Majesty, holding in his Right Hand the Bill of Rights, stood the 
British Aristides, the patriotic, upright Cambden.” The King signed the assent, but it was 
Pitt and Camden who held the documents codifying the rights of Englishmen that so 
concerned the colonists.42  
The final panel was given over to “A beautiful Landscape, charged with vegetable 
Productions, representing the Blessings which Liberty bestows on Agriculture, and Rural 
Life.” This painting “filled the upper triangular Compartment, and finished the Piece.” 
Thus, the four portions of the emblematical painting exhibited the commerce that tied 
together Britain and its colonies, the agriculture that produced valuable raw goods for 
Britain, and the men who were, in the colonists’ eyes, working in Britain to protect that 
                                                 
41 Newport Mercury, 2 June 1766. 
42 Newport Mercury, 2 June 1766. 
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commerce and that agriculture, and who had “stood forth, strenuously exerted, and nobly 
distinguished themselves in the glorious Cause of American Liberty.”43  
 
Newport’s emblematical paintings must have been memorable for those who saw 
them. Certainly they were considered important enough for a detailed description to be 
published in the Newport Mercury and reprinted in newspapers across the colonies. Ezra 
Stiles made sure to transcribe the Mercury’s description in his “Stamp Act Notebook.”44  
Stiles had begun that notebook in the summer of 1765, after the Virginia Resolves 
had been printed in Newport but before the crowd actions in that city or in Boston. The 
first thing he wrote was an inscription to be carved on an imaginary obelisk. Stiles’s 
inscription chronicled the history of English settlement in America, especially as it related to 
political turmoil in Britain in the seventeenth century—Cromwell and William and Mary as 
heroes, the Stuart kings as villains. He tied the Stamp Act to that narrative, and portrayed 
the relationship between America and the ascendant powers in Britain as frayed due to 
corruption in the mother country.45   
Now, as if in response to Stiles, Boston’s Sons of Liberty built an obelisk of their 
own. This was a frail thing, made of oiled paper and painted with figures and an inscription. 
Though taking a different form, the Boston monument conveyed similar sentiments to the 
emblematical painting in Newport. And, unlike that painting, a copy of the obelisk 
survives—for Paul Revere made an engraving showing each of the four sides. The engraving 
                                                 
43 Newport Mercury, 2 June 1766. 
44 Stiles, Stamp Act Notebook, 45. 
45 Stiles, Stamp Act Notebook, 1-19. 
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of the Boston obelisk, then, is the only surviving visual representation of the emotions and 
sentiments that the Sons of Liberty wished to convey to their compatriots during the repeal 
celebrations.46  
Revere described the engraved image as “A View of the Obelisk erected under 
Liberty-Tree in Boston on the Rejoicings for the Repeal of the ― Stamp Act.” He showed a 
four-sided monument with a pyramidal top, solid rectangular base, and between them three 
panels on each of the four sides. The top panel on each contained four head-and-shoulders 
portraits of British royal and parliamentarians, making sixteen portraits in all. The middle 
panel on each contained ten lines of a poem. The bottom panels incorporated emblematical 
paintings. And written below the monument was the text “To every Lover of Liberty, this 
Plate is humbly dedicated by her true born Sons in Boston, New England.” 
The sixteen portraits in the top panels of the monument were of men (and women) 
who the colonist viewed as supporters of their cause. Though their ranks ranged widely—
from the King down to Dennis De Berdt, Massachusetts’s agent in London—the sixteen 
were given equal space. In this tableau, De Berdt or Alderman Beckford of London ranked 
with Colonel Barré or William Pitt, the Duke of York or Lord Dartmouth, or even King 
George or Queen Charlotte.47   
                                                 
46 A high-quality image file of a print can be found at “The Illustrated Inventory of Paul Revere’s Works At the 
American Antiquarian Society,” http://www.americanantiquarian.org/Inventories/Revere/b2.htm (accessed 26 
November 2012). The description of the print is based on that image. 
47 The full list of the sixteen:  
On the first panel: Duke of York, Marquis of Rockingham, Queen Charlotte, and King George. 
2nd: Gen. Conway, Lord T—N, Colonel Barré, William Pitt. 
3rd: Lord Dartmouth, A—n B—r [Alderman Beckford] Lord D—l, Charles Townsend 
4th: Lord George S-k-e [Sackville], Mr. DeBerdt, John Wilkes, Ld. Camden 
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Figure 1: “A View of the Obelisk,” 1766. Used by permission of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
 
 204 
The poem in the middle panels celebrated resistance to the Stamp Act. It began with 
an invocation to Liberty, personified as a woman, for whom the colonists so clearly longed: “ 
Have we not woo’d thee, won thee, held thee / Lain in thy Lap, & melted on thy long 
Tongue…” Their passion for liberty led them to pursue “through Deaths & Dangers rugged 
paths” and to brave “the Powers of Earth & Powers of Hell.” And their fear was, as always 
that they would “be slaves.” This fate they struggled against always: “We dare to scorn it—
dare to die.” 
The second panel turned from the colonists’ striving against slavery to their enemies 
and supporters in Britain. To Grenville and Bute, architects of the Stamp Act, they would 
direct the sound of their “clanking Chains & Curses.” But to their friends they would 
instead appeal. “Illustrious Camden, Britain’s Guardian Pitt,” the poet begged, “recede not, 
frown not, rather let us be / Deprived of being, than of Liberty.” The settlers in America, too  
were Britons: “The Foes of Britain, only are our Foes.” 
The third panel reflected the struggle against the Stamp Act. Yet it was not entirely 
clear who was doing the struggling. Was it the colonists, or their friends in Britain? “Foul 
oppression” waxed stronger “while honest freedom struggles with her Chain.” Yet they 
would give answer.  The “Sons of Virtue, hardy, brave” were “Arrouz’d in Thunder, awfull 
they appear / With proud deliverance stalking in their Rear.” And with the hardy resistance 
of the “Sons of Virtue”—their refusal to be confined in chains—the other side gave way: 
“While Tyrant-Foes their pallid Fears betray / Shrink from their Arms & gave their 
Vengeance / See in th’ unequal War Oppressors away fall / The hate, Contempt and endless 
Curse of all.” 
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And the final panel celebrated the reunion of Britons and Americans. The poet, in 
joy, announced “Our Faith approv’d our Liberty restor’d / Our Hearts bend grateful to our 
Sov’rgn Lord.” They would now defend their beloved monarch against all threats. The poet 
perceived potential threats: a divided Britain, in which “Hosts rebellious, Shake our 
Brunswicks Throne / and as they dar’d thy Parent, dare the Son.” Should George III find his 
rule under assault as had George II in 1745, then he could always call across the water: “To 
this Asylum stretch thine happy Wing / And we’ll content who best shall love our King.” 
The four bottom panels were each small emblematical paintings. In his engraving, 
Revere helpfully provided a gloss on each. The first description read “1. America in distress 
apprehending the total loss of Liberty.” The panel contained two groups of figures. To the 
left, a woman wearing only a skirt, headdress, and quiver of arrows rested pensively under a 
tree. A second woman, with wings and carrying a pole with a liberty hat on it, hovered over 
the first holding out an arm as if to hold off the second group. These two figures followed 
accepted iconography and were clearly intended to represent, respectively, America and 
Liberty. 
The second group consisted of four figures—a monk, a Scotchman, an Englishman, 
and a man with snakes in his hair shouting at the other three while pointing at the reclining 
figure. The Englishman and Scotsman held chains over their shoulders. It is likely that these 
two represented, respectively, Grenville and Bute. The monk likely represented Catholicism 
or even Jacobites. These three all had smiles on their faces as they prepared to chain Liberty. 
What the fourth man was intended to represent remains wholly unclear. Above the four was 
a flying demon holding in one hand a paper labeled “Stm-Act.”  
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The tension in the image came from the relation between the two standing non-
human figures. The angelic representation of Liberty and the demonic creature with snakes 
for hair connected the two groups visually; his hand, pointing towards America, overlapped 
horizontally with hers restraining the villains. 
The second panel showed how that tension—between pictorial groupings and 
between colonies and mother country—had been resolved. The painting held three groups. 
In the center was America, dressed as before but now holding, in one hand, her bow. She 
faced, to the right, four men in formal wigs and dress, likely meant to represent those in 
England to whom the colonists looked to for relief. Above the foremost of the four men was 
another angelic figure, holding not a liberty pole but blowing a trumpet and simultaneously 
placing a wreath on the first figure’s head. This may have represented Fame bestowing glory 
upon the Englishman for saving America. 
America faced away from but pointed towards the third group: the four villains from 
the first panel. They now stood further in the background while a thundercloud shot down 
lightning bolts upon each of their heads. The shock caused the Englishman and Scotchman 
to drop their chains, which the artist portrayed in the moment of their falling to earth. 
Taken alone, the panel can be read two ways. It might have portrayed America kneeling, 
beseeching Britain to save her from slavery—and Britain responding in the affirmative. Or, 
perhaps, America had already freed herself of her chains and now was exposing the evildoers 
to those who could undo their works. Just who and what had undone the Stamp Act was, 
perhaps, purposely left unclear—was it colonial resistance or parliamentary act?  
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The third panel, however, strongly suggested that the former interpretation was the 
proper one. This panel was much simpler in composition. It showed a deciduous tree 
growing from a low hill, topped by a nest of five baby birds, necks craning upwards to where 
an adult bird flew above them, apparently in the process of feeding them. To the right flew 
towards them an armored female angelic figure bearing a shield—the accepted 
representation of Britannia. The mother country was, in this panel, giving essential 
sustenance to her children.  
The parent-child relation was again suggested in the final panel. This image was of a 
single group of three figures, standing and conversing. Britannia in the center, now without 
wings, looked to the right in conversation with the Native American figure representing 
America. Behind Britannia, but connected visually by their hands extended towards each 
other, was Liberty with hat on pole. British rights and British liberties, the panel suggested, 
would ever be the savior of America. 
There was a narrative tension, then, within both the poem and the panel. Both told 
stories of release from bondage. But who was the agent of that release? Was it King George, 
William Pitt, and the others who had voted for repeal of the Stamp Act? Or was it the 
colonists themselves, the “Sons of Virtue, hardy, brave” who refused to be chained by the 
Stamp Act in the first place?  
It seems likely that it was not possible to resolve this tension, neither in the repeal 
celebrations as a whole nor on the obelisk in particular. The colonists had been asked by 
their friends in Britain to celebrate the repeal well, to pay their respects to Parliament and to 
acknowledge the work done on their behalf. Yet their whole resistance over the previous 
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year had been based on the idea that they themselves must fight the imposition of the Stamp 
Act at all costs. Thus, in Paul Revere’s engraving of the Boston obelisk, he used traditional 
emblems—the armored woman for Britannia, the Native American woman for America, and 
the woman with hat and pole for Liberty. The caricatures of Grenville and Bute would also 
have been familiar to readers both in the colonies and in the mother country. But in British 
cartoons of the period, even cartoons that were opposed to the Stamp Act, there was one 
vital difference. None of those attempting to lay the Stamp Act on America bore chains. The 
Stamp Act was, across the water, an abstract thing—a relationship between colony and 
metropole, a new account opened in the royal coffers. But for the colonists, it was something 
more, something real and visible. The relationship it implied was a particular one, and that 
relationship was not colony to metropole but slave to master.1 
 
Throughout the colonies the repeal celebrations followed patterns similar to those 
seen in Boston and Newport. In Hartford, though, the “Rejoicings” were muted. This was 
not because the people of Connecticut had any lingering fondness for the Stamp Act, but 
rather because of a horrible accident. Connecticut’s General Assembly had appointed Friday, 
23 May was appointed as a “day of general Rejoicing.” The day began as it did in many other 
colonies—ringing of bells, flags raised on the ships in the harbor, the thunder of cannon, 
“and the greatest Preparations making for a general Illumination.”2  
                                                 
1 For British prints, see Douglass Adair, “The Stamp Act in Contemporary English Cartoons,” William and 
Mary Quarterly 3d series, 10, no. 4 (1953): 538-42. 
2 Pennsylvania Gazette, 12 June 1766. 
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“But sudden,” reports continued, “was the Transition from the Heights of Joy, to 
extreme Sorrow!” The Assembly had granted a great deal of gunpowder for use in the 
evening’s fireworks. That powder was delivered to the basement of the brick schoolhouse 
where men were preparing the fireworks. As the powder was taken in, some leaked out and 
was scattered on the ground.3  
Nearby, some boys, “undesignedly, and unnoticed,” set the scattered powder alight. 
(A second account instead blamed “a Negro Boy, [who] seeing some Powder scatter’d on the 
Ground, scraped some of it together, and set Fire to it.”) The fire immediately followed the 
powder trail into the schoolhouse, to the cellar room set aside for its storage. The resulting 
explosion “in an Instant reduced the Building to a Heap of Rubbish” and buried the twenty-
seven men and boys within. Three died immediately, the rest all had injuries ranging from 
slight wounds to shattered limbs and severe burns, and many were not expected to live.4 
The planned celebrations were of course canceled. And that Sunday John Devotion, 
the minister of Hartford’s North Meeting-House, preached a sermon titled On the Necessity 
of a Constant Readiness for Death. The dour text of Devotion’s sermon was in keeping with 
the title. But in contrast to the mood in Hartford, other ministers across the colonies were 
preaching on the far happier topic of the repeal, titling their sermons such things as The 
Snare Broken or Good News from a Far Country.5 
                                                 
3 Pennsylvania Gazette, 12 June 1766. 
4 Pennsylvania Gazette, 5 June 1766, 12 June 1766. 
5 John Devotion, The Necessity of a Constant Readiness for Death. A Discourse, Preached At Hartford North-
Meeting-House, May 25th, 1766. Occasioned By That Alarming Providence, the Sudden Demolition of the School-
House, By Gun-Powder; Whereby About Thirty Persons Were Wounded, Six of Whom Are Since Dead. (Hartford: 
Thomas Green, 1766); Jonathan Mayhew, The Snare Broken: A Thanksgiving-Discourse, Preached At the Desire of the 
West Church in Boston, N.E. Friday May 23, 1766, Occasioned By the Repeal of the Stamp-Act (Boston: R. & S. 
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These sermons celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act in many cases served a dual 
purpose. They invoked, as had so many other writings of the past year, the themes of 
bondage and slavery. Yet they treated these themes in a different way than had, for example, 
the Sons of Liberty who had resolved to resist the Stamp Act as slavery. The sermons, like 
other events surrounding the celebrations of the repeal, emphasized deliverance by King and 
Parliament rather than the colonists’ struggle to free themselves.  
Of the half-dozen or so sermons surviving sermons that played variations on this 
theme, one in particular reached a wide audience, by being printed and reprinted by several 
different publishers. This was The Snare Broken, delivered by the Congregationalist minister 
Jonathan Mayhew at the West Church in Boston on 23 May 1766—the same day as the 
explosion at the Hartford schoolhouse. The Snare Broken was, perhaps not coincidentally, 
the sermon that most directly engaged the rhetoric of slavery and resistance that had 
animated the colonies through the prior year.6  
And Mayhew was explicit about what the Stamp Act had represented. Its repeal had 
left the colonists “emancipated from a slavish, inglorious bondage.” Mayhew, then, took it 
upon himself to express the “general sense of the colonies” upon that repeal. The essential 
point was that the Stamp Act took their money away from them unlawfully. And it was 
unlawful because they were not slaves: 
                                                 
Draper, Edes & Gill, and T. & J. Fleet, 1766); Charles Chauncy, A Discourse on “the Good News From a Far 
Country”: Delivered July 24th. A Day of Thanks-Giving to Almighty God, Throughout the Province of the 
Massachusetts-Bay in New-England, on Occasion of the Repeal of the Stamp-Act; Appointed By His Excellency, the 
Governor of Said Province, At the Desire of It’s House of Representatives, With the Advice of His Majesty’s Council. 
(Boston: Kneeland and Adams for Thomas Leverett, 1766). 
6 The first printing was by three Boston publishers in concert. They produced a second edition after the first 
proved popular. It was also distributed in London, through the printer G. Kearsly. 
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…[A]s we were free-born, never made slaves by the right of conquest in war, if there 
be indeed any such right, nor sold as slaves in any open lawful market, for money, so 
we have a natural right to our own, till we have freely consented to part with it, 
either in person, or by those whom WE have appointed to represent, and to act for 
us.7 
The Stamp Act had abridged the colonists’ right to self-taxation and, Mayhew 
added, to the right to trial by jury. In so doing, it tended directly to reduce the colonies to 
slavery. Thus, they had been justified in certain forms of resistance to the Stamp Act. Their 
petitions and remonstrances to Britain had been right and natural. But Mayhew drew the 
line at anything beyond such peaceful forms and here, he acknowledged, he might differ from 
the “general sense of the Colonies.” He decried the violent resistance against the Stamp Act, 
without specifying any particular examples of such violence, and declared the perpetrators 
“men of Belial … who had the effrontery to cloak their rapacious violences with the pretext 
of zeal for liberty.”8 
But the Stamp Act had indeed been repealed, by a just and good King and 
Parliament. In the metaphor of the sermon’s title, “‘our fowl is escaped from as a bird from 
the snare of the fowlers; the snare is broken, and we are escaped;’ tho’ not without much 
struggling in the snare, before it gave way, and set us at liberty again.” The fowlers, Mayhew 
suggested, had been “not improbably, in the employ of the Houses of Bourbon and the 
Pretender.” Thus, the Stamp Act may have been intended to rupture the good relations 
between the colonies and Britain.9 
                                                 
7 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 4. 
8 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 4-7. 
9 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 9. 
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The Stamp Act, then, represented a greater danger than had even the Seven Years’ 
War.  For it made no difference whether slavery was laid upon them by an absolute monarch 
or a legislature in which they were not represented: 
It may be questioned, whether the ancient Greeks or Romans, or any other nation in 
which slavery was allowed, carried their idea of it much further than this. So that our 
late apprehensions, and universal consternation, on account of ourselves and 
posterity, were far, very far indeed, from being groundless. For what is there in this 
world more wretched, than for those who were born free, and have a right to 
continue so, to be made slaves themselves, and to think of leaving a race of slaves 
behind them; even though it be to masters, confessedly the most humane and 
generous in the world?10  
Though discontent over the Stamp Act was general, it took different forms in 
different people, according to their dispositions: melancholy, consternation and delirium, or 
instinct towards submission. “But the greater part,” Mayhew believed, had been “firmly 
united in a consistent, however imprudent or desperate a plan, to run all risques, to tempt 
all hazards, to go all lengths, if things were driven to extremity, rather than to submit; 
preferring death itself to what they esteemed so wretched and inglourious a servitude.” It 
was not only the white men of the colonies who felt this way. White women were, “I 
imagine, so far metamorphosed into men on this sad occasion, that they would have declined 
hardly any kind of manly exertions, rather than live to propagate a race of slaves, or to be so 
themselves.”11  
And yet a more extraordinary group, Mayhew believed, also opposed the Stamp Act:  
Even our bought Negro slaves apparently shared in the common distress: For which 
one cannot easily account, except by supposing that even some of them saw, that if 
the act took place, their masters might soon be too poor to provide them suitable 
                                                 
10 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 13. 
11 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 18. 
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food and raiment; and thought it would be more ignominious and wretched to be 
the servants of servants, than of free men.12  
The colonists’ primary fear was of a new layer of authority ruling directly over them, 
not from Britain, but from their own shores. They believed that the money collected from 
the Stamp Act would be used to pay civil officers, or to maintain a standing army in America 
that would intimidate them into submission, or to maintain a “standing army of bishops and 
other ecclesiastics.” The result had been tension among the people, the shutting of courts, a 
state of general disorder, and even some committing “abominable excesses and outrages on 
the persons or property of others.”13  
Mayhew, and some others, saw a dark road ahead. They worried this would lead to 
“British subjects making war on British subjects,” and from there the ruin of the colonies 
and the fall of Britain. Popery would be triumphant. “Some of us had, lately, painful 
apprehensions of this kind, when there was talk of a great military force coming to stamp 
America into a particular kind of subjection, to which most people here have an invincible 
aversion.”14  
Now Mayhew, having recreated the despair of the previous autumn, shifted to the 
present—the news of the repeal. That repeal had “restored things to order, and composed 
our minds, by removing the chief ground of our fears.” And for this, he asked, “how great are 
our obligations for it to the supreme Governor of the world?” From honoring God the 
proper next step must be to honor the King. Thus, the colonists should have “a respectful, 
                                                 
12 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 17. 
13 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 18-20. 
14 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 20-22. 
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loyal, and dutiful manner of speech and conduct, respecting his Majesty and his government; 
thereby making a suitable return to him for the redress of our late grievances.” The King’s 
actions, in assenting to the repeal, confirmed his understanding of his proper relation to his 
subjects. It was to be a communion between father and child. The King was not a “tyrant, or 
even master; [the people] are not slaves, or even servants.”15  
The colonists must also pay due respect to the British Parliament. It was clear that 
Parliament had the right to “superintend the general affairs of the colonies, to direct, check, 
or control them.” And Parliament, it was now clear, would listen to humble petitions from 
the colonies, even the colonies speaking as one. Their voices united in the resolves of the 
Stamp Act Congress, had been accompanied by the “spirited resolutions and conduct of the 
American Merchants” in Britain. Parliament could have no doubt that equitable treatment 
would bind the colonies to Britain more surely than any amount of force.16  
The best way to pay respect to King and Parliament would be to behave well in their 
celebrations of the repeal. In doing so, they would frustrate those in America who predicted 
the colonists would grow insolent or triumphant. And Massachusetts, in particular, had an 
obligation. As they had led by calling for a “spirited, tho’ decent and respectful application 
for the redress or our late grievances” (likely referring to the Congress held in New York in 
October), now they should again set “an example of moderation and discretion to other 
colonies.”17  
                                                 
15 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 23-25. 
16 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 25-27. 
17 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 33. 
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Nevertheless, the colonists should not abandon their watch: threats against their 
rights and privileges could appear at any time. It was Mayhew’s hope that even out of the 
evil of the Stamp Act good might come. He had been horrified when, last November, 
“Liberty” had seemed “about to take her final departure from America, and to leave that 
ugly Hag Slavery, the deformed child of Satan, in her room.” But now, he believed, the end 
result of the repeal might even be “confirmation and enlargement” of those liberties.18  
Mayhew hoped that colonists would never abuse the influence they had shown they 
could have when united, nor would they become restless under good treatment by Britain. 
But nor should they “lose a just sense of liberty, or what they may reasonably expect from 
the mother country.” For had they “patiently received the yoke, no one can tell when, or 
whether ever it would have been take off.” Finally, the unity that had led them through the 
crisis of the Stamp Act should be replicated at home. There had been many internecine 
disputes about how to resist the Stamp Act; with the Act’s repeal and their own restoration 
to good relations with Britain, so too should these internal rifts be bridged.19  
The Snare Broken remains extraordinary for the importance it placed on the resolves 
of the Stamp Act Congress, and the power of the colonists petitioning in unison. For this 
directly contradicted the best information that had arrived from Britain. By 17 April news 
had arrived in Boston that the Congress’s petitions had been rejected as coming from 
“persons improperly joined.” It was clear that the Stamp Act Congress had not been 
instrumental in the repeal; if any sort of colonial unity had contributed, it was certainly the 
                                                 
18 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 35-37. 
19 Mayhew, Snare Broken, 38-44. 
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concerted nullification carried out by Sons of Liberty across the continent. Nevertheless, 
Mayhew’s interpretation might have tended to become accepted wisdom. So long as Britain 
did not try again to lay chains on the colonists, it was in the interest of very few to remember 
their actions that led to the repeal.  
 
Despite the defeat of the Stamp Act, the tossing off of chains, not all in the colonies 
were as convinced as Mayhew that a perfect balance of power between Parliament and 
colonies had been achieved. The stirring of such dissent—and the opposition it provoked—
can be seen in the furor over a particular letter published in the New-York Gazette and Weekly 
Post-Boy on 8 May. A writer with the pseudonym “Philatheles” argued that neither 
Parliament nor King had the right to legislate unilaterally for America—never mind lay an 
internal tax on the colonies. Philatheles drew from Pitt’s speech in debate with Grenville 
from January: 
A celebrated patriotic member of the H―se of C―ns has lately and very justly 
ridiculed the idea of virtual representation, boldly denied the right of Great Britain 
to tax America, and yet to my surprize asserts the authority of that Kingdom to 
restrain the trade, manufacture, &c. of the colonies, tho’ he allows this very step may 
raise a revenue, and so be equivalent to a tax.20  
Philatheles’s argument went further than did the consensus colonial position, that 
Parliament could not impose an internal tax on the colonies, but could impose trade duties 
for the empire that affected the colonies. It had become accepted truth in the colonies that 
submission to an internal tax like the Stamp Act was equivalent to slavery. Philatheles, then, 
                                                 
20 New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy, 8 May 1766. 
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tried to show that it was really Parliament’s attempts to legislate that made the colonists 
into slaves, and not simply their imposition of an explicit internal tax.21  
Philatheles argued from analogy: there was no difference between “tying a man’s 
hands and picking his pockets without his consent.” Indeed, the former might be the more 
“slavish,” for it prevented the man from earning any income at all. He argued from British 
law: “the King himself has no right to impose a law of any kind on any of his subjects.” If the 
King could not do so, how could any one part of his subjects impose a law on another part? 
And Philatheles argued from a view of what the future might hold. The colonies were 
growing in population far faster than was Britain. If Britain could legislate for them now, 
why should it not be that, “if America should ever be, as she doubtless will be, more 
populous than Great Britain, she must necessarily take the lead and give Law.”22  
Yet, as the capstone of the essay, Philatheles returned to the key metaphor of his 
time. He declared “…I had rather be a subject to King George, even tho’ he were clothed 
with all the power of an absolute Monarch, than be a slave to his British subjects.” To truly 
avert slavery, then, the colonists must be free to legislate for themselves (and legislation 
included trade duties that raised revenue), and not just to impose their own internal taxes. 
The next issue of the Gazette made it clear readers had been outraged. A short essay 
titled “The Printer to his Readers” discussed Philatheles’s essay. The printer made it clear 
that he had not written the piece. He acknowledged the negative response he had received. 
Yet, he believe the essay was too important to be withheld from the public. He asked 
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readers to “suspend censures” until, next week, he could explain why he had published 
Philatheles. At that time he would publish letters for and against Philatheles’s position.23  
The printer never did; instead he wrote a lengthy defense of his decision to publish 
the essay in the first place. He laid out four objections that readers had made. First, that the 
essay’s doctrine was “not true, nor defensible upon the Principles of Reason and the English 
Constitution.” Second, some readers felt that whatever the piece’s merits, this was not an 
appropriate time to dispute these issues. Third, some thought it was disrespectful to friends 
in England, who had asked the colonists to show proper submission to Parliament and to be 
discreet in their celebrations. It was also ungrateful to Pitt and disobedient to Parliament for 
denying their authority. Finally, a small group who had always disagreed with the sentiments 
expressed in the New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy saw Philatheles’s essay as a 
justification of their suspicions towards the paper.24  
The printer responded to each objection individually. To the first, he said merely 
that he thought the matter sufficiently important to deserve the public’s attention. It was his 
answer to the question of whether this was an appropriate time to publish the piece that 
reveals more about the more radical strains of thought in May of 1766: 
The Author thought this a proper Time; many other Persons are of the same 
Opinion; and the Printer did not think himself at Liberty to control those Opinions. 
The Subjects of this Piece are as yet new to the whole British Nation. They were 
never thought of till the Stamp, and some other late Acts brought them under 
consideration; and the People of England understand them not a whit better than we 
do in America, nor have had any more Experience, or Information, or Opportunities 
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of reasoning upon them. God forbid that any Printer should take upon him to 
obstruct a free Inquiry.25  
And there was no better time to conduct such a “free Inquiry.” Those who agree 
with Philatheles thought it equally true that the English constitution denied Parliament the 
right to legislate for those who had not assented (in person or via representative) as surely as 
it denied them the right to tax. And since these matters were now under consideration, it 
was a good time to settle them on a “firm Foundation.” Surely the English constitution was 
strong enough to withstand such examination, as long as they are expressed, as did 
Philatheles, with “the duty of a loyal subject to his majesty.” Further, the joyous time of the 
repeal was potentially also a time of danger, as those behind previous “machinations” might 
try to gain an advantage: “for Instance, an Acknowledgement from us of the Parliament’s 
Right to Tax us; of that in every other Respect but Taxation, they have an absolute Right to 
make Laws to bind us without our own Consent.” In other words, the danger might be that 
the colonists would acknowledge their rightful subjugation, or that they might be forced into 
such a state. The editor’s phrasing was, though subtly, again the rhetoric of slavery and 
struggle. But, surely (to answer readers’ third objection) their true friends such as the great 
Pitt would always want them to defend themselves, for they believed in all Britons’ “freedom 
to liberty of expression.”26  
Philatheles’s letter and the minor uproar it caused, then, illustrate some of the 
intellectual unrest that was taking place in the colonies. Already, when the Stamp Act—
decried as slavery by colonial assemblies and Sons of Liberty alike—had been defeated, some 
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were asking whether the logic by which the Stamp Act had been understood to be a form of 
slavery did not also apply to other kinds of Parliamentary measure. Such thoughts were at 
this time uncertain: their holders felt the need to work through long chains of questionable 
logic backed with rhetorical tricks in order to make the argument that Parliament had no 
right to legislate for the colonies. Within a few years such reasoning would be conventional. 
Further down the road, during and after the period of the Townsend duties, this 
understanding of Parliamentary right would become a commonplace. Someone calling the 
Boston Port Act “slavery” could just come out and say it, as had, for example, the writer of 
the essays in the Constitutional Courant, or the Sons of Liberty who drafted resolves for their 
towns against the Stamp Act. 
 
The American colonists, following the injunctions of their supporters in Britain, 
celebrated the repeal of the Stamp Act peacefully. They credited Parliament with their 
deliverance; they downplayed their own acts in nullifying the Stamp Act through violence 
and threat. Yet, in retrospect, perhaps the clinching case for the repeal had been the 
testimony before Parliament of the men who had been the victims of those crowd actions. 
When Parliament came back into session in January of 1766 and began, per the King’s 
request, to reconsider the Stamp Act, they gathered as much information as they could. It is 
well known that they took the testimony of British merchants trading to America. But they 
asked the Treasury, the Stamp Office, and the Colonial Office to provide them with the 
documents sent by royal governors and stamp officers that detailed the violence and the 
threats of violence against those who supported the Stamp Act. And Parliament requested 
 221 
testimony from four men who had been the subjects of that violence: Martin Howard, Jr. 
and Thomas Moffatt, whose houses had been attacked in the Newport riot of August; Major 
Thomas James of New York; and Colonel George Mercer of Virginia. Of the four, only 
Mercer had been appointed a stamp officer; Howard and Moffatt had defended the Stamp 
Act with pen and voice while James, commanding Fort George, had tried to protect the 
stamped paper itself.  
The men gave their testimony at the beginning of Februaray 1766, before any votes 
had been taken on whether to repeal the Stamp Act or to enforce it. The documents from 
the crown officers, read to Parliament in the days just preceding, painted a picture of 
colonial cities largely out of British control. And the testimony of the four men who had 
witnessed that colonial unrest confirmed and amplified the fears expressed in the letters. 
Moffatt and Howard told Parliament of attacks by crowds cut free of all authority, crowds 
that nearly destroyed their houses and that did destroy or steal most of their most valued 
possessions. These mobs had “overawed” the better people of the town. There was no 
effective force that could have prevented the riot. Moffatt estimated it would take ten weeks 
or more to outfit a proper command and send it to Newport. And, when asked if those same 
better people would have cooperated with a military force if it existed, the hypothetical 
seemed hardly worth considering. Howard could only repeat, “Our civil authority is very 
weak, military we have none.”27  
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In New York the situation was worse. There a mob of three or four thousand had 
surrounded the fort, threatening an attack. James had, he estimated, twenty-four men to 
defend it. He might have fired on the crowd, killing (he estimated) nine hundred of them, 
but “if that would have intimidated the country I can’t tell.” But he strongly doubted it 
would have been enough to enforce the Stamp Act. He believed that any attempt to use 
military might would have met general resistance. For the areas of New York and the Jerseys 
surrounding the city were well-populated. James explained, “[t]here can be assembled in 
New York and the Jerseys 50,000 fighting men as I have heard. If any small force had been 
used there would have been a general resistance. In two days more there would have been 
20,000 strong. There was no possibility of assembling [British] forces nearer than 200 
miles.”28  
Mercer reported the potential for similar resistance in Virginia. He had stayed in his 
colony until 28 November, a month longer than James and three longer than the Rhode 
Islanders. Yet he found no alteration in their temperament. The Stamp Act, were it to be 
enforced, would certainly meet resistance. Military force would be the only way to enact 
it—and nobody in Virginia would be willing to risk their own lives by executing the Act 
without the backing of such military force.29  
Parliament asked the four men what was behind the colonists’ unexpected resistance 
to the Stamp Act, and if they could be expected to put up similar resistance to other acts 
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they might pass. Here the responses differed by colony. Moffatt and Howard believed that 
the Stamp Act was the principal source of Rhode Islanders’ anger, but that some in that 
colony were also beginning to doubt Parliament’s jurisdiction in other areas. In Rhode 
Island, Moffatt suggested, the distinction between internal and external taxes was less 
important than elsewhere—he had seen the distinction made in newspaper articles, at least. 
Howard believed that “They made no objection while they only taxed by customs. But now 
the whole.” Apparently a justification for the latter was that “they have in Virginia denied all 
taxes.”30   
Yet when the Sugar Act had been passed in 1764, Moffatt remembered “no 
conversation at that time, or complaints about the jurisdiction of Parliament.” And, even 
when a crowd seized Newport’s fort and fired on Royal Navy ships that summer, Moffatt 
believed the cause had been “a dispute about seamen.” The questioner insisted it had been 
about a seizure; Moffatt seemingly shrugged, “Probably it might. There was no punishment 
for it.” Moffatt was right the first time; the crowd had been angered over impressment of 
local seamen into service on the HMS St. John. The seizure of a merchant’s sloop had been 
an entirely different incident.31  
In New York, James indicated that the mob’s resentment was due to two factors, 
both immediate in scope: “One that I should say I would force the Stamp Papers on them 
throughout. The other that I said I would drive them out of town with 24 men.” And in 
Virginia, such resistance was also specific to the Stamp Act.  Three years ago, there had been 
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“not the least breath of disloyalty.” It was never their opinion that British Acts of Parliament 
ought not to be received, “nor now except in the Stamp Act.” (This last, of course, 
contradicted the Rhode Islanders’ interpretation of Virginia’s position).32   
So, in brief, Parliament heard from those who had been on the scene of some of the 
largest acts of resistance to the Stamp Act that the vast majority of the colonists were ready 
to use force, if necessary, to prevent the Stamp Act from being enacted. Thousands had 
already mobbed in New York, and tens of thousands were nearby, numbers corroborated in 
the correspondence of the Sons of Liberty. The letters from crown officers confirmed the 
extent of the resistance. Yet it was also clear that such great resistance was confined to the 
Stamp Act itself, not to any other acts of Parliament, however disliked they might be. The 
Stamp Act, though, could not be enforced without committing military men and materiel to 
the cause. 
The geography of the American colonies thus thwarted enactment of the Stamp Act 
in two ways. As shown in chapter 2, it was the centralized distribution of the stamped papers 
from the port cities that made it possible for crowds to nullify the Act. Perhaps a larger 
military presence could have protected the distributors of the stamps, each in his own 
colony’s capital. But to force Virginia’s justices back to their benches, to oversee their use of 
only stamped papers, throughout the sixty counties of that province—that would surely have 
been beyond the capabilities of even the British army. In proposing the Stamp Act, Britain 
had, without fully considering the implications, created a law that would extend tendrils 
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down the rivers and roads of the colonies, reaching the merchants and especially the 
courthouses scattered across the countryside. To exert control over such a decentralized 
system would surely have cost far more than the Act ever would have brought in revenue. A 
model that might have worked in Britain, with a greater population packed into a smaller 
area and with more and larger cities, was not effective in the colonies.  
Small wonder, then, that Parliament chose instead to repeal the Stamp Act. But, 
even if colonial resistance and the threat of more should enforcement be attempted had been 
the keys to the repeal, it would be difficult for Parliament to acknowledge that. Instead, they 
found a way to save face. They emphasized Americans’ more moderate actions: the non-
importation agreements among some merchants in a handful of cities and the potential 
economic damage that the loss of the American market would do to British merchants and 
manufacturers. The correspondents to merchants in the colonies wrote of the planned 
repeal, and asked for calm celebration and due deference to Parliament, on threat of losing 
their remaining friends in Britain. For the colonists, there was no reason not to express such 
gratitude. The repeal of the Stamp Act had been the whole object of their resistance. 
 
Yet it was those statements by Howard and Moffatt, James and Mercer—that 
brought home to Parliament the extent of the uprising against the Stamp Act. Added to 
letters from colonial governors and stamp officers echoing the same themes, the testimony 
forced Parliament to choose between repeal and a military suppression of a revolt. And even 
then, the statements also hinted at the rifts that would over the next decade widen between 
the colonies and the mother country. 
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For the differences in the testimony of Howard and Moffatt from that of James and 
Mercer showed that the merchants and seamen of Rhode Island had a very different 
relationship with imperial power than did the gentlemen of Virginia, or even the artisans of 
New York. Both New Yorkers and Virginians were willing to resist with force attempts to 
impose a particular new layer of taxes upon them, taxes collected by a new level of official—
the stamp officers. But Rhode Islanders believed they had been dealing with such force for 
the past year and more. They had relied on coercion and threat in the past to vex customs 
officials; they were used to resisting the impressment of their seamen onto Royal Navy 
vessels. For colonists less dependent on ocean-borne trade, the Sugar Act and similar acts 
were merely trade duties. Rhode Islanders, though, found them enforced with the same vigor 
as would be an internal tax like the Stamp Act. What difference, then, should be made 
between the two? The distinction between internal and external tax, clear enough in the 
abstract and accepted as such across the colonies, became far less clear when both were the 
leading edge of British military might.33  
And it was such might, enforcing British acts with coercive power, that was at the 
heart of all colonial fears: standing armies; increased enforcement by the Royal Navy; tighter 
restraints on settlement across the Appalachians; even the possibility of a network of bishops 
for America. Coercion of these sorts could be, and were, argued to be no better than slavery. 
This theme of bondage, and struggle against bondage was returned to, again and again, by 
those writing and speaking against the Stamp Act, from the version of the Virginia Resolves 
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printed in the Newport Mercury and Maryland Gazette, to the Constitutional Courant 
distributed anonymously in New York as the crisis there came to a head, to the Sons of 
Liberty in town after town declaring their intention to struggle against those chains. After 
the Act was repealed and the rift with Britain healed, slavery was invoked less, yet Jonathan 
Mayhew’s broken snare and the chains held by Bute and Grenville on Paul Revere’s obelisk 
show that the dangers of the Act were not forgotten. 
Nine years after those celebrations of the repeal, British redcoats would attempt a 
raid on colonial military supplies at Concord, Massachusetts. The result was the battles of 
Lexington and Concord, and the iconic “first shots of the American Revolution.” Though 
they could not have known, the Massachusetts minutemen were echoing an oration of a 
month before. For in March, at a meeting of the Virginia House of Burgesses at St. John’s 
Church in Richmond, Patrick Henry had risen and with passion declared, “Give me liberty 
or give me death!”34   
Those seven words, the climax of Henry’s speech, are famous; but how many 
remember what preceded it? For Henry spoke about slavery: neither the bondage of Africans 
on the plantations of the South nor in the seaports of the North, but the oppression under 
which Britain wished to lay the colonies. Britain’s armed forces menacing the colonies were 
“implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort.” They were 
sent to “bind and rivet upon us those chains which the British ministry have been so long 
forging.” Argument, so long tried, had failed. Now only arms were left: “If we wish to be free 
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… we must fight! … There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are 
forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable—and let 
it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come.”35  
Henry finished, 
It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace—but 
there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the 
north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in 
the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they 
have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and 
slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for 
me, give me liberty or give me death!36  
We remember Henry positing a decision between liberty and death. But, calling to 
mind only the last clause of his oration, we forget all that led up to it. The choice between 
liberty and death was not, truly, any choice at all, merely a consequence of the real decision. 
And that had been, not between liberty and death, but between slavery and struggle. To 
prevent themselves from being chained, the colonists must resist, with arms. They must set 
foot upon the battlefield and prove to themselves and the world that they refused to be 
subjugated—and, in that refusal, proved themselves to be not slaves at all, but free men.  
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